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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Consent is a concept used frequently and with great significance in a wide array of legal 
fields. It serves to regulate relationships, legitimize authority, delimit normality, and 
entrench idealized ways of being in the world. Yet despite the consequence of these 
functions, there is very little precision within legal scholarship about just what consent 
is. Few investigations of its definitional content depart from presumptive statements 
about personal autonomy.  These associations are often described as the ‘common 
sense’ of consent and serve to secure a foundationalist discourse about what consent is, 
rendering alternative conceptions of its meaning or functions unintelligible.  This is 
perhaps best evidenced in more critical approaches to consent, where despite 
widespread acknowledgement of the concept as a legal and political fiction, its status as 
a signifier of autonomy is maintained.  This creates an imperative to move beyond the 
notion of consent as merely an illusion, to an understanding of it as something more 
operative.  Not only does the story of autonomy that is told about consent obscure the 
social realities of inequality, difference, and subordination that might threaten a notion 
of a homogenous citizenry (and thus, governmental action made in its name), but it also 
conceals the  historically specific conditions of existence which have brought consent’s 
‘common sense’ story of autonomy into being.  This thesis explores how this dominant 
narrative of consent, while producing certain ‘ideal’ subjectivities, also necessarily 
produces subjectivities which don’t fall within the ambit of consent.  Moreover, this 
project asks what is achieved when the meaning of consent is positioned as a matter of 
‘common sense’?  What does its apparent transparency keep obscure?  
 
In contrast to conventional approaches to consent, this project positions consent as an 
historical artefact rather than a concept with doctrinal, cognitive, or communicative 
certainty and seeks to investigate its operations across legal fields rather than strictly 
within them. This includes an examination of consent to sex, the doctrine of informed 
consent in medical jurisprudence, and the defence of consent to assault in professional 
sporting contexts.  Further, the project engages in a ‘juridical genealogy’ of consent, 
studying its use in three vastly different historical periods in search of how it might 
perform different socio-political functions than understandings of its role within 
contemporary medical and criminal law suggest it should. How these counter-narratives 
of consent serve to challenge the dominant autonomy story are investigated for what 
they reveal about the frames of cultural and legal intelligibility at work in consent law 
today. 
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This one’s for JR. 
 
 
JOE: I was looking for you. Where were you? 
MAG: Waiting for you. 
 
 
- Brian Friel, Lovers (1967) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
We tend to invoke ‘consent’ to talk about personal subjects that matter a great 
deal to us. And we are able to do so because consent is a protean concept that 
takes diverse and shifting shapes depending upon the context.  Yet because we 
are often only dimly aware of the shifting content of consent, we end up talking 
past one another – and, even worse, contradicting one another – without being 
aware of it.
 1
 
 
 
Everyone, it seems, is talking about consent. International campaigns for the prevention 
of sexual assault proclaim that ‘consent is sexy,’ charting a course away from the 
rhetoric of ‘just say no.’2  Sports leagues, under fire for failing to adequately protect 
players from in-game violence, rely on judicial determinations of a player’s right to 
consent to injury.
3
 News sources around the globe recently debated the limits of 
physicians’ standards of care when Canada’s highest court declared that consent is 
required for the withdrawal of treatment,
4
 while leading legal scholars have claimed the 
past century as an ‘era of consent.’5 Yet as the opening excerpt from Peter Westen’s 
work suggests, legal scholarship often makes a claim of uncertainty about just what 
consent is and about what, exactly, it is meant to do. This ‘shifting content’ is rather 
astounding given the consequential place consent holds in law, both in terms of the 
functions it is thought to perform and the wide array of legal sub-fields within which it 
operates.  Consent is used to assess when property has been equitably traded, bodily 
contact lawfully made, and levels of personal integrity and cognitive awareness 
adequately reached.  It is seen as a central factor in the regulation of relationships, the 
                                                          
1
 Peter Westen, The Logic of Consent (Ashgate, Aldershot 2004), vii. 
2
 See, for instance, the international campaign website at: <www.consentissexy.net/> Last accessed: 16 
December 2013. 
3
 See, for example: R. v. Barnes [2005] 1 Cr App Rep 507; and case commentary by M. James, ‘Player 
Violence and Compensation for Injury: R. v. Barnes [2005] Cr. App. Rep. 507’ in J. Anderson (ed) 
Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press 2013) and S. Weimer, ‘Consent and Right Action in Sport’ 
(2012) 39(1) Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 11.  
4
 Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53. 
5
 See: J. Oliffe, et. al. ‘“Truth Telling” and Cultural Assumptions in an Era of Informed Consent’ (2007) 
30(1) Family & Community Health 5; and S. Wolf, ‘Toward a Systematic Theory of Informed Consent in 
Managed Care’ (1999) 35 Houston Law Review 1631.  
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establishment of political communities, and the constitution of subjectivity.  For 
political theorists, it is the very foundation for legitimate state authority.  Consent is 
described in law as a doctrine, device, defence, excuse, justification, process, signifier, 
and even a form of ‘moral magic’6 and it is employed in as vast an array of applications 
as the diversity of law allows, including contract, tort, criminal, medical, family, 
property, constitutional and administrative law, among others.   
 
Amidst such breadth of scope and significance, it is troubling that consent’s content and 
scope is not defined with more specificity; yet, this is hardly a new problem. Knowing 
the ‘inner will’ of another (and evaluating its authenticity) has long been a matter of 
contemplation among philosophers and legal theorists alike.
7
 Further, law has 
recognized the impossibility of knowing a person’s ‘true’ inner intentions while 
simultaneously acknowledging the necessity for a means of approximating this ideal.
8
  
Legal scholarship contains many instances where the law’s failures in this 
approximation project have been recognized, along with the harms that ensue.
9
  Despite 
an awareness of these failures and a difficulty in establishing the exact content or scope 
of consent, the law has imbued consent with a certain truth, a ‘common sense’ about 
what it means, signifies, and does.  In this way, consent operates with what H.L.A. Hart 
described as an ‘open texture,’  similar to how one might be familiar enough with the 
roads and routes through a town so as to have put them to memory ‘without being able 
                                                          
6
 H. Hurd, ‘The moral magic of consent’ (1992) 2(2) Legal Theory 121. 
7
 St. Thomas Aquinas’ own struggles with this challenge (and his reflections on Aristotle’s views on 
knowledge of the ‘inner will’) are explored in further detail in Chapter Three. 
8
 The use of the reasonable person standard is an example of an explicit avoidance of the dilemma, but 
more nuanced instances of law’s struggles with needing to know the inner will of another can be observed 
in a variety of legal areas. The inference of the requisite mens rea from the circumstances of an offence in 
the criminal law of attempts is one example. 
9
 Some of these instances are explored in greater detail in Chapter One. 
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to draw a map’ of them.10  This results in consent being treated somewhat paradoxically 
in law, where it is deemed to have a ‘shifting content’ while simultaneously treated as 
having a straightforward meaning – one rooted in personal autonomy.  The ensuing 
discussion seeks to interrogate this claim of clarity.  What is achieved when the 
meaning of consent is positioned as a matter of ‘common sense’?  What does its 
apparent transparency keep obscure?
11
  The present work takes up these questions, 
interrogating the tacit operations of power, discipline, and normativity that are effected 
by the use of consent in law. 
 
Specifying the inquiry 
The current project concerns itself with the concept of ‘consent’12 as it is used and 
theorized in law. This topic is conventionally approached in one of three ways. The first 
might be described as a standardization project where a description of consent’s internal 
‘logic’ or a set of guiding principles about its operation in a given field is sought so as 
to determine when consent is ‘found’ and what circumstances might serve to vitiate it.13  
These analyses are often normatively driven, with aims of critiquing and reforming how 
consent operates in theory
14
 or legal and clinical practice.
15
  Secondly, investigations of 
                                                          
10
 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer’ 
(1957) 105 Univ. of Penn. L.R. 953, 956-957. Hart is not referring explicitly to consent in this piece but 
rather to a variety of legal concepts which he felt were approached with a certain ambiguity  – something 
he suggests is a consequence of analytical jurisprudence itself. 
11
 These questions are versions of those asked by Judith Butler in her 1999 Preface to Gender Trouble 
(10
th
 anniversary edition), where she suggests ‘[t]he demand for lucidity forgets the ruses that motor the 
ostensibly ‘clear’ view… What travels under the sign of ‘clarity’?... Who devises the protocols of ‘clarity’ 
and whose interests do they serve?’; J. Butler, Gender Trouble (10th ann edn, Routledge 1999), xix. 
12
 For the purpose of avoiding an overly clumsy text, I hereafter avoid the use of shudder quotes around 
the term consent; however, the term should be considered to be in a consistent state of contestation 
throughout the ensuing discussion. 
13
 See: Westen (n 1); and M. Cowling and P. Reynolds (eds), Making Sense of Sexual Consent (Ashgate 
2004). 
14
 R. Hunter and S. Cowan, (eds) Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with law and subjectivity 
(Routledge-Cavendish, New York 2004); D. Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory (The 
University of Chicago Press 1989).  
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consent can take the form of a comparative analysis, where general surveys are 
conducted of how consent is defined or can be seen to function across diverse areas of 
its application, often with the similar aim of providing alternatives to these operations.
16
 
The third approach is the theoretical reconstruction of consent, involving historical 
accounts,
17
 philosophical ontologies,
18
 or what some have simply termed 
‘jurisprudential analysis.’19  
 
This project shares some components with each of these three approaches, including the 
examination of consent as it is used in more than one sub-field of law and the 
exploration of alternative theoretical accounts of the concept’s operations and effects 
within these fields. Yet, as a whole, this project does not belong to any of these 
investigatory camps given its refusal to treat consent as a self-evident, pre-existent, and 
pre-juridical aspect of socio-political life or human psychology. This thesis is instead 
interested in exploring consent as a product of human relations that in particular 
historical contexts comes to house pervasive, truth-telling meanings about human 
activity and personhood. It seeks to position consent as an historical artefact rather than 
a concept with doctrinal, cognitive, or communicative certainty and thus moves away 
from traditional legal inquiries into what is said about consent towards an examination 
of what consent can be seen to do. More specifically, I want to show how the concept 
                                                                                                                                                                          
15
 R. West, ‘Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape’ (1992) 93(6) Colum. L. Rev. 
1442; P. Schuck, ‘Rethinking Informed Consent’ (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 899; T. Beauchamp and 
J.F. Childress, Principles of Bioethics, (6
th
 ed, OUP 2008). 
16
 K. van Marle, ‘The politics of consent, friendship, and sovereignty’ in Hunter and Cowan (n14); G. 
Calder, ‘The language of refusal: Sexual consent and the limits of post-structuralism’ in Cowling and 
Reynolds (n 13). 
17
 P. Haag, Consent: Sexual Rights and the Transformation of American Liberalism. (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999). 
18
 B. Kious, The Evidentiary Account of Consent’s Moral Significance. (PhD Dissertation, University of 
California 2009). 
19
 S. Cowan, ‘“Freedom and Capacity to Make a Choice”: A feminist analysis of consent in the criminal 
law of rape’ in V. Munro and C. Stychin (ed) Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements (Routledge, 
NY 2007). 
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functions to establish norms of intelligibility that bring particular subjectivities into 
existence while leaving others outside this frame of recognisability.
20
  
 
Admittedly, it is unusual for an examination of the law’s treatment of consent to begin 
from the premise of telling a story about otherness.  Most histories of difference focus 
on categories of persons or identities which position certain groups in either marginal or 
external positions to a ‘presumed (and usually unstated) norm.’21  This thesis, however, 
enters the scene of consent theorising with three atypical contentions. First, that a series 
of unspoken presumptions about what is ‘normal’ human behaviour, cognitive capacity, 
communication strategy, and even the core components of recognisable personhood 
operate within contemporary treatments of consent in all areas of its legal application.
22
 
These articulations of consent and its pre-requisites in both moral philosophy and law 
reflect a foundation in a certain understanding of reason, particularly in terms of which 
persons or mental states can be excluded from consenting capacity, namely children, the 
mentally ‘impaired,’ or the ‘coerced.’  Where the desires, behaviours, or subjectivities 
of those seeking consent venture too far off the beaten path, the capacity to consent is 
denied.  Thus the few legislative definitions of consent that exist prioritise certain 
determinations of capacity that are in alignment with the ‘common sense’ of consent, 
i.e. informed, voluntary, and rational action.  The United Kingdom’s recently amended 
                                                          
20
 Here I employ the somewhat awkward term of ‘recognisability’ in lieu of ‘recognition’ to invoke Judith 
Butler’s use of the term as a form of state-sanctioned or enacted intelligibility. I also employ it to engage 
in what Butler has suggested is an obligation on scholars in the humanities to ‘question common sense, 
interrogate its tacit presumptions and provoke new ways of looking at a familiar world.’ I am persuaded 
by her suggestion that ‘[l]anguage that takes up this challenge can help point the way to a more socially 
just world.’ Thus, I employ the use of these types of linguistic ‘stumbling blocks’ to momentarily halt the 
reader, invoking opportunities for reflection and a re-thinking of the ‘common sense’; J. Butler, ‘A “Bad 
Writer” Bites Back’ New York Times (Op-Ed) 20 March 1999, A29. 
21
 J. Scott, ‘The Evidence of Experience’ (1991) 17 Critical Inquiry 773. 
22
 This includes medical law’s doctrine of informed consent, the defence of consent found in criminal and 
tort law analyses of assault, and the valuation of equitable exchange that consent is thought to signify in 
contract law. 
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Sexual Offences Act,
23
 for instance, defines consent as a matter of agreement by ‘choice’ 
where one ‘has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’24 Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines consent as an ‘agreement, approval, or permission as to some act or 
purpose, especially given voluntarily by a competent person.’25  And in their well-
regarded delineation of the four basic principles of bioethics, Beauchamp and Childress 
identify ‘autonomy’ as foremost, linking it with the Greek etymology of ‘self rule,’ and 
manifested as voluntary choice(s) made by a competent, informed, and rational 
individual.
26
  Even where the courts have ruled against the defence on the basis of 
public policy concerns,
27
 the availability of consent has hinged on the ‘reasonableness’ 
of the defendant’s conduct, where the would-be consenter’s rationality can be vitiated 
by the ‘unwritten rules of the game’28 or the unintelligibility of her conduct (e.g. self-
harm or sadomasochistic activities). 
 
Second, these unstated norms are both concealed and produced by the paradoxical 
character of consent as a concept (or doctrine or defence, etc.) which is difficult to 
define yet integral to determining the limits of human action in almost every sub-field of 
law.  As Emily Sherwin has argued: ‘[i]t is in the nature of law that law can and must 
determine whether consent has occurred, even if no one is sure just what consent is.’29 
This problem of definitional elusiveness is compounded by a focus within consent 
                                                          
23
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42), United Kingdom. 
24
 SOA (n 23), s. 74. 
25
 B.A. Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (West Group 1999), 300. 
26
 T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5
th
 ed. (OUP 2001), 67. 
27
 See the English case, R. v. Brown (1993) 2 All. E.R. 75 where the House of Lords did not permit the 
defence of consent in a case involving sadomasochism given the lack of ‘good reason’ for the injuries 
caused.  Similar arguments have been accepted in the arena of sporting activities, see the Canadian cases: 
Cey, (1989) 48 C.C.C. 3d 480 (Sask. C.A.), Cicarelli (1989) 54 C.C.C. 3d 121 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), Leclerc 
(1991) 67 C.C.C. 3d. 563 (Ont. C.A.) and the English case, R. v. Barnes (n 3).  These ‘public policy’ 
arguments are subject to a longer discussion in the following chapters, specifically Chapters One, Four, 
and Five. 
28
 See: Cey, (n 27); Cicarelli  (n 27); Leclerc (n 27); and McSorley [2000] BCPC 117 (CanLII) (all cases 
arising from assaults within the context of an ice hockey game.) 
29
 E. Sherwin, ‘Infelicitious Sex’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 209, 229. 
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jurisprudence on what consent is not (e.g. coercion), rather than what it is.
30
  This is 
well evidenced by the backgrounders to the consent provisions in the Sexual Offences 
Act, including the Home Office Report, Setting the Boundaries
31
 and the White Paper, 
Protecting the Public,
32
 which established the government’s ‘blueprint for legislation.’33 
Despite a declaration that the aim of the statutory revisions was to make consent ‘clear 
and unambiguous,’ the legislative approach taken was to delineate a set of (rebuttable) 
circumstances in which ‘non-consent’ would be presumed, while maintaining the 
defence’s right to argue that consent still existed.34  Further, much of the scholarship 
that does address the content of consent (rather than its negative) – in fields as diverse 
as neurobiology and philosophy – has concerned itself with the circumstantial aspects of 
consent (e.g. how is it conveyed) rather than its meaning.
35
  The content of consent is 
left to presumptions about its heralded foundation in personal autonomy and free 
action.
36
  
 
                                                          
30
 For example, Pamela Haag  suggests two means by which sexual consent is defined and interpreted.  
First, through an enumeration of the ‘parameters, physical conditions, and events’ of what constitutes 
violence; and second, with an emphasis on the self-evident utterances of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (n 17), xv.  Paul 
Reynolds makes a marked departure from this approach in his chapter, ‘The Quality of Consent’ in 
Cowling and Reynolds (n 13). 
31
 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences. (Home Office, London, July 
2000). 
32
 Home Office, Protecting the Public: Strengthening protecting against sex offenders and reforming the 
law on sexual offences. (White Paper, Cm. 5668, 2002). 
33
 J. Temkin and A. Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults, and the 
Problems of Consent’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 328, 333. 
34
 As Temkin and Ashworth note, this approach required ‘that, once the prosecution had established 
beyond reasonable doubt that one of the listed circumstances existed, the burden of proof would then lie 
on the defence to prove consent on the balance of probabilities,’ (n 33), 333. Therefore, in its attempt to 
make consent as ‘clear and unambiguous’ as possible, the Sexual Offences Act did not define consent (in 
any way beyond an ‘agreement to make a choice’) but instead listed a set of (rebuttable) circumstances in 
which non-consent will be presumed. 
35
 Cowling and Reynolds (n 13). 
36
 That is, where academic treatments and uses of ‘consent’ offer an examination of its meaning – most 
don’t. See for example: T.P. Humphreys and E. Herold, ‘Should Universities and Colleges Mandate 
Sexual Behavior? Student Perceptions of Antioch College’s Consent Policy’ (2003) 15 Journal of 
Psychology & Human Sexuality 35; C. Elliott and C. De Than, ‘The Case for a Rational Reconstruction of 
Consent in Criminal Law’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 225.  Similar sources are also identified by M. 
A. Beres, ‘“Spontaneous” Sexual Consent: An Analysis of Sexual Consent Literature’ (2007) 17(1) 
Feminism & Psychology 93.  Notable exceptions include Haag (n 17) and Cowling and Reynolds (n 13).  
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These ‘foundations’ are often described as the ‘common sense’ meaning of consent37 
and represent the third contention guiding this thesis: that where attempts to offer 
definitions of consent do appear, they emerge from and within a discourse which 
prioritises a certain kind of freedom enacted by or belonging to certain kinds of 
subjects.  This constitutes what I describe as the ‘consent-as-autonomy story’ – a 
narrative that has gained such widespread adoption that alternative accounts of the 
meaning of consent are not simply unintelligible, but non-existent.  In this respect, 
consent acts as a ‘joker card,’ serving fairly different purposes depending on the 
context.
38
 Legal assessments of the capacity for consent continue to be affected by one’s 
sexual orientation,
39
 marital status
40
, and religious affiliations or beliefs.
41
  The 
decisions of bipolar patients (including one who claimed to speak regularly with extra-
terrestrials) to discontinue treatment have been upheld by the same courts which have 
determined Jehovah’s Witness patients to lack the capacity for consent (and thus 
treatment refusal) on the basis that their judgment was impaired by the ‘undue 
influence’ of their religious community.42  While criminal law has emphatically 
forbidden the use of the doctrine of implied consent in sexual assault cases, injuries on 
the sports field are excluded from criminal prosecution on the basis that consent is 
implicitly given by mere participation in the game. What these fluctuations in meaning 
and application suggest is that despite claims to consent’s common sense, there is very 
                                                          
37
 In her survey of sexual consent literature, Beres likens this to Bourdieu’s conception of ‘spontaneous 
sociology,’ where the presumed meanings of a concept are adopted without critical assessment of ‘the 
cultural, historical, and social forces that produced these meanings,’ (n 36), 95. 
38
 Mariana Valverde uses this term to refer to certain key terms in Canadian judicial discourse (such as 
‘risk of harm’) in cases involving the legal regulation of sexuality (e.g. obscenity); M. Valverde, ‘The 
Harms of Sex and the Risks of Breasts: Obscenity and Indecency in Canadian Law’ (1999) 8(2) Social & 
Legal Studies 181, 184.  
39
 See, for instance, the recent debates and literature surrounding Britain’s equalization of the age of 
consent for homosexual and heterosexual persons in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 amendments. 
40
 See s. 150.1(2.1)(b) of Canada’s Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, C-46. 
41
  B.H. (Next friend of) v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare), 2002 ABQB 371. 
42
 See Starson v. Swayze, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722 and  B.H., (n 41) respectively. 
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little about its use or meaning in law that is stable. What, then, is served by claims to the 
contrary?   
 
While the ensuing discussion attempts to answer this inquiry in further detail, certainly 
one observable aim that assertions of consent’s ‘transparent’ meaning accomplishes is 
the establishment of the consent-as-autonomy story to the exclusion of all other 
narratives.
43
 This is explored in depth in Chapter One. The following section provides a 
preliminary overview of this narrative's basic assumptions. 
 
Autonomy: The common sense of consent 
The few in-depth analyses of the laws and practices surrounding consent that exist can 
be organized into three general disciplinary areas, namely: (i) political theory (wherein 
we find the original contract model); (ii) criminal law (largely focused on sexual 
consent and defences to assault); and (iii) medical law (where much of the literature 
addresses the doctrine of informed consent to treatment and intervention).
44
  While this 
literature encompasses a wide array of perspectives, I would suggest that each is 
embedded in a discourse in which the content and scope of consent are delineated using 
a grammar of rational agency and possessive individualism. In these accounts, consent 
is configured as autonomy itself or, in the more critical analyses, as an inefficient model 
for reaching this ideal of self-governance. In both instances, the self-determining 
individual is maintained (if only, in more critical approaches, with an aim of 
                                                          
43
 The establishment of this narrative as ‘common sense’ is explored in further detail in Chapter One.  Its 
relationship to the establishment of neoliberal rationality as a foundationalist discourse is discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
44
 Various specialized examinations of topical issues included within these treatises (e.g. age of consent) 
are also available although none, to my knowledge, attempt to examine consent across these three areas. 
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dismantling it).
45
 This can be seen in even the most general summaries or treatments of 
consent,  where its substantive content is aligned with the notion of capacity – an ability 
which, to be recognizable, must be exercised in reasonable or prescribed ways 
(reminiscent of the ‘freedom’ of the social contract.)   
 
In his text, The Law of Consent, Peter W. Young suggests that most legal dictionary 
offerings on the term consent encircle three central elements, emerging from 
Fonblanque’s 18th century Treatise on Equality46 and delineated in Jowitt’s Law 
Dictionary as ‘a physical power, a mental power, and a free and serious use of them.’47  
For consent to be established, these elements are to be employed in ‘an act of reason 
accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in a balance the good or evil on 
either side.’48  These components of competency, rational willing, and moral standing 
are summarised in David Archard’s Principle of Consensuality which states that ‘a 
practice, P, is morally permissible if all those who are parties to P are competent to 
consent, give their valid consent, and the interests of no other parties are significantly 
harmed.’49 While Archard notes the need to clarify certain phrases within this general 
principle (e.g. ‘valid consent,’ or ‘competent’), he does attempt to identify some general 
conditions about the doctrine which flow from its ‘moral significance’ and its scope.  
This moral characteristic within both Canadian and British case law and secondary 
literature often houses explications of the necessary conditions of transforming an 
illegitimate transaction or event into a legitimate one, a transformation evoked by Heidi 
                                                          
45
 See, for instance, Hunter and Cowan’s  compilation which is organized around an understanding of 
‘choice and consent as defining attributes of the sovereign, self-interested, masculine, liberal subject’ (n 
14), 1. 
46
 Specifically, Book 1, Ch. 2, s.1. 
47
 As cited in P. W. Young, The Law of Consent. (Law Book Co 1986), 13. 
48
 Young (n 47), 13. 
49
 D. Archard, Sexual Consent (Westview Press,  Boulder, CO 1998), 2. 
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Hurd with the term ‘moral magic.’50  Thus the mere presence of a party’s ‘willingness’ 
to agree, assent,
51
 or acquiesce,
 52
 is insufficient to satisfy consent’s normative 
requirement.  This mental state must be enacted (or performed)
53
 in contexts and ways 
which are recognised, at law, as demonstrating a certain form of capacity.   
 
This capacity is presumed, at least in the first instance, to exist in all persons.  As a 
guardian against tyrannical rule and arbitrary exercises of power, Locke envisioned this 
inalienable right to liberty of each person as both the rationale and the means of state 
legitimacy, subject to limitation so as to maximize human welfare and prevent 
(unjustifiable) injury. Law, for Locke, was thus a means of ‘confin[ing] the liberty [all 
persons] had by the Law of Nature.’54  Yet to ensure acceptance of these confines and 
prevent their abuse, liberal understandings of state sovereignty suggest that these 
limitations must themselves be expressions of freedom, i.e. the acts of autonomous 
subjects.  Consent emerges in these treatments as a signification of this autonomy, a 
means of participating in self-governance, and, as some authors have suggested, a 
marker of the boundaries of state power.
55
   
 
                                                          
50
 Hurd (n 6). 
51
  Archard distinguishes between ‘consent’ and ‘assent’ by suggesting the former is an agreement to a set 
of conditions whereas the latter is an agreement with, (n 49), 5. This distinction rests on an understanding 
of consent as a mental state made manifest (often through action).  Other scholars support this view, see 
Young (n 47), 24. 
52
 See, for example, Robin West, (n15). 
53
 See H. Malm, ‘The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law of Rape’ (1996) 2 
Legal Theory 147, where she argues that consent is a ‘signifier.’   
54
 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (first published 1689, Peter Laslett tr, CUP 1963), 2.129;  as 
cited in K. McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent (Cornell University 
Press 1996), 250. 
55
 ‘It is this notion [of consent] that is usually advanced as the minimal ground for differentiating between 
a “legitimate” or “acceptable” polity and its tyrannical or despotic counterpart’:  McClure, (n 54), 2. 
McClure attributes these terms to Martin Seliger in The Liberal Politics of John Locke (Frederick Praeger, 
NY 1969) and John Dunn in The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument 
of the ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (CUP 1969). 
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The subject who is thought to perform consent is the basis for many of the critiques of 
these accounts of consent-as-autonomy which take issue with the individualistic account 
of agency and its demand to be ‘left alone.’ With a view to the social character of 
human lives and decision-making processes, theories of a ‘relational’ autonomy have 
emerged which emphasize the need to consider the circumstances and relationships in 
which choices are made.
56
  The difficulty these relationists identify with conventional 
approaches to consent is the equation of autonomy with mere choice.
57
 This view, while 
often associated with the writings of John Stuart Mill, doesn’t capture the meaning of 
Mill’s notion of individuality, which required ‘persons to “own” or identify with certain 
desires, to cultivate certain feelings and impulses rather than others, thereby becoming 
well-developed human beings.’58  The normative (and exclusive) consequences of this 
model are easily noted; freedom to choose is limited by the circumstances in which the 
consenting subject finds herself, a notion hinted at in Slavoj Žižek’s critique of the 
social contract’s ‘corporatist fantasy’ of a homogenous populace.59 The vision of 
autonomy as freedom from state interference fails to account for disenfranchised 
members of a society who do not enjoy the minimal pre-conditions for political life and, 
according to some critics, serves to privatize inequality.
60
  As Jackson and Sclater have 
noted, privacy is a sphere of life respected for the space it provides an individual to 
make choices and self-determine away from ‘the critical gaze of others,’ to the benefit 
of the socio-economically privileged and the detriment of those that remain.
61
  In these 
instances, some form of state interference is needed to create the conditions for 
                                                          
56
 J. Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of 
Law and Feminism 7; E. Jackson and S. Day-Sclater, ‘Introduction: Autonomy and Private Life’ in S.D. 
Sclater et. al. (eds) Regulating Autonomy: Sex, Reproduction, and Family (Hart Publishing 2009). 
57
 O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 2002). 
58
 O’Neill (n 57), 30.  O’Neill notes that Mill ‘hardly ever uses the word autonomy’ in his writing and 
never in relation to individuals (as opposed to state action, to which O’Neill notes only a passing 
reference.) 
59
 S. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso 1989), 126. 
60
 C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press 1988). 
61
 Jackson and Sclater (n 56), 1. 
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autonomous action or, as Joseph Raz has argued, autonomy needs to be more than the 
simple power to choose, but ‘an adequate range of choices.’62  
 
Despite the persuasiveness of these critiques of autonomy, their application to 
considerations of consent has largely resulted in the reformulation (and expansion) of 
the procedural requirements of consent, thus leaving its foundations in autonomy intact.  
One example is O’Neill’s observation of how critiques of the embedded hierarchical 
relationship between patients and physicians have established a preeminent status for 
patient autonomy.  Yet this has not led to an elaborate logic of character-building 
choices and reflective decision-making (à la Mill) or to a more communitarian approach 
to doctor-patient conversations. Instead, the result has been the development of 
elaborate procedural requirements to establish informed consent which amount to little 
more than a series of checked boxes.
63
 Further, patients’ resistance to or interrogation of 
these technical requirements is subject to scrutiny on the basis of reasonableness, itself a 
standard informed by understandings of the self-interested individual.
64
  In these 
instances, the foundationalist character of the consent-as-autonomy story is evident in 
that particular premises or categories are left unstated and unquestioned and indeed are 
unquestionable as a result of their presumed permanence and ahistoricity.
65
 The result is 
the creation of a ‘common ground’ of analysis where the evaluative terms of reference 
                                                          
62
 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 373. 
63
 O’Neill (n 58). 
64
 As Lori Beaman has suggested within the context of religious freedom to refuse medical treatment, the 
margins of the ‘reasonable’ patient are demarcated by articulations of risk and excess.  The law’s 
assessment of what behaviour might fall into excessive categories of risk is informed (often explicitly) by 
a presumed shared understanding or common sense ‘community standards’: L. Beaman, Defining Harm: 
Religious Freedom and the Limits of the Law (UBC Press 2008).  Beaman’s research focuses exclusively 
on court assessments of consenting capacity in cases involving religious objections to medical treatment; 
however, an example of the same practice at work in criminal law contexts can be found in the case of R. 
v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, a Canadian Supreme Court of Canada decision which decided the confines 
of obscenity on a ‘national community standard relat[ing] to harm not taste.’ This qualifier hints at the 
protection of the private sphere as a space free from state intervention unless justified under threat of 
harm. This is the foundation of the social contract – the surrendering of certain inalienable rights for the 
‘common good.’ 
65
 Scott (n 21). 
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must themselves serve to both ‘authorize and legitimize analysis; indeed, analysis seems 
not to be able to proceed without them.’66  In such a context, it is all but impossible to 
theorize about consent without invoking its story of autonomy.  Many other (largely 
feminist) writers have sought a means to address questions of inequality and oppression 
outside these terms of reference, contending that a need exists for a ‘postindividualist 
concept of freedom.’67  Yet finding the means of approaching this without re-engaging 
with the discursive foundations of autonomy is challenging.  Articulations of consent in 
non-autonomy terms are absent from legal and theoretical discourse.      
 
As such, an understanding of consent as a ‘homeland’ for self-governance is awarded a 
commonplace status, if not religious observance in law; moreover, there is a form of 
‘fetishism’ to these rather opaque conceptualizations of consent in so far as these 
meanings are disconnected from the processes that brought them into being.  They 
appear, to quote Marx, as ‘figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into 
relations with each other and with the human race.’68 This thesis is thus interested in the 
conditions of possibility for consent’s autonomy story so as to approach consent in ways 
that do not engage this grammar as readily. Much of the scholarship on consent is 
limited by its own ‘intellectual horizons’69 where consent as an expression of free will is 
‘found’ or prioritised in interpretations and evaluations of state-intrusive legislation.70  
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 Scott (n 21), 780. 
67
 C. Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy’ in C. 
Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (University of Illinois Press 
1988). 
68
 K. Marx, Capital: A critique of political economy, vol. 1 (first published 1867, B. Fowkes, tr. Penguin, 
1976), 165. 
69
 D. Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and other essays on Greek Love (Routledge 1990). 
70
 Take, for example, the offence of ‘depriving one of her virginity’ in the Laws of Eshnunna, (thought to 
pre-date the Code of Hammurabi by almost two thousand years) which reads as follows: 
s. 31. If a man deprives another man’s slave-girl of her virginity, he shall pay one-third of a mina 
of silver; the slave-girl remains the property of her owner.  
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The effect is to posit consent as ahistorical and pre-juridical. It takes on the quality of a 
‘foundationalist discourse’ where the human subject and its agency are reified, 
presumed to have always existed, precluding questions about how selves are 
produced.
71
 Further, such ‘foundations’ make interventions in contemporary debates 
about consent reiterative of these presumptions. As such, this project proposes to ‘read 
against the grain’ of dominant consent discourses which debate its application, its 
codification, and its inadequacies but leave alone the productive forces which have 
made its signification of autonomy intelligible (and incontestable). Below, I propose 
two methods of addressing this challenge. 
 
Methodology: A Juridical Genealogy of Consent 
Methodologically, this work diverges from conventional secularised analyses of consent 
to review its discursive operations across legal fields rather than strictly within them. 
Despite the emphasis placed by legal scholars on the diversity of forms, applications, 
and procedures that consent assumes in each legal field, the few explorations of the 
meaning of consent or its philosophical foundations within law tend not to observe these 
boundaries.  Instead, concepts of autonomy, free will, voluntariness, knowledge, and 
rationality which appear in consent analyses travel across disciplinary divisions. This 
analysis will attempt to follow these movements, examining consent in both criminal 
and medical contexts in the jurisprudence of both Canada and the United Kingdom.  
These jurisdictions have been chosen because they are the areas of legal analysis I am 
most familiar with and because they often rely on one another in judicial treatments of 
consent both in criminal and medical law. Further, the recent Canadian approach to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
As cited in James B. Pritchard (ed), Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, (3
rd
 edn, 
Princeton University Press 1969), 162.  A common description of this section of the Eshnunna Code is 
that it represents a ‘rape’ law, where rape is defined (contemporarily) as ‘non-consensual sex.’   
71
 Scott, (n 21), 26-27. 
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establishing an ‘affirmative’ model of sexual consent is unique (in an international 
criminal law context) and coincides with recent statutory revisions in the United 
Kingdom to sexual offences  and the meaning of consent. Finally, the defence of 
consent in sporting contexts (the focus of this project’s fourth chapter) has been 
developed by both British and Canadian courts in tandem.
72
 
 
Second, I propose to treat ‘sexual consent,’ ‘informed consent,’ and the ‘defence of 
consent’ as historical artefacts which have been produced (and distributed) within 
specific contexts rather than as mere descriptions of naturally occurring or intrinsic 
characteristics of human states of being. In an attempt to further ‘skew’ my glance, I 
propose to select three vastly different historical periods where consent appears to 
perform different socio-political functions than dominant understandings of its role 
within contemporary medical and criminal law suggest it should.  Contrary to 
conventional historical analyses in law, my aim is not to study a pre-existing notion of 
consent with an aim of discovering ‘what happened’ in a specific time period or to 
identify an origin of consent as a concept in criminal or medical contexts. Rather, my 
investigation of these artefacts is with the intention of unearthing alternative stories 
about the regulation of sexual behaviour, medical intervention, and bodily harm, stories 
occluded by the contemporary consent-as-autonomy narrative. Further, my aim is less to 
understand consent as a legal concept, discursive formation of liberalism or form of 
human cognition than it is to understand how the law’s past narratives of consent have 
shaped the way juridical subjects are formed in today’s jurisprudence. 
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 For further discussion of this cooperative jurisprudence in the area of sports violence, see Chapter Four. 
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To this end, I propose taking up Foucault’s approach of genealogy, ‘for it really is 
against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that the 
genealogy must wage its struggle.’73  Posed as a means of ‘render[ing] the familiar 
strange,’74 genealogy might be characterized as the engine which powers Foucault’s 
methodological approach of archaeology.
75
 Foucault’s archaeology is, as the name 
implies, a ‘digging out’ of the rules, codes, and schemes (written and unwritten) which 
produce and organize utterances and their meanings in the world. Rather than viewing 
statements as an indicator of the speaker’s or writer’s intentions (the substance of what 
might be thought ‘surface’ knowledge for Foucault), archaeology is interested in the 
ontology of discourse,
76
 the ‘conditions of existence’ for statements.  The ‘dig’ is thus 
centred on an inquiry into ‘why these words now?’ so as to uncover the contingencies, 
qualifications, contexts, and exclusions from which particular discursive practices and 
the knowledges they make possible emerge.  Characterized predominantly as a ‘history 
of the present,’ the genealogical gaze is meant to reveal constitutive components of 
current subjectivities or practices which can’t be seen from the place where the subject 
stands. It is an attempt to shift one’s view; to ‘look awry,’ as Slavoj Žižek has 
suggested, as a means of seeing more in the distortion or skewed glance than is visible 
in the direct glare.
77
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 M. Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in C. Gordon (ed & tr) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977 (Harvester Press 1980), 84. 
74
 L.J. Graham, ‘Discourse analysis and the critical use of Foucault’ (Australian Association for Research 
in Education Conference, Sydney, AU, 27 November 2005), 4. 
75
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 A. Peterson and R. Branton (eds) Foucault, Health, and Medicine (Routledge 1997), 35-41. 
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Spectre of Ideology’ in S. Žižek (ed) Mapping Ideology (Verso, London 1994); and S. Žižek, The Ticklish 
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Feldner, ‘Ideology Critique or Discourse Analysis?’ (2007) 6(2)  European Journal of Political Theory 
141;  and F. Vighi and H. Feldner, Žižek: Beyond Foucault (Palgrave MacMillan: Hampshire 2007). 
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Foucault described the task of a genealogist as one concerned with uncovering ‘erudite 
knowledge and local memories’ in a way that might be tactically used in the formulation 
of new knowledges.
78
 As such, it necessitates looking in unfamiliar places both for the 
emergence of discursive practices and for the means by which these practices gain 
power and disciplinary control.  In the present case, this has resulted in an exploration 
of what might be thought of as the ‘conditions of possibility’ for contemporary 
understandings of consent through an exploration of how consent was used and thought 
about in three very different legal and historical contexts.  In each of these contexts 
(outlined below), the dominant narrative of consent-as-autonomy is either absent or 
simply can’t ring true given the particular conditions of social and political existence 
that are at work.  
 
Charting the Course: A Chapter Outline 
The hunt for understandings of consent that might challenge or differ from the consent-
as-autonomy story has meant travelling to some fairly unexpected places. The following 
chapters will ask the reader to consider sexual offences in Antiquity, medical ethics in 
the Middle Ages, and bodily harm on the sports field of the present day.  We start, 
however, with a reconstruction of the consent-as-autonomy story.  Chapter One will 
examine what might be thought of as the contemporary ‘canon’ of consent law in three 
legal areas to be discussed in upcoming chapters. These are: consent to sex, informed 
consent to medical treatment, and the defence of consent in sport. This contemporary 
picture of consent aims to reveal the dominance of the autonomy story even among 
more critical and reformist approaches to consent (and autonomy itself). Key 
                                                          
78
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components to this portrait include voluntariness, rationality, and knowledge as 
preconditions or requirements for consent, and the role of legal paternalism in 
establishing these ‘parameters’ of consent. In addition, Chapter One examines the 
contributions of classical liberal scholars (such as John Locke) to the establishment of 
consent’s claim to the status of a ‘common sense’ and the productive power of this 
claim in contemporary understandings of consent (as autonomy).  
 
Chapter Two marks the first of three substantive investigations into the conditions of 
possibility for contemporary understandings of consent, exploring how sexual 
behaviours and identities were regulated in Classical Athens and Rome during the 
Augustan moral reform period at the turn of the first century.  This historical context is 
one where personal and socio-political autonomy was explicitly restricted to certain 
members of the polis (free male citizens).  However, contemporary scholars often write 
about ‘female consent’ and ‘sexual consent’ when examining the legal regulation of sex 
of the period.
79
  This suggests a possibility for unearthing moments of disjuncture in the 
construction of consent-as-autonomy which might serve to destabilise this foundational 
discourse.  The discussion begins with an examination of the offences of sexual 
violence and transgression (e.g. adultery and prostitution) which figure most 
prominently in the period’s legal codes, Attic rhetoric, and Greek and Roman dramatic 
sources, and in contemporary Classics scholarship.  The analysis is then organised 
around the functions which consent can be seen to perform in the context of early 
Athenian and Roman sexual life. This includes a role of proprietorship in relation to the 
political and patrilineage interests which sexual offence legislation of the period was 
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meant to protect, and a role of political belonging, where consent served as a form of 
juridical and cultural recognition. Chapter Two suggests that what is at issue, at least in 
this ancient story of consent, is not a certain quality of free action, personal integrity, or 
the capacity for self-control, but rather a form of property protection and the 
constitution of the public domain. Further, through an examination of those who were 
excluded from the socio-political status necessary to enact forms of consent-as-
proprietorship during the period (women, slaves, foreigners, and various ‘sexual 
transgressors’), the ability of consent to prescribe normative ways of being and acting is 
revealed, speaking to consent’s contemporary understandings of both voluntariness and 
rationality that must be enacted in specific ways to be recognizable. 
  
Chapter Three continues the search for alternative stories of consent, investigating the 
introduction of the ‘knowledge’ component to consent within the medical field.  David 
Halperin has suggested that genealogy is a method which ‘enables us to glimpse 
contingency where before we had seen only necessity; it thereby allows us to suspend, 
however briefly, the categories of thought and action within which we habitually 
conduct our lives.’80 This positions this methodological approach as particularly apt for 
destabilizing one of the more secured juridical discourses of consent-as-autonomy: the 
informed consent doctrine.  Leading medical ethics commentators have gone so far as to 
suggest that autonomy should be considered ‘the single most important moral value for 
informed consent.’81  Discerning an account of medical consent uninformed by notions 
of self-determination and individualism requires an archaeological site far removed 
from the accepted twentieth-century origins of autonomy-based medical ethics.  For this 
reason, Chapter Three examines consent within medieval accounts of medicine and its 
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ethics, a period thought by many to represent the ‘Dark Age’ of medical practice.82  
Most accounts of the ‘history’ of informed consent begin with the aftermath of human 
experimentation in the Second World War and the codes of practice emerging from the 
Nuremberg trials, suggesting that the doctrine itself is a twentieth century invention; 
however, there is some evidence that physicians’ codes of ethics contemplated consent 
during the Middle Ages.
83
 Further, the period following the fall of the Roman Empire 
represented a rise in Christian influences in many legal and medical forums and 
Foucault remarks on the impact which this seemed to have on an ideal of purity being 
measured by an external physical integrity, rather than an ‘internal’ self-restraint.84 The 
chapter attempts to track these influences in pursuit of an alternative account of medical 
consent, beginning with a brief picture of medieval medicine, including the 
requirements for both medical education and medical practice.  Particular attention is 
paid to the influence of Christianity on who could become a physician and on what the 
content of medical training would entail.  Against a backdrop where health and illness 
were understood to be acts of divine intervention, other medieval understandings of 
consent are explored, including theological analyses of Christian conversion and 
marriage formation, where the dilemma of knowing the inner will of another was of 
central concern, and the medieval market, where consent played a central role in the 
arena of trade and commerce. In each instance, an understanding of consent as a form of 
submission emerges, challenging the contemporary story of autonomy. 
 
                                                          
82
 L. C. MacKinney, ‘Medical Ethics and Etiquette in the Early Middle Ages: The Persistence of 
Hippocratic Ideals’ (1952) 26(1) Bulletin of the History of Medicine 1. 
83
 See, for instance, Loren C. MacKinney’s translation and study of source documents from 400 to 1100 
A.D. which ‘bear resemblances to passages from Hippocratic works’ among other medical codes of 
practice, (n 82). Similarly, a 2010 article in the Journal of Medical Ethics discusses the discovery of a 
‘written consent’ form signed in 1539, see: S. Selek ‘A written consent five centuries ago’ (2010) 36 
Journal of Medical Ethics 639. 
84
 Halperin, (n 69), 69. 
22 
 
Chapter Four examines constructions of consent as they appear in judicial 
determinations of assaults which occur within sporting contexts.  Of central concern in 
this chapter is the contemporary understanding of ‘harm’ that the criminal law considers 
when establishing the limits of what a person can and cannot consent to and the 
underlying cultural assumptions that this understanding both relies on and produces.  
The chapter begins with a review of the leading cases in both Canada and the United 
Kingdom where consent has been used as a defence to assault, highlighting how the 
courts have defined ‘harm’ when determining which activities are excluded from the 
scope of consent on the basis of ‘public utility.’ Discursive formations of consent as a 
procedure or process of normative transformation are common in contemporary 
scholarship.  Consent, thus articulated, is a means of altering normative relations, 
‘turn[ing] a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift; an 
invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of name and 
likeness into a biography.’85 This involves the drawing of distinctions between those 
acts which further a notion of the ‘common good’ and those which are deemed too 
harmful to be allowed.  In Chapter Four, the law’s treatment of this principle of social 
utility is critiqued for its allegiance to hegemonic forms of both masculinity and 
capitalism, which privilege (and demand) the commodification of the body as capital in 
exchange for civic virtue.  Operating as a criminal defense, consent transforms an 
otherwise criminal act into a legal one and, in the case of sporting activity, a universally 
desirable aim.  A ‘right to do wrong’ is made out as certain acts (and subjects) are 
moved into the sphere of the ‘common good.’  In this respect, consent’s process of 
‘transformation’ is also a productive power.  It creates new normative understandings of 
legitimate action and the components of subjectivity it is said to harbour. How these 
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subjectivities might be gendered or otherwise normatively constructed is examined in 
Chapter Four’s conclusion, where it is suggested that consent’s common sense is 
integrally connected to a neoliberal rationality that both prescribes and produces 
subjectivities in service to its basic tenets. 
 
Chapter Five pushes on the characteristics of this neoliberal rationality as a 
foundationalist discourse, examining what might be thought of as the ‘political 
economy’ of consent. Building on Chapter Four’s suggestion that contemporary uses of 
consent function within a logic where the rational subject is one who employs (and 
suffers) violence for the sake of economic and cultural capital, the consent-as-autonomy 
story is viewed from within the contemporary period’s capitalist logic.  The chapter asks 
what the meaning of ‘social utility’ or the ‘common good’ might be in a neoliberal 
world and, consequently, how freedom or autonomy might be understood when 
envisioned as dispositions of commodities.  Chapter Five begins with a brief description 
of neoliberalism as a form of legal and political rationality that, while functioning as a 
‘site of truth,’ manages to produce those subjects that self-govern in neoliberal ways, 
while demonizing and excluding those that don’t.  The case law from Canada and the 
United Kingdom in contemporary sexual assault law and medical law’s treatment of 
informed consent is reviewed for evidence of this neoliberal rationality at work.  This 
includes an examination of the arguments of social utility and risk that judicial 
treatments of consent employ and the role they play in maintaining neoliberal 
understandings of the self, while ‘naturalizing’ these conceptions through the 
construction of consent’s common sense. Ultimately, Chapter Five establishes the ways 
in which the consent-as-autonomy narrative is one that emerges as part of the ideology 
of contemporary capitalism, serving to obscure the wide universe of alternate meanings 
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and functions that consent can be seen to perform in Ancient Greece or medieval 
medicine.  Moreover, this autonomy story belies the ways in which these historical uses 
of consent continue to resonate in judicial treatments of consent in the present day. This 
suggests that the many difficulties identified in legal scholarship with what consent is or 
how it should be treated are not the central problem; rather the problem is consent itself. 
This is a concept that has been widely held to be illusory,
86
 a ‘placeholder’ for ideals of 
freedom and equality that are valued as dearly as they are dismissed as unrealisable.  
Yet the ideals consent is meant to house exist only for those who enact freedom or 
personal autonomy in ways that embed and naturalize the social relationships and 
normative subjectivities they depend upon.
87
  This creates the imperative to move 
beyond understandings of consent as an ‘illusion,’ so as to view its more productive 
effects. 
 
The thesis concludes with a discussion that aims to take this longer view, examining the 
implications for legal and cultural subjectivity of a consent-as-autonomy story that is in 
service to neoliberal rationality. Likening this narrative to the new ‘art of government’ 
that Foucault examined in his own study of the emergence of neoliberalism, I position 
consent as a means of producing and managing a certain kind of freedom.  The 
consenting subject is ‘free’ to act as she wishes, provided she does so in ways that are in 
alignment with neoliberal understandings of the ‘common good.’  Consent thus serves 
as ‘a limited use of an empty liberty.’88 And while the ideal of autonomy that consent is 
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meant to signify is an appealing one, the self-rule it promises is not without its 
preconditions.  Any story of consent that positions an ahistorical, pre-juridical, and self-
governing subject will also necessarily produce experiences and identities which fail to 
approximate this norm. How does the law’s continuing project to ‘fix’ consent produce 
recognisable objects (or abjects) of scrutiny?  And what might an investigation into the 
‘common sense’ of consent help us to grasp about the frames of cultural and legal 
intelligibility at work in consent law today?  It is to these questions that the discussion’s 
final pages turn their aim.   
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CHAPTER ONE  – The Consent-as-Autonomy Story 
 
 
 
‘We are definitely not all liberals now. But we do all live in a liberal world.’89 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The indivisible association of consent with autonomy is commonplace in legal and 
political scholarship where consent is understood as a core element of personhood.  
There are, however, preconditions to the freedom and subjectivity that consent is meant 
to signify.  One must first demonstrate, for instance, a capacity to consent, and the acts 
to which one is consenting must not be irrational or unreasonable.  Consent, to be valid, 
must be adequately informed and enacted voluntarily by clear-thinking (and 
recognizable) subjects, for socially valuable ends.  Thus, despite its promise of universal 
self-rule and independence, consent is a rather selective and highly governed means of 
enacting freedom.  Some subjects are excluded from its presumption of autonomy, 
marginalized from the scope of consent not simply because of non-conformity to 
hegemonic ideals of subjectivity and statehood, but by way of being unintelligible 
within them. There is, then, a paradox in the story of autonomy that is told about 
consent which forecloses certain forms of personhood or liberty in the name of others.  
 
This chapter seeks to interrogate this paradox through a contextualization of 
contemporary deployments of consent in each of the three legal areas examined in 
upcoming chapters, namely: consent to sex, informed consent to medical treatment, and 
the defence of consent in sport. This modern account of consent aims to reveal the 
pervasiveness with which consent is defined as a form of personal autonomy, even 
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among more critical and reformist approaches to consent (and autonomy itself) that 
recognize its internal contradictions and an inequity in its application. An examination 
of the law’s three most prevalent ‘preconditions’ of consent (i.e. knowledge, 
voluntariness, and rationality) and their roots in liberal concerns with legal paternalism 
forms part of this analysis.  Secondly, this chapter explores how this narrative of 
autonomy gains such widespread adoption through an invocation of a ‘common sense’ 
that not only serves to ‘naturalize’ the conditions needed for liberal accounts of 
autonomy, but also establishes the frames of intelligibility that exclude all other notions 
of what consent might be or do. Ultimately, this chapter contends that to suggest that 
autonomy is central to understandings of consent is to understate the matter. Autonomy 
is not simply the most popular or widely accepted understanding of consent; it is the 
only story there is. How this narrative is employed to limit the content and scope of 
consent on the basis of conformity to particular forms of (liberal) subjectivity is 
explored in the chapter’s conclusion, highlighting the need to uncover alternative 
understandings of consent (to which the ensuing chapters take aim). 
 
Mediated Magic: Paternalism and its Paradox 
The understanding of the human will as serving to eradicate wrongdoing is often 
attributed to ancient history, sourced in the Roman maxim volenti non fit injuria (‘to the 
willing no injury is done’)90 and used by the courts to cement the principle that one 
should be able to consent to anything, even the impossible.
91
 Yet Onora O’Neill has 
suggested that autonomy in the antiquity context referred to the self-governance of 
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states rather than the actions of individuals.
92
 This latter association of consent with a 
notion of inviolable individualism owes more to the work of early theorists of 
liberalism, such as John Stuart Mill whose text, On Liberty, employed it as a means of 
balancing the competing interests of individual and state action.
93
  O’Neill has 
suggested that contemporary understandings of autonomy stem from Mill’s work and 
amount to a kind of ‘self-legislation' which is not more (nor less) than the establishment 
of a set of principles that all persons can employ to both govern their own behaviour and 
judge that of others.  Consent, in this way, is understood as an exchange (as in contract 
law) or a process whereby freedom (in the form of rights) is surrendered for some other 
aim (e.g. freedom in the universal).
94
 
 
The legitimacy-granting character that is ascribed to consent has had implications for 
how the scope of the doctrine is understood to operate in law, bringing to the fore one of 
the underlying tensions in liberalism between the sacred ideal of individual autonomy 
and the state’s forays into legal paternalism.  Ostensibly, this discord is mediated 
through a narrowly interpreted harm principle, often attributed to Mill,
95
 where 
governments are permitted some coercive power over the citizenry so as to act in their 
best interests. This necessarily places limits on the ‘moral magic’ of consent when some 
actions are deemed to be too harmful to be permitted merely on the basis of individual 
will. As Ashworth notes: 
                                                          
92
 Chapter Two examines sexual consent in Ancient Greece and Rome at the turn of the first century 
where the interests of the state are found to be paramount in terms of the functions consent was meant to 
perform. 
93
 Albeit, as O’Neill informs us, without mentioning the word ‘autonomy’ in reference to individual 
action at all (n 57), 30. 
94
 Faden and Beauchamp (n 81); R. T. Hull, ‘Informed Consent: Patient’s Right or Patient’s Duty?’ 
(1985) 10 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 183. 
95
 See: J. Feinberg ‘Legal Paternalism’ (1971) 1(1) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 105; D. Dyzenhaus, 
‘John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography’ (1992) 102(3) Ethics 534.  See also R. Vernon ‘John 
Stuart Mill and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle’ (1996) 106(3) Ethics 621, for an alternative 
reading of Mill’s On Liberty and the standard approach to the harm principle. 
29 
 
[I]ndividual autonomy has both positive and negative aspects: on the one hand it 
argues for liberty from attack or interference, whereas on the other hand it 
argues for the liberty to do with one’s body as one wishes… If a person wishes 
to give up her or his physical integrity in certain circumstances or to risk it for 
the sake of sport or excitement, should the criminal law allow the consent to 
negative what would otherwise be a crime?
96
 
 
Joel Feinberg has suggested that this conundrum results from a misreading of the volenti 
maxim so as to interpret it as saying something about ‘harm’ whereas it might be better 
understood to be directed towards legal wrongs.
97
  This re-reading results in a view of 
consent as vitiating a liability claim rather than a harm or injury, similar to a waiver of 
legal right(s). Based on this view, Feinberg argues a better reading of the volenti maxim 
might be: ‘To one who freely consents to a thing no wrong is done, no matter how 
harmful to [her/]him the consequences may be.’98  This suggests that the ‘magic’ of 
consent to transform wrong to right is constrained by the liberal understanding of 
autonomy as individualised agency, where legal paternalism is positioned as its greatest 
foe. Thus any state intervention which impedes an individual’s exercise of free will 
(even if to prevent self-inflicted harm) amounts to a coercion which is itself too harmful 
to allow.
99
 This has the effect of exempting certain ‘problematic’ or even 
‘unconscionable’ interactions from the label of ‘illegitimate,’ (and thus criminal and 
civil liability) on the basis that the (self-inflicted) harm they occasion is less than the 
harm that would be incurred by state interventions to prevent it.
100
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There are, however, many circumstances in which interference with another’s liberty or 
autonomous action might be deemed necessary or advisable for a multitude of reasons 
ranging from a broad sense of social welfare or the ‘common good’ to an assessment of 
individual interests or self-protection.
101
 Indeed, the classic tenets of liberalism first 
penned by the political theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
composed with these restraints on autonomy in mind.
102
  This represents what Kultgen 
has suggested is the dilemma created by absolutist positions on autonomy where ‘if one 
defines autonomy so that it always deserves respect, no one is autonomous; and if one 
defines it so that everyone is autonomous, it does not always deserve respect.’103 This 
has prompted many liberal theorists to conceptualise varying degrees of justifiable 
paternalism. Feinberg distinguishes between cases of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ paternalism in an 
attempt to provide justification for state intervention to prevent harm in some cases 
while opposing it in others.
104
  Hard paternalism is thus understood to be coercive state 
action (e.g. criminal legislation) which prohibits individuals (against their will) from 
engaging in conduct that is harmful to themselves and/or others. Soft paternalism, on 
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the other hand, is a more qualified form of state coercion reserved for determinations of 
an individual’s will, exemplified by Mill’s now famous example of a man about to cross 
a damaged bridge.
105
 While the hard paternalist would prevent the man from crossing 
irrespective of his own wishes, the soft paternalist would be justified in detaining the 
man only long enough to determine whether he is aware of the bridge’s state of 
disrepair and its dangers, leaving him to his own actions once the nature of his will has 
been settled. 
 
The scope of, limits to, and justifications for the state’s acts of soft paternalism are the 
subject of much debate in legal and moral philosophy, political theory, bioethics, 
criminal and contract law and it is within these deliberations that most of the 
contemporary discussions of consent take place (be that in the name of enhancing the 
informed choices of patients or contractors, the physical integrity of sexual actors or 
sport participants, or in debating the proper boundaries of free-acting citizens.) This 
literature is largely concerned with the necessary conditions, capacities, circumstances, 
and evidences of consent. How much harm can a free citizen consent to? What steps or 
procedures must be taken to ensure a choice is made knowledgeably? What individual 
acts will garner more widespread harm if allowed  than the harm of state-imposed 
infringements on personal freedom will incur? And so on. There is a paradox in this 
treatment of consent, however, given that this problem of paternalism and how (or if) it 
should be addressed stems from the liberal commitment to autonomy. Therefore even 
attempts to offer solutions to or critiques of the problem must engage with this same 
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narrative of autonomy. Consent discussions are thus also confined to this box.
106
  Take, 
for instance, Tom Beauchamp’s defence of soft paternalism in the field of 
‘biobehavioral control’107 on the basis that such acts do not interfere with patient 
autonomy given that the patient lacks the requisite characteristics of an autonomous 
actor when the consent that is offered has not been ‘adequately informed.’ Beauchamp 
explains: 
It is not a question of protecting a man against himself or of interfering with his 
liberty of action. He is not acting at all in regard to this danger. He needs 
protection from something which is precisely not himself, not his intended 
action, not in any remote sense of his own making.
108
 
 
Feinberg makes a similar point, suggesting that we should not ‘expect anti-paternalistic 
individualism to deny protection to a person from his own nonvoluntary choices, for 
insofar as the choices are not voluntary they are just as alien to him as the choices of 
someone else.’109 For Beauchamp, any number of factors can serve to ‘constrain free 
choice’ in this regard, ‘such as inadequate reflection, transitory desires, inner 
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psychological compulsions, family pressures,’ and so forth.110  Thus, despite the 
prominence awarded to autonomy in the liberal account of consent, it is a liberty to self-
govern that comes with prerequisites. Further, it is from this liberal story of consent-as-
autonomy that contemporary law gleans a number of factors which serve to vitiate or 
negate consent on the basis of their impact on one or more of these preconditions, (the 
presence of fraud, duress, coercion, false pretences, or mistake are common examples).  
Although both Feinberg and Beauchamp in the excerpts above allude to one of the more 
commonly cited ‘pre-requisites’ of consent (i.e. voluntariness), these stipulations can 
take different forms depending on whether the commentator is a moral philosopher, 
contract lawyer, rights advocate, bioethicist, critical theorist, and so on.
111
  These 
components also serve to differentiate and produce particular subjectivities ‘capable’ or 
‘incapable’ of consenting, thus defining and regulating not simply what might be 
surrendered (e.g. liberty) but for whom this surrendering is possible.   
 
The following section turns its focus on three of the more common ‘preconditions’ of 
consent, namely: voluntariness, knowledge, and rationality.  In each instance, the law’s 
conventional approach to the precondition is examined alongside a discussion of some 
of the critiques these approaches have garnered, demonstrating the integral role the 
consent-as-autonomy story plays for each. While discussed separately below, it should 
be noted that these preconditions are both correlative, insofar as they rely on one 
another for coherence, and cumulative, in terms of their role in establishing a valid 
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consent, i.e. one which is offered voluntarily, knowingly, and rationally.  This 
interdependence (examined in greater detail in the next section) is derivative of 
liberalism’s theory of state legitimacy. It is predicated on the fiction of political consent 
and its resultant paradoxes of autonomous action. In other words, the need to limit both 
what kinds of persons may consent and what kinds of things they may consent to 
emerges from a theory of state legitimacy grounded in individual autonomy: if persons 
are free to choose, they may choose not to be governed (or at least not to be governed 
by the same principles that might best serve the state).
112
 Thus, the preconditions of 
consent establish not simply that a person must know what she is consenting to prior to 
voluntarily and rationally consenting, but rather that there are allowable (and 
unallowable) ways of willing, knowing, and rationalizing produced by these very 
preconditions themselves.  
 
The Parameters of Consent: Productive Preconditions 
(i)   voluntariness 
Broadly understood as a legal recognition of free or unrestrained choice, voluntariness 
is arguably the most common ground upon which consent’s validity is contested. Within 
liberal political theories of the state, government is positioned as a ‘voluntary 
association’ and while certain coercive elements will be necessary parts of state 
functionality, it is the degree of approximation to this ideal of voluntariness which 
underlies state claims to legitimacy and, as we have seen, critiques of its paternalism.
113
 
A similar formula functions in both medical and criminal law’s theorisations of consent.  
Informed consent in medical law has been identified as serving legal, moral, and clinical 
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aims.
114
 Alongside ideals of preserving a patient’s right to self-determination and 
protecting physicians from legal sanctions against battery and assault, the voluntary 
participation or assent to treatment is thought to facilitate treatment and, ideally, 
improve patients’ clinical experiences.115  Stemming from the Nuremberg Code, 
voluntariness (in its association with autonomy) is ‘the most frequently mentioned 
moral principle in the literature on informed consent.’116 This is an interesting 
contention given the prevailing view that medical treatment operates predominantly on 
the basis of tacit consent.  Even where a consent form is signed, a patient’s consent is 
conceptualised as on-going, subject to revocation at any time. Emily Jackson identifies 
three factors which serve to vitiate consent in medical contexts: coercion, undue 
influence, and mistake.
117
 Each of these is discursively linked in the case law to 
consent’s precondition of voluntariness and positioned as an interference with the free-
willed action of the patient. English courts have been reluctant to find coercion to have 
vitiated consent to medical treatment unless a ‘real’ threat can be determined to have 
diminished the patient’s free choice, even when the political or social context the patient 
is in might significantly alter this range of options (e.g. prison).
118
  Tom Beauchamp has 
suggested a distinction between considerations of coercive factors that are external to 
the patient versus those that are internal (the latter, I would suggest, which are more 
often addressed by the courts in terms of another precondition of consent, i.e. 
‘rationality’ discussed at length below.)119 
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The same practice can be found in criminal law contexts.  To be considered valid, 
consent must be given voluntarily where the level of volition is assessed in conjunction 
with what a reasonable (i.e. rational) person can be considered to have done with the 
knowledge the victim had at the time.  This is predominant in assaults which arise 
within the context of sporting activities or what courts have termed ‘horseplay’ where 
participation in the activity is often positioned as a form of tacit consent, provided the 
level of risk does not exceed what can be deemed ‘reasonable.’  Although some of the 
difficulties associated with judicial reliance on standards of reasonableness are explored 
in the ensuing subsections which examine the preconditions of knowledge and 
rationality, the requirement of voluntariness highlights one of the oldest ‘dilemmas’ of 
consent theory and its application. Kann states the problem in this way: 
If we are social beings, how can we consent ‘voluntarily’? Do our desires and 
reasons reveal our ‘true’ selves or do they merely reflect social prejudices? 
Herbert Marcuse’s challenge that consent procedures are vacuous if our desires 
and reasons are socially determined is a serious one.
120
 
 
Although perhaps easy to dismiss as a merely esoteric philosophical inquiry, the 
difficulty in matching the ideal (if not hypothetical) consenter with the lived realities of 
the actual citizen has been a tangible challenge identified in much of the literature on 
consent, largely with respect to its precondition of voluntariness. Carole Pateman, for 
instance, suggests that consent theorists suffer a ‘standard embarrassment’ when 
‘attempt[ing] to show how and when citizens perform this act [of consent]’ given that 
grand assertions of its universality and fundamental nature tend to ‘gloss over the 
ambiguity… about which individuals or groups are capable of consenting and so count 
as full members of the political order.’121 For Pateman, among others, the notion of 
consent emerges from a ‘voluntarist theory of society’ rooted in early political 
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liberalism which maintains that any interferences with a citizen’s liberty must be freely 
undertaken.  Yet as Pateman has observed, such formulations do not take account of the 
structural inequalities within society (and the organisation of its members) which work 
to prevent any form of pure voluntariness.
122
 Instead, the ‘bitterest fruit of the liberal 
deception’ is when the most disadvantaged believe social inequity to be a result of 
misfortune rather than the organisation of the social order itself.
123
 Wendy Brown has 
argued that this is attributable to the nature of the social contract itself, whereby 
protection is granted to citizens in exchange for obedience.
124
 Consent, in this frame, 
appears more as an act of submission than voluntary agreement. ‘[I]t marks the presence 
of power, arrangements, and actions that one does not oneself create but to which one 
submits.’125  
 
Aside from these broader based concerns with the amount of voluntary action that might 
be possible in an unequally ordered society, consent’s precondition of voluntariness is 
evaluated in practice in exclusionary ways.  This stems from the same measured 
approach to paternalism which Feinberg (and others) have advocated given the paradox 
of autonomy that classical liberalism creates and maintains. Liberal notions of 
autonomy attempt to house both individual self-determination and individual well-
being, where the latter can often fall into conflict with the former.
126
  Feinberg’s soft 
paternalism brings voluntariness to the fore, questioning how voluntary any act of self-
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harm can be. He suggests that ‘[w]hen there is a strong presumption that no normal 
person would voluntarily choose or consent to the kind of conduct in question, that 
should be a proper ground for detaining the person until the voluntary character of his 
choice can be established.’127  This demonstrates that consent’s precondition of 
voluntariness is often assessed alongside a consideration of the perceived 
reasonableness of either an act of self-harm or an assumption of risk. Further, 
Feinberg’s own use of the term ‘normal’ points to a dominant (if not hegemonic) notion 
of reasonableness that is at work in these considerations, perhaps most poignantly when 
the courts have made determinations of consent on ‘public policy’ grounds.128  As noted 
by the UK Law Commission in its 1994 Report on Consent: 
The law clearly reserves the right to say that some activities do not qualify for 
special exemption at all; just as it reserves the right to say that, within a lawful 
sport, public policy requires that injury caused by some of the sport’s practices, 
even though accepted by the injured player, should be dealt with as criminal in 
nature.
129
 
 
This reveals that in both the criminal and medical contexts, the would-be-consenter’s 
voluntariness is not a stand-alone consideration but rather one linked (arguably 
inseparably) to both the level of information or knowledge the participant can be said to 
have had when expressing a voluntary will and an assessment of the reasonableness or 
rational acceptability of that volition.  These two preconditions are examined in greater 
detail below. 
 
(ii) knowledge 
The word ‘consent’ is derived from the Latin, consentire, meaning ‘to feel or sense 
with’ –an origin which alludes to the cognitive and emotional requirements that make 
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up a frequently articulated component of consent in law: knowledge.  Alongside 
considerations of voluntariness and rationality, the law’s assessment of the validity of 
consent is reliant on a perception of a subject’s ability to know and understand the 
relevant circumstances of a consent (or its waiver).  Although competence is often 
positioned as a precursor to the requisite elements of consent, one’s capacity to consent 
is frequently defined in relation to the nature of information or knowledge about the 
intended treatment or intervention the would-be-consenter can be determined to have.  
Put most simply, a person is held to be competent to consent if they are able to 
understand what they are consenting to. 
 
The relationship between consent and knowledge is most explicitly recognized in the 
medico-legal doctrine of informed consent.  This doctrine is heralded by some legal 
scholars as a signification of the ‘special’ or ‘fiduciary’ relationship existent between 
physicians and patients where the patient’s on-going need to be knowledgeable of the 
nature of their consent is central. Although many bioethicists suggest that the 
Hippocratic Oath served to preclude any entitlement patients might have to information 
about their condition or its prognosis, the 1767 English case of Slater v. Baker and 
Stapleton
130
 is often marked as the dawn of the physician’s legal duty to ensure patients 
were made aware of the procedures awaiting them.  Comprehension of these events, 
however, was not a matter to preoccupy the law’s consideration of informed consent 
until later in the twentieth century when a ‘partnership model’ of decision-making 
would be introduced into medical law, establishing the role of the self-governing 
patient.
131
 This has led some commentators to suggest informed consent is more aptly 
described as a ‘process’ rather than a doctrine given the complex procedures involved in 
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ensuring patients both know and understand the nature and consequences of the relevant 
medical intervention.
132
  This process model entails a series of steps, including an initial 
report of injury or illness, documentation of a patient’s history, diagnosis and/or 
designation of a care plan, disclosure of treatment options and risks, confirmation of a 
patient’s understanding of available options and associated contingencies, and the 
patient’s (ongoing) decision with respect to treatment(s).133   
 
The precondition of knowledge figures large in this process model and is perhaps most 
explicitly represented by the ‘consent form,’ thought to signify a patient’s clear 
understanding of the treatment in question (despite ample evidence to the contrary).
134
 
Where comprehension is an issue, some medical scholars have suggested that the 
solution lies in enhanced procedural requirements, such as a formal assessment of 
language and reading comprehension skills administered prior to the signing of a 
consent form,
135
 whereas others have experimented with shortened consent forms as a 
means of improving patient understanding.
136
  Still others have suggested that the 
problem of ascertaining whether a patient has sufficient knowledge of a treatment prior 
to granting consent lies in the unequal power relations between doctors and patients.  In 
her consideration of tort law’s treatment of medical malpractice cases, Emily Jackson 
argues that the doctrine of informed consent serves as a kind of ‘shorthand for two 
distinct duties: the duty to obtain the patient’s consent before treatment, and the duty to 
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ensure that the patient has been properly informed about its risks and benefits.’137 
Jackson contends that in neither case does the law adequately protect patients’ interests 
in making informed decisions nor provide remedies for when they are not.  Instead, 
medical law’s emphasis on consent (and its precondition of knowledge) creates a 
‘paternalistic model of medical decision making in which a doctor offers the patient one 
treatment option, which can then be accepted or declined.
138
  
 
These critiques of informed consent’s ability to ward off the dangers of paternalism 
echo those raised by Feinberg, Dworkin, and others as they struggled with preserving 
liberalism’s commitment to autonomy within socio-political contexts that constrain 
rather than foster free choice. It is in this way that the limits of consent can be defined 
by its preconditions such that an inadequate amount of information or a lack of 
reasonable alternatives can serve to vitiate the ‘moral magic’ of consent when situated 
as impediments to autonomous decision-making.  Jackson alludes to these difficulties 
when rejecting the law of negligence as an appropriate avenue for the protection of 
patients’ autonomous interests given juridical determinations of the appropriate standard 
of care in non-disclosure cases. There, considerations of the  
‘reasonable doctor’ and/or the ‘prudent patient’ are often not desirable given their 
reliance on customary standards and hypothetical contexts. 
  
This same positioning of consent’s knowledge requirement within a sphere of normative 
standards can be seen in the criminal law context, particularly in assault cases that occur 
during sporting activities. A player’s participation in a sport is understood to be a form 
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of tacit consent to injuries that could reasonably be expected during the regular rules of 
play. Determining the parameters of what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘normal,’ however, is a 
daunting task. Courts have often taken judicial notice of behaviour and attitudes that fall 
outside the official rulebooks, taking into account unwritten codes of playing culture 
and attitudes. When dismissing an assault charge against a rugby player who had 
stomped on the head of an opposing player during a match, a Newcastle judge asserted 
she was ‘flabbergasted’ the Crown had pursued the case at all, dismissing the injury as 
‘the sort that happens within the rough and tumble of a rugby match.’139 This speaks to 
many of the issues raised in Chapter Four, where a survey of the consent defence in 
sporting contexts is conducted, highlighting how codes of hegemonic masculinity 
inform sporting activities and their culture. In these contexts, players are expected to 
learn ‘“how things are done here” through unwritten rules/norms, expectations, shared 
values, role models, traditions, attitudes, reactions to incidents of violence, which they 
internalise from the moment they join that group.’140  The player’s knowledge of these 
codes is a key component to the law’s assessment of whether an ‘implied sporting 
consent’ can be claimed.141   
 
This same discourse of ‘unwritten rules’ is employed in consent discussions of sexual 
assault law, even accompanied in some cases with explicit ‘game playing’ language.142 
While knowledge of and abidance with the often unstated ‘codes’ of (sexual) conduct 
are integral considerations of consent in sexual assault cases, in contrast to assaults 
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which take place on a sporting field, in sexual contexts these codes speak to the 
reasonableness of the assailant’s belief in consent rather than the validity of the consent 
itself. This distinction is often explained in the literature with reference to the mental 
elements of the offence.  The requisite mens rea of sexual assault requires that the 
assailant knew the victim was not consenting or, in the event of an honest but mistaken 
belief in consent, the establishment that this mistaken belief was reasonable.
143
 The 
difficulty arises when these standards of reasonableness are established within 
frameworks that both rely on and propagate harmful stereotypes about male and female 
sexuality.
144
  This was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
sexual assault case, Seaboyer (1991) in the dissenting judgment offered by L’Heureux-
Dubé J: 
The woman who comes to the attention of the authorities has her victimization 
measured against the current rape mythologies, i.e. who she should be in order to 
be recognized as having been, in the eyes of the law, raped; who her attacker 
must be in order to be recognized, in the eyes of the law, as a potential rapist; 
and how injured she must be in order to be believed.  If her victimization does 
not fit the myths, it is unlikely that an arrest will be made or a conviction 
obtained.
145
 
 
Thus the reasonableness of an accused’s belief in a sexual partner’s consent is reliant on 
a set of unwritten rules about sexuality, communication, and gender codes which 
privilege certain subjects while prejudicing others. This is perhaps best evidenced in the 
case law addressing the defence of an honest but mistaken belief in consent where both 
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English (D.P.P. v. Morgan)
146
 and Canadian (Pappajohn)
147
 courts have a history of 
upholding the mistake defence even where the accused’s belief was not reasonable.148 
Elizabeth Sheehy speaks to the inherent bias of this standard: 
Men’s stories can aspire to “reasonableness” not only because the women 
assaulted have been silenced by sleep, alcohol, drugs or some combination, but 
also because these stories tap into phallocentric beliefs. Such beliefs condition 
our willingness to disregard women’s accounts of rape and to instead accept that 
their bodies have betrayed them, and that honest men, bewildered by what Carol 
Smart calls the unknowability of women’s sexual desires and consistent with 
male pornographic imagination, have been seduced by unconscious women.
149
 
 
Studies within the field of conversation analysis suggest ways in which hegemonic 
norms about male and female sexuality inform both judicial treatments of consent 
within sexual assault law as well as feminist advocacy projects which emphasise ‘just 
say no’ strategies.150  Using comparisons with other forms of refusals found in day-to-
day conversation, Kitzinger and Frith contend that ‘it should not... be necessary for a 
woman to say “no” for her to be understood as refusing sex.’151  Instead, these policies 
serve to cement and proliferate assumptions about the inherent ‘nature’ of women’s lack 
of assertiveness and submissive sexuality. Further, these beliefs enter into the unwritten 
‘codes’ which can inform an accused’s honest but mistaken belief in consent.  This 
suggests that approaches to consent in law which propose ‘just say no’ strategies do 
                                                          
146
 [1976] AC 182. 
147
 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120. 
148
 In Canada there have been some legislative attempts to remedy this (see s. 273.2 of the Criminal 
Code), although even these reforms are not without their critics: see  E. Sheehy, Sexual Assault in 
Canada: Law, Legal Practice & Women’s Activism (University of Ottawa Press 2012).  Similarly, in the 
UK, the Sexual Offences Act suggests the reasonableness of the accused’s belief should be assessed 
‘having regard to all the circumstances’ (s. 4(2)). The maintenance of an unreasonable but mistaken belief 
in consent standard continues to be applied in other jursidictions.  For a comment on the relevant 
Australian jurisprudence, see: W. Larcombe, ‘Worsnop v. The Queen: Subjective Belief in Consent 
Prevails (Again) in Victoria’s Rape Law’ (2011) 35(2) Melbourne University Law Review 697. 
149
 Sheehy (n 148), 488. See also the 2011 Supreme Court of Canada case, R. v. J.A., [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440, 
which overturns an appellate court’s decision to issue an acquittal in a sexual assault case involving an 
unconscious complainant on the basis that she had previously consented to being choked into an 
unconscious state (as part of the couple’s experimentation with erotic asphyxiation). 
150
 C. Kitzinger and H. Frith, ‘”Just Say No?” The Use of Conversation Analysis in Developing a 
Feminist Perspective on Sexual Refusal’ (1999) 10(3) Discourse & Society 293. 
151
 Kitzinger & Frith (n 150), 294. 
45 
 
more to protect the rapist from criminal liability than they do for empowering women or 
remedying the harm of sexual assault – a critique that has been made of medical law’s 
use of informed consent as well with respect to protecting doctors from malpractice 
suits rather than increasing patient choice.
152
 As Kitzinger and Frith note: 
If there is an organized and normative way of doing indirect refusal which 
provides for culturally understood ways in which (for example) ‘maybe later’ 
means ‘no,’ then men who claim not to have understood an indirect refusal (as in 
‘she didn’t actually say no’) are claiming to be cultural dopes, and playing rather 
disingenuously on how refusals are usually done and understood to be done.  
They are claiming not to understand perfectly normal conversational interaction, 
and to be ignorant of ways of expressing refusal which they themselves routinely 
use in other areas of their lives... [T]he root of the problem is not that men do not 
understand sexual refusals, but that they do not like them.
153
 
   
One of the more interesting aspects to consent’s precondition of knowledge is the 
explicitness with which it demonstrates the epistemological hierarchy law employs 
when assessing the validity (or availability) of consent.  Players, patients, and sex 
partners are required to know certain things in certain ways before their consent can be 
recognized in law.  As has already been demonstrated, one of the primary delimiters of 
the ‘right way’ of knowing in consent configurations is a standard of reasonableness, 
which is grounded in the third precondition of consent: rationality. 
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 (iii)   rationality 
The law’s interest in protecting the ‘public interest’ is a central engine in considerations 
of a consenter’s rationality.  Alluded to in the common law maxim non consentit qui 
errat (one who errs does not consent), forms of consent which lack sufficient cogency 
so as to liken themselves to mistakes or nonsense have not traditionally been considered 
valid.  Amartya Sen suggests that this practice of public assessment is an integral 
component to reason, defining rationality as the ‘discipline of subjecting one’s choices – 
of actions as well as objectives, values, and priorities – to reasoned scrutiny.’154 
Although often articulated in a form consistent with liberal political theory, 
considerations of rationality found in judicial treatments of consent are not simply 
matters of reasoned self-interest or preservation. Rather, stemming from an emphasis on 
self-rule, articulations of consent which prioritize rational exercises of will might best 
be characterised as explorations of autonomy.  Sen, for instance, links rationality to 
freedom of thought, where rationality serves to recognise (and ideally) ‘accommodate 
the diversity of reasons that may sensibly motivate choice’.155 Yet law’s interpretation 
of the scope of ‘sensibly’ creates a wide ambit from which many acts and desires are 
excluded.   
 
In the criminal law context, this is perhaps most explicit in cases involving 
sadomasochistic activity.  In the English case of Brown (1993), the court rejected the 
defence of consent of the defendants who had participated in sadomasochistic 
(homosexual) activity over a period of ten years.
156
  The defendants’ voluntariness was 
not in question (nor their knowledge of the activities in which they willingly engaged), 
but the defence of consent failed on the basis that  ‘the infliction of bodily harm without 
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good reason is unlawful,’ rendering the consent of the victim immaterial.157 
Determining the content of ‘good reason’ is largely a matter left to consent’s 
precondition of rationality. Whereas the court was able to recognise the underlying 
rationale for such risk-associated and purposely harmful activities as tattooing, ritual 
circumcision, and violent sports, it viewed the sadomasochistic activity of the 
defendants as lacking in good reason and thus contrary to the ‘public interest.’158  Far 
less extreme cases exhibit the same approach.  Judicial treatments of consent in any case 
involving a form of voluntary self-harm have emphasised the ‘general principle’ that 
interference with autonomy is justified only where a strong reason to do so exists, where 
language of the ‘common good’ or public interest is invoked to construct the content of 
this reason.
159
    
 
In the medical law field, the articulation of consent’s requirement of rationality is, at 
first glance, treated quite separately from concerns about public policy. The evaluation 
of one’s rational decision-making abilities often rests on an assessment of whether 
undue influence has been exerted on the would-be consenter. Similar to the law’s 
consideration of the external and internal aspects of voluntariness, the courts have 
sought to identify the leading influences on medical patients’ consenting capacities.  
This has been articulated by the courts as an exercise in assessing the patient’s ‘strength 
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of will’ and the degrees to which it might be tempered by states of illness or pain or the 
presence of a ‘persuasive’ relationship – an approach which echoes the court’s attempts 
in Brown to negate the defendants’ consent through renderings of the activity involved 
as coerced or involuntary as a result of drug/alcohol use and the ‘undue influence’ of 
older participants.
160
  Similar effects of negation on consent can be seen in cases 
involving religious objections to treatment.  As Lord Donaldson MR in Re T
161
 stated: 
Persuasion based upon religious belief can also be much more compelling and 
the fact that arguments based upon religious beliefs are being deployed by 
someone in a very close relationship with the patient will give them added force 
and should alert the doctors to the possibility—no more—that the patient’s 
capacity or will to decide has been overborne. In other words the patient may not 
mean what he says.
162
 
 
Some scholars have suggested that distinctions can be drawn between patient wishes 
which are ‘mere desires’ and those which can be thought sufficiently rational to signify 
consent.
163
 While this view has led some to argue for a more structured format for 
assessing competency, others suggest that evaluations of a patient’s capacity are ‘often 
omitted if the patient’s decision “makes sense.”’164  Similar to the epistemological 
hierarchy enacted in consent’s precondition of knowledge, the danger in such 
assessments of rational belief and action lies in their tendency to rely upon and further 
inscribe hegemonic belief systems.  As Lori Beaman maintains in her examination of 
religious objections to medical treatment, the freedom to make decisions according to 
religious belief is restricted, in law, to ‘those religions that look like mainstream 
Christianity or are most familiar to many Canadians.  Those beliefs and practices that lie 
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outside that hegemony are often constructed as harmful, or as potentially resulting in 
harm, and thus their limitation is justifiable.’165  Thus law’s assessment of what 
behaviour might fall into excessive categories of ‘risk’ is mediated by consent’s 
precondition of rationality – itself constructed with shared understandings or common 
sense ‘community standards.’166  Beaman suggests this point is well illustrated in the 
Canadian case, B.H.,
167
 where the courts forced a 16-year old Jehovah’s Witness to 
undergo a blood transfusion, vitiating her consent (in part) on the basis of rationality.  
Provocatively, Beaman positions the court’s reasoning as an articulation of the 
‘common sense’ position that ‘[a]nyone who is willing to risk death for her religious 
beliefs cannot be thinking rationally. Clearly, she has been unduly influenced, duped, 
brainwashed.’168 
 
Although many of the difficulties stemming from the law’s use of public policy or 
‘community standards’ arguments in its assessments of the reasonableness of a consent 
to injury or refusal of medical treatment has been amply reviewed in the literature,
169
 
what is often left unexamined is the contribution the consent-as-autonomy story makes 
to this framework. As Ackerman has argued within the context of medical law’s 
informed consent doctrine, autonomy is rooted in two fundamental beliefs about human 
                                                          
165
 Beaman (n 64), 67. 
166
  See R. v. Butler (n 64), a Canadian Supreme Court of Canada decision which decided the confines of 
obscenity on a ‘national community standard relat[ing] to harm not taste.’ Interestingly, Chapter Three 
explores how a similar framework was employed during the medieval period where consent served as an 
indicator of how well human appetites and desires were ‘balanced’ or moderated so as to avoid sinful 
excess.  
167
  H.(B.) (n 41). 
168
 Beaman (n 64), 91. 
169
 Nicola Padfield surveys some of the UK case law on this matter in her article ‘Consent and the public 
interest’ (1992) 142 New Law Journal 430.  See also Chapter Four’s discussion the defense of consent in 
sport for a review of some of these critiques (and consequences) of the ‘public policy’ objections to 
consent. 
50 
 
behaviour and cognition which stem from classical political liberalism.
170
 One of these 
is the principle of non-interference. Autonomy is often thought to be best preserved 
when persons are ‘left alone’ to make their own choices.171 In the medical ethics field, 
this has manifested as a doctrine of ‘non-interference’ within the doctor-patient 
relationship where after sufficient disclosure, patients’ choices and actions are their 
own.  Ackerman’s own position on this model of non-interference is akin to that taken 
by many contemporary bioethicists who suggest that aside from ample discussion about 
disclosure procedures, very little attention is paid to the myriad of factors which can 
influence one’s ability to act autonomously, perhaps pre-eminently, illness.172 Further, 
this principle assumes that patients are already autonomous in their decisions (when 
given the necessary conditions or opportunities) which pre-empts examinations of the 
ways that these decisions are made and the factors that can influence them.  This has led 
many contemporary writers in the field to advocate for the ‘process model’ of obtaining 
consent, discussed earlier.
173
  
  
A second tenet of classical liberalism that underlies dominant understandings of 
autonomous action is that agentic or autonomous human behaviour is that which is 
                                                          
170
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governed by a plan or intended course of action that has been reached through a process 
of rational deliberation. For Ackerman, this deliberation entails an ‘investigation of the 
factual circumstances affecting the choice of goals and the means for achieving them, as 
well as the setting of preferences based upon such investigation.’174  For these 
deliberations to be considered ‘rational,’ the investigation of the surrounding factual 
circumstances, the preferences an individual has within these circumstances, and the 
hierarchy or priority to which these preferences are assigned must conform in some 
meaningful way to dominant norms and preferences in similar circumstances. As Mele 
has argued, to be an autonomous agent one must be capable of reliable deliberation.
175
 
This reliability, then, is determined on the basis of whether the factors that have 
influenced a person’s decision are familiar, common, or ‘known’ to those judging the 
deliberation. This requirement of familiarity or reliability – as the differently pleasured 
in Brown or the Jehovah’s Witnesses in B.H. know already – is of central importance to 
law, its notions of responsibility, and its limits.  As Morse notes: 
The law’s conception of the person as a practical reasoner is inevitable if one 
considers the nature of law.  At base, law is a system of rules and standards 
expressed in language that are meant to guide human behaviour. The law 
therefore presupposes that people are capable of using rules and standards as 
premises in the practical syllogisms that guide action… The law’s concept of 
responsibility follows from its view of the person and the nature of law itself.  
Unless human beings are rational creatures who can understand the applicable 
rules and standards, and can conform to those legal requirements through 
intentional action, the law would be powerless to affect human behavior.  
Legally responsible agents are therefore people who have the general capacity to 
grasp and be guided by good reason in particular legal contexts.  They must be 
capable of rational practical reasoning.
176
   
 
A key component, then, to the precondition of rationality is an evaluation of how well 
reasoned or deliberated a particular decision has been. Further, an assessment of this 
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process of reasoning necessitates some knowledge and acceptance of the factors or 
‘rules and standards’ used as ‘premises in the practical syllogisms’ that have guided 
one’s action (to employ Morse’s terminology). For law and, in particular, its delineation 
of who can and cannot consent, this requires an invocation of ‘common sense,’ given its 
noted familiarity and reliability – key elements of liberalism’s view of rational 
deliberation. This presents little difficulty to those subjects whose own beliefs and value 
systems (if not bodies, identities, and subjectivities) fall squarely within the familiar; 
however, for those whose beliefs or values are deemed too ‘strange,’ consent’s 
precondition of rationality will not be met.
177
  These non-conformists are left, to employ 
the language of the House of Lords in Brown, with ‘no good reason.’  
 
In some instances, being too far outside the realm of the ‘common’ renders a 
consideration of consent irrelevant from the onset, irrespective of whether it has met the 
necessary preconditions.  This lends credence to MacLean’s observation that ‘for 
consent to have normative or justificatory force, it will have to be conceptually linked to 
other concepts, most importantly, to the concept of rationality.’178  The promise of free 
will, liberty, and self-governance that consent is meant to signify and protect seems 
available for some people and practices but not others. Central to the production and 
maintenance of these governing norms of ‘good reason’ is the establishment of a 
‘common sense’ – one that can privilege certain behaviours and subjectivities while 
obscuring alternative accounts of ways of being and acting in the world.  This 
relationship between consent and the ‘sense we hold in common’ is explored in the 
following section.   
                                                          
177
 For a discussion of how this characterisation of ‘strangeness’ functions in Canadian case law 
addressing indecency, obscenity, sexual deviance, polygamy, and freedom of religion (among minority 
religions), see: Jennifer Olijnyk, A Question of Strangeness (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty 
of Law 2010).  
178
 D. MacLean (ed) Values at Risk (Rowman & Littlefield 1986), 17. 
53 
 
Conceptualising the Common: Tacit Consent and Intelligibility 
While writing about penal reform during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, Alan Norrie notes that many of the central notions of the Enlightenment 
which influenced the reform movement, such as free individualism, are ‘tempting 
simply to see… ahistorically, as part of the triumph of reason and progress in human 
affairs.’179  In spite of a recognition that this ahistorical lens is the one most often 
employed by lawyers and legal theorists, Norrie maintains that historicising these 
concepts is an essential task for legal scholars given the ways in which they have 
‘served important social interests and embodied particular ideological stances and 
strategies.’180  An appreciation for these social relations is of particular importance 
when, as some critical legal scholars have argued, the relations are unequal and 
supported by embedded ideologies.  In such circumstances, ‘the liberal emphasis on free 
individuals makes the theory itself the bearer of subordination.’181   
 
Carole Pateman articulates this very position in her 1988 text, The Sexual Contract, 
where she contends that the social contract theory of classical liberalism both creates 
and relies on a fiction of property in the person.  Although Pateman’s central concern 
throughout the text is with the civil subordination this fiction creates for women when 
control over their bodies is ‘contracted out’ to others via marriage, prostitution, and 
surrogacy agreements (among other social relationships governed by contract theory), 
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her critique is equally applicable to other circumstances where the consent-as-autonomy 
story operates amidst conditions of social inequality. Although contract is often 
heralded among liberal scholars as the ultimate symbol of freedom,
182
 Pateman 
maintains that this subordination is dependent on the social context in which a contract 
is made.
183
 In this way, Pateman draws a distinction between contract and consent on 
the basis that the former can create new relationships whereas the latter merely operates 
within a given frame of existing social relations.  Wendy Brown has made a similar 
observation, suggesting that the liberal understanding of consent constructs a state of 
subservience rather than autonomy wherein one submits to terms that are not one’s own; 
one acquiesces to the circumstances set by another. For Brown, this leaves consent to 
mark the boundaries of ‘legitimate subordination.’  Using the example of contemporary 
rape law, she elaborates: 
If in rape law, men are seen to do sex while women consent to it, if the measure 
of rape is not whether a woman sought or desired sex but whether she acceded to 
it or refused it when it was pressed upon her, then consent operates both as a 
sign of subordination and a means of its legitimation. Consent is thus a response 
to power – it adds or withdraws legitimacy – but is not a mode of enacting or 
sharing in power. Moreover, since consent is obtained or registered rather than 
enacted, consent is always mediated by authority… and is thus both constituent 
of that authority and legitimated by it.
184
 
 
Pateman makes a parallel contention within the context of employment contracts, where 
an employee’s continued participation in the workplace is viewed as a form of 
agreement with its conditions, however unequal they might be.  Pateman suggests ‘[i]t 
might be argued that, rather than giving consent, the individual assents or acquiesces to 
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the power structure, but this raises other equally familiar difficulties about tacit 
consent.’185   
 
Although Pateman herself doesn’t tackle these ‘familiar difficulties,’ it seems safe to 
assume that at least one of them is tacit consent’s necessary (and widely acknowledged) 
hypothetical character.  As this chapter’s earlier discussion of political theorists’ battles 
with legal paternalism noted, consent’s status as a political fiction is often attributed to a 
practical problem, i.e. the impossibility of obtaining actual consent in many cases.  Yet 
what this kind of account overlooks is the role this fictional status has in establishing 
and entrenching the consent-as-autonomy story.  In the first instance, attributing a 
‘common sense’ to a group can serve homogeneous ends within a collection of persons 
who are likely never to know one another.  This is acknowledged explicitly in the work 
of Benedict Anderson who has suggested the sense of socio-political belonging that is 
produced through invocations of a hypothetical or tacit consent can be characterized as 
an ‘imagined community’ given that ‘the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion.’186  Anderson focuses on how this 
sense of belonging forms the crux of how nation states are understood and actions in 
their name are carried out.  Echoing some of the observations made by Pateman and 
others, Anderson notes that ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that 
may prevail in each [community], the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship.’187  
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This is something addressed directly by John Locke, to whom the concept of ‘tacit 
consent’ is attributed.188  Of particular importance to the current inquiry is the link 
Locke himself makes between ‘common’ or familiar understandings and tacit consent.  
Locke positions tacit consent as the means by which government gains legitimacy over 
the natural freedom all persons are presumed to have.
189
  Akin to more contemporary 
scholars’ struggles with legal paternalism explored at this chapter’s outset, Locke notes 
the impossibility for this consent to be anything other than hypothetical, thus 
necessitating the presumptive or unspoken consent of all citizens. While most readers of 
Locke’s work suggest that this tacit consent marks the formation of the social contract, 
Anili reinterprets Locke’s notion of tacit consent in light of the empiricist views he 
expressed in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), wherein Locke 
pursues questions about how human beings come to know and understand the world 
around them.
190
  This work provides insight into Locke’s own epistemological stance, 
one deeply rooted in the Christian medieval world.
191
  Regarding the human mind as a 
blank slate, Locke maintained that knowledge was gained through sensory and 
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reflective experience.
192
  Further, Locke viewed words as merely signifiers of these 
external experiences
193
 and these signifiers themselves as being, in the first instance, 
subjective. ‘Words,’ Locke writes, ‘in their primary or immediate signification, stand 
for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him who uses them, how imperfectly soever or 
carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to 
represent.’194   
 
This relationship between words and their subjective meanings raises a problem for 
Locke not unlike the one pursued by Thomas Aquinas with respect to the unknowable 
nature of another’s internal will.195 If words are merely the marker of ideas within the 
minds of individuals, how can anyone be assured that the same meanings have been 
ascribed to the same words in the minds of others?
196
 Locke is clear that the ability to 
impose shared meanings is an epistemological (if not political) power that no individual, 
not even ‘the great Augustus himself’ possesses.197 Instead, these shared meanings can 
be nothing more than approximations that are established as a familiarity with words 
and their associated meanings is gained among a community – a process that occurs, 
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according to Locke, through common use. Moreover, this common use is granted an 
epistemological authority via tacit consent, for as Locke explains, as ‘certain sounds to 
certain ideas’ gain common appropriation, the ‘signification of that sound’ becomes 
limited such that ‘unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: 
and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he 
makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly.’198  Anili characterizes 
this use of tacit consent as a semiotic contract, given its role in producing the 
‘conditions for communication’ – an operation which he likens to the social contract on 
the basis that each ‘rests on the agreement of individuals, and on the power of 
community to enforce it.’199 While this articulation relies heavily on the liberal story of 
consent (i.e. as an autonomous choice or agreement to the terms of political authority), 
Anili’s characterisation of Lockean individualism as ‘semiotic’ is a useful insight. 
Locke himself identifies the role a shared language or system of signs plays in the 
construction and maintenance of schemes of intelligibility. He reminds us, in the 
passage quoted above, that one must use the words shared ‘in common’ to ‘speak 
properly’ in order to be understood. Further, the use of these words and their shared 
meanings marks one as a member of the community. Not unlike Hegel’s notion of 
reciprocal recognition, to be an intelligible person, one must be seen or understood as 
such (by other recognisably intelligible persons).  This requires the use of the common 
language, something which for Locke was understood as (tacit) consent – the mark of 
community membership.
200
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This points to one of two ways in which the fictional status of consent serves to 
entrench the consent-as-autonomy story.  Through invocations of a ‘common sense’ that 
prioritizes autonomy, the frames of intelligibility of consent are established so as to 
prevent the possibility of thinking of it in any other way.  Within the context of 
contemporary treatments of consent, these might be thought of as the ‘unwritten codes’ 
that establish the parameters of ‘good reason’ or the ‘common good.’   If one steps too 
far off the beaten path, violating these normative codes, one’s actions become 
unintelligible. They lack ‘good reason’ or demonstrate an inability to ‘speak properly,’ 
as Locke might suggest.
201
  This demonstrates how these structures of normative 
grammar or frames of intelligibility contain a coercive element, compelling speakers or 
subjects to adopt dominant discursive practices as their own (or risk not being 
understood).  Consent thus becomes the means by which a subject’s intelligibility is 
both produced and enforced and must therefore be understood in conjunction with 
(rather than in opposition to) coercion.
202
  The power to establish a ‘common sense’ or 
to set the frames of intelligibility is the power to establish and define communities and 
the subjects who live within them.
203
   
 
This creates a conundrum of considerable social and political consequence when 
consent is the means by which members of certain groups are not merely excluded from 
intelligibility but are held to have agreed to the terms which make this exclusion 
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compulsory.  This speaks to the second way in which consent’s hypothetical character 
serves to entrench the autonomy story.  Tacit consent is often positioned as a substitute 
for an impossible experience; it is a fiction meant to stand in for an unlived reality. This 
is what Jeremy Webber has argued is the ‘trope’ of consent, where it is imputed to 
members of a political community on one of three bases: that it represents what citizens 
could consent to (thus examining the limits of what constitutes ‘legitimate’ state action); 
that it represents what citizens should consent to (thereby invoking the issue of rights 
and correlative duties); or that it represents what citizens would consent to (if only it 
were possible to ask them).
204
 Consent thus functions as an acceptable substitution only 
if its imaginary form contains the fiction of its realisability. In other words, consent – to 
be operable as an adherent of political community – must be unreal (i.e. hypothetical) 
while not being so unreal as to be unimaginable (and thus ineffective).  This is 
particularly important when, as Anderson notes above, the imagined community consent 
is meant to produce and hold together is not homogenous but rather rife with inequality.   
 
Difference, while prima facie threatening to the imagined homogeneity of the 
community, is an integral component of its constitution and is often the basis for 
differential or unequal treatment of its members.
205
 This is not simply because of the 
role of the ‘other’ in constructing a shared (if imagined) identity – although this, too, is 
part of the work of consent’s autonomy story.  Rather, one might argue (as Judith Butler 
does with respect to pornography), that the fiction of consent ‘depicts impossible and 
uninhabitable positions, compensatory fantasies that continually reproduce a rift 
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between those positions and the ones that belong to the domain of social reality.’206  
This rift is a necessary one – not because of the inequality or subordination that it 
reveals, but because of the ideal of autonomy that it preserves, the vision that if we can 
only ‘get it right,’ consent will deliver self-actualisation, self-determination, and bodily 
integrity. Provided that the autonomy that consent promises remains unrealizable, it can 
continue to hold sway. It is able to house a vision of what could be, even in the face of 
what we know isn’t.207    
 
This creates an imperative to move beyond the notion of consent as merely an illusion, 
to an understanding of it as something more operative.  Not only does the story of 
autonomy that is told about consent obscure the social realities of inequality, difference, 
and subordination that might threaten a notion of the homogenous citizenry (and thus, 
governmental action made in its name), but it also conceals the  historically specific 
conditions of existence which have brought consent’s ‘common sense’ into being. It is 
an ‘invocation of a nonhistorical “before”… that guarantees a presocial ontology of 
persons who freely consent to be governed, and thereby, constitute the legitimacy of the 
social contract.’208  The production of this presocial ontology is the key to 
understanding how consent has continued to play an integral role in the establishment of 
political community, state legitimacy, and corporeal governance despite explicit 
recognition of its fictional and paradoxical promise of autonomy.   
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 Butler (n 11), 5. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed what might be thought of as the ‘canon’ of contemporary 
consent law.  Despite performing a multitude of functions across diverse areas of law, 
there is a common underlying story of autonomy that is told about consent.  Moreover, 
this story is awarded a ‘common sense’ status in consent theorising, to the exclusion of 
all other narratives.  This represents something of a paradox in how consent is 
understood both in legal theory and practice.  Although claims of its ‘shifting content’ 
or ambiguous meaning are commonplace, legal treatments of consent in both medical 
law and criminal contexts take place against a backdrop of this ‘common sense’ story.  
Understanding consent as an enactment of personal autonomy or means of self-
governance is what ‘everybody knows’ consent means.  A review of how courts in 
Canada and the United Kingdom assess the availability of consent reveals it is a 
‘freedom’ that has pre-requisites, each of which serve to allow consent in some contexts 
(and for some subjects) while prohibiting it in and for others. Further, these 
preconditions of voluntariness, knowledge, and rationality are defined in accordance 
with this common sense story of autonomy.  Where subjects attempt to consent in 
contexts that don’t conform to this narrative, the law does not recognize the consent as 
valid (or autonomous). Instead, these acts and subjects are rendered ‘irrational’ or 
lacking in ‘good reason’ for their failure to conform to this dominant story of autonomy.   
 
This lends an unquestionable status to the consent-as-autonomy story, creating a need to 
‘unhook’ consent from this common sense narrative in order to understand the social, 
cultural, and political conditions which have made this view of consent possible and, 
indeed, necessary in contemporary determinations of the limits of self-rule.  This thesis 
aims to address this imperative by treating consent as a human artefact, steeped in 
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historically located ideologies, with significant implications for subjectivity.  The 
following chapters attempt to track consent as it travels through some of these locations, 
each involving social relations that differ greatly from those in which consent operates 
today, in the hopes of uncovering uses and functions that both differ from and challenge 
the consent-as-autonomy story.  
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CHAPTER TWO – ANCIENT SEX 
 
 
 
 
We don’t know what consent would look like because ‘it’ hasn’t existed in ideal 
form and therefore hasn’t existed at all. But consent has looked like and does 
look like what it has been socially interpreted and conceived to be.. [C]onsent is 
always an interpreted idea, not an idealised abstraction... [and] casting consent 
as a nonexistent ideal (what would it look like?) because it has yet to be 
developed according to feminist values seems to erase the rich and perhaps 
illustrative history of the idea as a social and not a philosophical artifact.
209
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of the legal regulation of sex has been inextricably bound to the concept of 
consent. Certainly much legal scholarship would lend itself to the assumption that 
consent has pre-existed rape. Its absence marks the presence of sexual violence. This 
chapter aims to approach sexual consent differently, positioning it as an historical 
artefact rather than a concept with a priori status. In an attempt to move beyond 
discursive patterns in consent jurisprudence which foreground, if not privilege, the story 
of autonomy, this chapter proposes an examination of sexual offence legislation in the 
Classical period in Athens and Rome. The influence of both ancient Athenian and 
Roman law within Continental Europe and North America has been well 
documented.
210
  While the contemporary relevance of this early jurisprudence is always 
subject to debate given the scarcity of sources, contentious (mis)representations of 
rhetoric, and the difficulties associated with interpretation and translation, some have 
argued that the ‘problem’ of, in particular, Athenian nomos – the wide assemblage of 
statutes, ordinances, and customs that are thought to make up early Greek ‘law’ – is, in 
fact, its greatest attribute.
211
  This case is arguably made stronger when a genealogical 
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approach to law is taken. Given the primacy which Athenian legal discussions and 
rhetoric placed on social attitudes and political contexts, this wide jurisprudential field 
can only aid an examination of a matter as socially and politically charged as the legal 
regulation of sex.
212
  Further, the challenge of destabilising the foundations of sexual 
consent discourse is perhaps lessened amidst a narrative of socio-sexual relations in 
which notions of female agency do not figure in familiar forms.  
 
Aside from examining the ancient period for an account of consent that differs from the 
autonomy story, this chapter is aimed at understanding how contemporary uses of 
consent in legal treatments of sexuality both rely upon and call to presumptions of this 
history. It is meant to be, to employ Foucault’s term, a ‘history of the present’ to 
determine how what is ‘known’ about sexual consent and its origins has been 
necessitated by the circumstances in which these knowledges were produced.
213
  What 
are the ‘conditions of possibility’ of what we know about sexual consent? How did the 
social and political context of ancient Greece and Rome frame (and place limits upon) 
this knowledge? And how might these early constructions help to illuminate modern 
debates among theorists of consent and their critics?  As David Halperin has remarked: 
 
[T]he Greeks are hardly alien or lost to us. They are, on the contrary, all about us 
– not because we are (allegedly) their inheritors, not because we may expect to 
find vestiges of them buried within ourselves, faintly discernible beneath layers 
of historical encrustation, transformation, and displacement. Rather, the Greeks 
are all about us insofar as they represent one of the codes in which we transact 
our own cultural business: we use our ‘truths’ about the Greeks to explain 
ourselves to ourselves and to construct our own experiences, including our 
sexual experiences.
214
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Much the same could be said about the influence of Roman law and social custom on 
contemporary understandings of political life, culture, and subjectivity, if not more 
forcefully.
215
 Indeed, while much of the Athenian approach to sexual offences persisted 
within Roman legislation, some divergences (later influenced by the development of 
Christian thought) exist. The first of three substantive sections of this chapter will 
attempt to reflect this pattern, beginning with an examination of the core Athenian 
practices which inform the notion of consent and incorporating Roman adaptations of 
and divergences from the Greek approach in later sub-sections that review both 
Athenian and Roman approaches to offences of (sexual) violence and adultery. This 
first section’s delineation of early attempts to codify social norms about sexual 
behaviour, seen most starkly in the legislation of Augustan’s moral reform in Rome at 
the turn of the first century, will focus on the proprietary and patrilineal interests sexual 
offence legislation was meant to protect. The role sexual consent can be seen to play in 
protecting these interests is also discussed using a construction I refer to as ‘consent-as-
proprietorship,’ which highlights the function consent played in signifying political 
status and protecting its parameters.  The second section examines an alternative story 
about consent as enacted among those members of early Athenian and Roman societies 
who were excluded from socio-political status, namely women, slaves, foreigners, and 
various ‘sexual transgressors.’ While it is tempting to characterize the actions among 
this group as ‘autonomous’ (in keeping with modern articulations of consent), when 
viewed within the context of the Classical period, these acts are not intelligible either as 
enactments of agency or of consent. Rather, what the sexual behaviours of this group of 
ancient outcasts reveals is not a story of consent-as-autonomy, but an account of the 
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way in which the availability and deployment of consent is restricted and governed by 
dominant norms of intelligibility.  This snapshot of early Athenian and Roman law 
reveals that consent was available only to certain subjects who were willing to act in 
certain ways. How this ancient story of consent can be seen to inform the doctrine’s 
contemporary uses is explored in this chapter’s third section. 
 
In this way, this chapter might be seen to echo the theoretical approach of Benjamin 
Constant where ‘Ancient’ and ‘Modern’ models of liberty were explored with the aim 
of better understanding a present state of affairs.
216
  My own exploration of ancient and 
modern forms of consent is rooted in a contention that both the ‘consent of the ancients’ 
and the ‘consent of the moderns’ invoke particular models of ownership, whether of 
others (in the case of the ancients) or of the self (in the case of the moderns). Yet in 
contrast to Constant, I have approached these models as artefacts, viewing consent (as 
autonomy) as a relatively modern construction which is ‘found’ by scholars in their 
investigations of earlier eras.
217
 These discoveries thus engage in a liberal grammar of 
self-governance and possessive individualism characteristic of modern conceptions of 
consent-as-autonomy.  Reading these constructions within a historical context which 
explicitly denied notions of self-rule on the basis of political status provides an 
opportunity to destabilise this foundational discourse and contemplate an untold story of 
consent.  The implications of this alternative narrative are explored in this chapter’s 
conclusion. 
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Ancient Approaches: Consent-as-Proprietorship 
Issues of consent figure most prominently in Athenian law in the designation and 
prohibition of ‘illicit’ or transgressive sexual behaviour.  Sexual offences were 
addressed under three primary categories, namely: (i) hubris; (ii) bia; and (iii) moicheia, 
each of which is examined in further detail below.
218
  Roman legal developments in this 
area were largely subsumed under the single category of stuprum, understood to refer to 
‘illicit sexual intercourse in any form.’219  While largely understood to refer to 
adulterous behaviour, stuprum could also include instances of forcible sex. At times, 
this was made explicit in the language, for instance when combined with the term 
raptus (understood to mean ‘forcible abduction’); however, stuprum is also found to 
have been used on its own to refer to violent sexual behaviour as well as consensual sex.  
As such, the Roman treatment of sexual consent is addressed in the second and third 
sub-sections below where the greatest overlap in the two jurisdictions’ treatment of 
sexual offences occurs. 
 
In each of these legal classifications, consent was a power limited to those members of 
the polis who enjoyed full rights of citizenship (i.e. free, Athenian-born men) and its 
enactment was a signifier of this status of political membership. In particular, consent 
served to represent a model of patriarchal rule and was employed as a means of 
protecting patrilineal interests and proprietary control over female sexuality. Where 
consent appears in circumstances that challenge this paradigm, it is treated as an 
aggravating factor to the sexual offence (rather than a means of vitiating a wrong, as in 
the contemporary context).  Moreover, in such instances, consent did not establish a 
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subject’s autonomy, but rather served to remove the political status upon which such 
rights to self-rule were found.  The following sub-sections explore this in further depth 
within each of the three forms of sexual offences of the period. 
 
(i)  hubris  
Perhaps indicative of the ‘extra legal’ character of Athenian juridical practice, the 
offence of hubris has been noted by some scholars of ancient history to represent 
something of a paradox.
220
 Despite the prominence the concept is thought to have had in 
daily Athenian life, there are few recorded cases of hubris having been brought to the 
courts. One explanation for this may lie in the nature of the offence itself.  Loosely 
interpreted to mean ‘shame,’ the text of the law as existent in the fourth century reads: 
If anyone commits hubris against another, whether child or woman or man, 
whether free or slave, or if he does anything outrageous (paranomon) against 
any of these, let any one who wishes (ho boulomenos), of those Athenians who 
are entitled, bring an indictment (graphē) before the judges (thesmothetai).221 
  
Understood to be an act of power used to shame another for pleasure,
222
 the party 
bringing the charge or graphē has allegedly suffered some dishonour from the 
perpetrator’s act and presumably might wish to avoid the publicity of a formal trial.223  
Further, hubris also pertained to ‘degrading acts’ which were thought to bring shame 
upon the citizenry as a whole.
224
 This was particularly the case in charges of hubris 
which involved a sexual act, although the graphē hubris could encompass a wide array 
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of actions, including verbal assault, and need not involve an element of violence.  
Instead, the central component of the offence was a subjective one: did the perpetrator 
intend to shame?  Often, the coercive element of the offence could be implied by the 
respective social positions of the parties.
225
 Cohen notes the work of Xenophon and his 
description of a ‘tyrant’s dilemma’ where Hiero, a ruler, desires the affections of 
Dailochus, a young male, yet to seek favour from him would be to endanger a charge of 
hubris, given his implicit power to compel obedience (for his own pleasure).
226
  
 
Arguably, consent can be seen to play a key role in the charge of hubris given that its 
absence would suggest domination over another’s free will, thus causing dishonour.227 
Within the context of sexual assault, however, the graphē hubris was available to the 
‘outraged fathers, husbands or brothers’ whose consent had not been sought before 
sexual access to the women in their care was obtained.
228
  Coupled with the 
acknowledgment that a charge of hubris need not involve physical violence, some 
scholars have suggested that adultery would also have fallen within the offence’s scope. 
As Fisher notes, ‘it is clearly a deliberate act, involving pleasure for the agent, shame 
for the various victims, and consequently contempt for the laws and the values of a 
community.’229 Cohen cites Lysias’ On the Murder of Eratosthenes as evidence of this 
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when Euphiletus raises the defence of justifiable homicide on the basis of hubris for 
having murdered Eratosthenes following his (consensual) seduction and sexual relations 
with Euphiletus’ wife.230  Rather than being immaterial, the evidence of the wife’s 
consent serves to establish the grounds for a charge of hubris given the dishonour the 
act brings to Euphiletus’ house and children. In this way, consent does not vitiate the 
harm of a sexual offence but rather establishes it. The shame of the offence is made out 
through the consent of Euphiletus’ wife, echoing a concern with familial lineage, rather 
than physical integrity or female autonomy.
231
 Consensual extra-marital sex could result 
in uncertainty about a child’s legitimate rights to inheritance and social status, thus its 
very invocation brought the property rights and obligations of the ‘injured’ male citizen 
to the fore. 
 
The offence of hubris could also be employed to enforce attitudes towards appropriate 
age requirements for sexual behaviour. While some remnants of what cultural 
anthropologists have suggested was a ‘familial’ or ‘tribal’ approach to linking sexual 
age with puberty are evident in so-called Athenian ‘age-of-consent’ mores, this was 
largely limited to female citizens and based on concerns of (successful) reproduction.
232
  
In this respect, these ‘age of consent’ parameters might better be described as ‘age of 
marriage’ or ‘age of access’ norms given that it was the consent of the woman’s father, 
husband, or kurios (i.e. legal guardian) which determined a man’s access to her in both 
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Athens and Rome (rather than some level of sexual independence that reaching a certain 
age might bring).
233
  
 
Where age and consent met more substantively in Athens was in the practice of 
paederasty, a homoerotic mentoring relationship between older Greek men and boys 
between the ages of twelve and eighteen (or earlier if signs of ‘manhood,’ e.g. beard 
growth, emerged).
234
  While often represented in contemporary analyses as examples of 
accepted homosexuality, the relations between adult Greek men and their adolescent 
citizens-in-training were subject to a number of limitations that differentiate them from 
contemporary understandings and forms of homosexual love.
235
 The paederastic 
relationship was understood to be one of ‘friendship, virtue, and pedagogy’ and did not 
extend beyond the youth’s adolescence.236  Paederastic practices are a good site for 
exploring alternative conceptions of consent given that sex was not understood to be a 
reciprocal transaction in Classical Greece but rather an act which was done by one to 
another, creating active and passive roles.
237
  The Greek sexual ‘actor’ was regarded as 
having a penetrative and dominant role, necessitating a passive and recipient role for the 
other party. As such, sex played both a hierarchical and polarizing role in Greek society, 
where free, full rights-bearing Greek (male) citizens could only engage in sexual 
activity with a person of inferior status.
238
  Sexual consent was thus understood to be a 
signifier of this lower, passive state.  This is evidenced by the Greek perception that a 
boy’s participation in paederastic relations was not indicative of any sexual desire, at 
least not in the reciprocally erotic fashion reserved among the Greeks for relations 
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between free, adult citizens.
239
 Instead, any enthusiasm the boy might display for his 
older lover was interpreted as ‘co-operation’ out of a sense of gratitude and affection 
rather than desire so as to avoid the perception of willed passivity, a state thought to 
emulate femininity and thus a lower status.  Xenophon makes this point rather explicitly 
when he suggests that ‘using men as women is to commit hubris against them,’240 which 
serves as the basis for Timarchus’ crime of having committed hubris against himself by 
‘consenting’ to sexual intercourse and thus ‘adopting the submissive sexual role of a 
woman.’241  This view of consent as a delimiter of social roles and the rights pertaining 
thereto is also evident in the regulation of other forms of transgressive sexual behaviour 
within both Athens and Rome as examined below.  
 
(ii) bia / raptus 
Unlike the term hubris which can have no positive connotations, the use of bia (and its 
cognates) in the legal rhetoric of Classical Athens denoted actions or characteristics that 
were deemed beneficial or admirable, depending on the circumstances.
242
  Often 
translated to mean ‘force’ or ‘violence,’ its use indicated the use of strength but need not 
involve a physical element, such as with the compulsion of another’s will.243 While 
sometimes found to be associated with hubris,
244
 the term bia is not thought to be as 
politicised a term as hubris and its meaning is more dependent on the context in which it 
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is used.  When employed as a conjunctive with sexual language, bia can be interpreted 
to most closely resemble a modern definition of ‘rape,’245 referenced by many scholars 
as dike biaion (where dike denotes a ‘private suit’ which had to have been brought by 
the offended party, as opposed to graphē which was a public suit to which any (free) 
person had standing).
246
  
 
The text most identified with the association between dike biaion and rape is Lysias’ On 
the Murder of Erotosthenes, discussed in the previous section in relation to its 
commentary on hubris.
247
 In this text, Lysias makes reference to the law’s treatment of 
sexual violence which many scholars employ as evidence of a legal distinction between 
consensual and non-consensual sex.
248
  Omitowoju translates the text as follows: 
Hear, gentlemen, that he [the lawgiver] orders that if someone shames by force a 
free person or child he shall owe double damages: if a woman, from those for 
whom it is possible to kill, he is included in the same provisions. Thus, 
gentlemen, he thought that those who use bia deserve a lesser penalty than those 
who use persuasion.
249
  
 
In this passage, Euphiletus’ reference to persuasion or peitho is designed to denote the 
act as one of seduction or adultery rather than of rape where the former was punished 
more severely than the latter.  Many scholars interpret this punitive distinction as 
suggesting an act of bia against the woman’s body (i.e. rape) was not thought as serious 
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as an act of force against her soul (in the case of persuasion) thus reinforcing a legal 
significance to the woman’s consent.250  This reading seems misleading for two reasons. 
First, the concern with seduction seems more likely to have been about the dangers 
which sexual infidelity posed to patrilineal legitimacy than the violation of a woman’s 
soul. Omitowoju argues that the language used by Euphiletus is telling, given that bia, 
while a possible descriptor of forced sex, is accompanied with the verb aischunein 
meaning ‘to shame’ and suggests that it is more likely a description of the shameful 
behaviour which Eratosthenes has shown in entering Euphiletus’ home without (its 
owner’s) permission.251 Secondly, to position Euphiletus’ wife’s consent as the factor 
which designates this offence as one of bia or rape is to grant women a status they did 
not have in Athenian society. Instead, it is the consent of her kurios that matters and 
thus the crime has been in Eratosthenes’ theft of Euphiletus’ property (or a ‘forcing of 
his will’ with respect to it.)252 To establish a category of female consent which is 
somehow left independent or unmediated by the consent of her kurios would be to insert 
an anomaly in Athenian legal society and women’s place within it.  At best, a notion of 
female sexual consent is ‘only ever a tangential issue in respect to the legal treatment of 
a crime’ and the degree to which its hubristic consequences might impact upon male 
parties.
253
 The legal consideration of the use of force in these Classical contexts 
demonstrates the proprietary interest consent represents (when exercised by a male 
citizen) as well as the connotations of passivity and lower status it signified within a 
sexual context. 
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A similar interpretation is made of the Roman term raptus, widely understood to refer to 
forcible abduction and associated with a proprietary theft (of another man’s female 
dependent(s)).
254
 While the term does not strictly include a sexual connotation, it is 
thought to have been presumed by the Classical period.
255
  The offence remained one 
subject to private suit until the rule of Constantine when it was made a public crime 
punishable by death.
256
  Forcible abductions were a common (and ritualised) component 
to nuptial and other religious ceremonies where brides (and boys in some paederastic 
rites of passage) were ‘taken off’ with the assumption that sexual activity would 
ensue.
257
 However, in such instances the sexual act had to remain an apparent or public 
one so as to differentiate it from acts of ‘actual violence [which was] equally 
condemned by public opinion and by the law.’258  Even in these instances, consent was 
an immaterial concept within both social and legal framings of permissible (and illicit) 
sexual activity.  
 
Such practices may have influenced the development of the concept in Roman law of 
‘coerced consent’ where the presence of force was often insufficient to negate a finding 
of free choice. Diana Moses suggests that Roman law during the period between the end 
of the Republic and the beginning of the Principate struggled with the limits of 
acceptable use of force resulting in a conceptual and temporal ‘middle ground’ where 
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exceptions were carved out, including times of war
259
 and elopements (where the 
father’s consent had not been sought).260 The continued influence of the Greek notion of 
peitho can also be seen in early Roman treatments of coacta voluit (as termed in the 
Corpus Juris Civilis)
261
 where coercion did not vitiate an understanding of preference or 
persuasion: ‘although she was forced she willed it.’262  Thus, the Roman understanding 
of coercion did not act to negate one’s will but rather was thought to re-direct it. In the 
case of women and transgressive sex, this re-direction was often to a more illicit end.  
Similar to the role assigned to the will of Euphiletus’ wife in Lysias’ account of the 
murder of Eratosthenes, a determination of whether a woman had been persuaded (by 
force) into illicit sexual activity informed her culpability rather than that of her 
perpetrator. In Roman terms, this would have elevated the offence to one of adultery or 
stuprum given the shame it brought upon her husband or guardian and the danger it 
brought upon her household (and heirs) with respect to legitimate claims to citizenship. 
The following section examines these offences of adultery in both ancient Athens 
(moicheia) and Rome (stuprum) to further explore this proprietary-informed role of 
sexual consent. 
  
(iii) moicheia / stuprum 
Contrary to modern classifications of ‘rape’ as the most severe of sexual crimes, 
Classical Athenian society reserved this place for the offence of adultery. As such, the 
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role of consent in the early Greek period contrasts significantly with the ‘morally 
transformative’ power current scholarship designates the concept as having in its 
demarcation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sex.263  In both Athens and Rome in the Classical era, 
women’s sexual consent was immaterial but for circumstances of seduction or adultery 
where its ‘transformative’ power was to further criminalise or shame the behaviour at 
issue. In this way, where female consent to sexual activity can be seen to take form in 
these early juridical treatments, ‘it does so only by reference to specific male concerns,’ 
often serving to aggravate the nature of an offence (rather than legitimize it).
264
  More 
importantly, I think, is that the concept enters the discourse only in retroactive readings 
of Classical orations and laws. While modern notions of consent are understood to 
imply autonomy, there is evidence to suggest that the concept was a signifier of other 
values within the polis, most particularly social status and property interests. 
 
This is perhaps best seen in the Athenian category of moicheia. Although some 
scholars, (most notably Cohen),
265
 have argued that the Athenian offence of moicheia is 
limited to adultery, (defined as a ‘voluntary violation of the marital bond’),266 I am 
persuaded by the arguments of others who suggest that the offence is more akin to the 
Roman term stuprum which encompassed a more general grouping of transgressive 
sexual behaviours.
267
 Archaic uses of stuprum are thought to have meant ‘pollution’ and 
certainly as the offence was adapted over time (and codified during the Augustan era), 
an understanding of it as an act of shaming or dishonouring was maintained.  As such, 
considerations of consent on the part of a victim of stuprum were largely irrelevant 
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given that the word was used rather neutrally with respect to whether the sex that had 
occurred was forced or not. Instead, the act was shameful on account of the victim 
having been used and one’s consent to such use could not undo the damage done.268  In 
this way, the offence of stuprum is better understood as protecting the proprety and 
patrilineal interests of male citizens in early Roman society than as protecting sexual 
agency.  Certainly, this argument can be made for the Greek offence of moicheia which 
could be brought as a graphē and thus would fall within the category of offences ‘with 
political rather than purely personal resonance.’269  Moicheia could thus be interpreted 
to be a means by which the polis regulated not simply the limits of acceptable sexual 
behaviour but also matters of a greater political interest (such as legitimate familial 
lineage and the boundaries of rightful citizenship). In fact, Stephen Todd makes this 
explicit when he suggests that ‘the graphe moikheias is used against anyone attempting 
to pass off his suppositious child as the son of a citizen.’270  
 
The Augustan moral reform at the turn of the first millenium is thought among many 
scholars to have been an attempt to regulate these boundaries of citizenship given its 
focus on rewarding procreation within marriage and penalizing childless and unmarried 
unions.
271
 As a result of Augustus’ leges Juliae, acts of stuprum became punishable by 
public law and were widely viewed as accusations against the victim’s (usually a 
woman’s) moral virtue.272  Further, the invocation of the criminal law to enforce 
regulations on sexual behaviour (as in Augustus’ lex Julia de adulteriis) allowed for 
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further specification of instances where force was used in committing the act, (e.g. per 
vim stuprum, or raptus ad stuprum) leading some writers to postulate whether this 
development began to direct Roman jurisprudence towards a contemplation of the 
subjective state of mind of the victim. Diana Moses explores this issue suggesting that 
the distinction between acts accomplished by force and those that took place 
consensually was not an articulation which ‘fit easily into Roman legal thinking and 
categories.’273 Rather, in most sexual offences of the time, the sexual act itself was 
sufficient to warrant guilt irrespective of how it had occurred.
274
  
 
This, of course, changes dramatically when the consent at issue is that of a male citizen, 
where the will of the kurios (or its absence) is a definitive component to establishing the 
commission of a sexual offence. At issue in both accounts is a violation of male 
proprietary rights to both access and regulation of female sexuality.  In this way, 
consent operates as a juridical product of value exchanged among men of sufficient 
political status rather than a form of agency.  Women were, after all, the ‘legal 
transmitters of the rights of inheritance and political participation’ and thus the 
regulation of their sexual relationships was a key component to ensuring the stability of 
male property and their family lines. The legal and social recognition and instatement of 
consent was essential to maintaining this system. Consent in this context presumes male 
ownership of female sexuality and its value as a means of exchanging them. This is a 
slight shift from Luce Irigaray’s argument about the ‘market’ of women’s sexuality 
where the exchange value of a woman’s body is intelligible only from the vantage point 
                                                          
273
 Moses (n 79), 50. 
274
 This is seen in Roman considerations of ‘coerced consent,’ discussed earlier, where an argument of the 
presence of force or duress serves merely to show how the will of the victim was directed or by what 
means ‘persuasion of the will’ can be said to have occurred. Similarly, the Athenian concept of moicheia 
does not appear to contemplate female consent in its definition. Omitowoju presents a segment from 
Xenophon’s Hiero (3.3) where the offence is made out when sex has occurred both through the woman’s 
‘own fault’ and her ‘misfortune’ (n 217), 93-94. 
81 
 
of a ‘speculating third party’ (i.e. male desire).275 Early Athenian and Roman societies 
did value the female body for ‘the work it could do’ but the provision of access to these 
labours (via kurios consent) was a product of value in its own right, asserting male 
proprietary rights, ensuring patrilineal legitimacy, and policing these boundaries of 
status and kinship through the invocation of shame.
276
 Further, this function of consent-
as-proprietorship served to alienate women from mastering their own bodies and 
subjectivities apart from male ownership and desire.
277
 Any relationships or actions on 
the part of women (among others) which did not fit this frame had to take place outside 
the polis. 
 
Ancient Outlaws: Unintelligible Acts 
Judith Butler has suggested two dimensions to the law’s disciplinary power, the first 
being a regulation (of what it permits) through acts of prohibition or limitation and the 
second, an effective production of subjects, gestures, and practices it is unable to 
contain.
278
  Early Athenian and Roman approaches to regulating sexual conduct can be 
seen to produce a population of others through a process of exclusion which occurs on 
two fronts.  The first is an exclusion on the basis of application.  The laws regulating 
sexual conduct were applicable only to free citizens of the state. Foreigners, women 
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without a kurios, prostitutes, slaves, and persons of questionable social status were not 
subjects of the law.  These persons could neither bring a charge of sexual misconduct 
(as articulated in any of the aforementioned offences) nor be subject to one.
279
  
 
A second form of exclusion is on the basis of (socio-political) recognition where certain 
sexual acts were not seen as invoking a concept of consent either because of the act 
itself or the subject engaged in it. Thus, where the sexual behaviour of persons fell 
outside the civic interests of the state, a particular ‘freedom’ was produced.  Omitowoju 
cites the example of the character Glykera in Menander’s play, Perikeiromene, who is 
understood to be a pallake or non-citizen.
280
 Despite conduct which would have 
transgressed several norms of the period, Glykera is regarded as ‘her own mistress’ 
given that she has no kurios whose consent is required to authorize her sexual 
availability.  Similarly, in the case of Apollodorus’ prosecution of Neaera, a woman 
who is a foreigner to Athens (and thus not a citizen) and is living ‘as if in marriage’ with 
Stephanus, an Athenian.
281
 The union would not have been recognised as valid, with 
laws in place to prohibit any children of the relationship from claiming citizenship.
282
 A 
daughter is born to the couple and following the Peleponnesian War, legal reform 
results in such unions being criminalised with a penalty of slavery for the woman and a 
fine for the Athenian man. In Apollodorus’ prosecution of Neaera, he provides a brief 
description of her life, so as to establish her foreign status.
283
 This history includes child 
prostitution and several acts of illicit sexual behaviour with Athenian men; however, as 
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Omitowoju notes, Apollodorus is careful not to use hubris to describe any of these acts. 
To do so would be to introduce the possibility of Neaera having a status she is not 
entitled to have. ‘There is no indication that what happens to Neaera... could ever form 
the basis of a graphē hubris... because Neaera does not have the status to maintain it.’284  
Consent in Neaera’s case is elided. To mention it would be to produce a kurios Neaera 
could not have and to give juridical recognition to her (transgressive) union with 
Stephanus.  Where, however, a subject was already recognised as having status, consent 
could act to vitiate it. Cohen notes a passage from Demosthenes which describes 
Androtion, a male prostitute, as having suffered hubris at the hands of those ‘men who 
had no love for him but could pay his price.’285  These relationships would have fallen 
outside the ambit of paederastic mentorship and as such, Androtion has lost his status by 
‘consent[ing] to conduct to which any honourable free man should never consent.’286  
 
Consent among this group of outcasts can be seen as a transgressive act both in terms of 
the engagement it signifies with sexual activities and unions unsanctioned by the state, 
and in terms of the expression of agency it represents among a group not granted this 
proprietary (nor subjective) right. Important to note, however, is the association of 
individualism with self-ownership embedded within the structure offered by liberal 
conceptions of consent that this marginalised population problematises.  Similar to the 
oxymoronic designation of Victorian prostitutes among other ‘immorals’ as ‘public 
women’ who were assigned to the public arena without any of its state-sanctioned 
rights, the ‘outlaws’ of ancient Greek and Roman societies were neither owned nor 
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substantively capable of being self-owners.
287
 The consent-as-autonomy model thus 
operates within this ‘outlaw’ sphere in a paradoxical fashion in at least two ways.  
 
First, the autonomy of the ancient outcast is possible only because these acts of 
(transgressive) sexual expression occur outside of the state and thus do not threaten its 
concerns with policing citizenship and property rights. As such, the outlaw’s consent is 
only autonomous in its lack of socio-political consequence or recognition. While the 
liberal subject is autonomous in its self-owning, proprietary rights-bearing capacity, the 
outcast of the ancient society exercises agency in a non-public arena, challenging the 
possessive individualism at the heart of dominant modern discourses of consent.  This 
stands in stark contrast to the autonomy which modern accounts have argued is made 
most manifest in consent. With a desire to preserve a dichotomy between the public and 
private spheres of human activity, liberal political theories argue for minimal 
government intervention, most notably within ‘private’ matters. Defining liberty as the 
freedom to be ‘let alone,’ these theories found the most promise for this independence 
in private property rights and a controlled role for state governance of economic affairs. 
In such models, consent is the means by which a citizen’s natural right to non-
interference is recognised and exchanged for security. While contemporary scholars will 
often read consent-as-autonomy in accounts of early Greek and Roman treatments of 
sexual offence regulation, a conception of the individual most free from state 
intervention and self-determinative of private relations is more evident among those 
deemed ineligible for consent within state borders.  Further, some aspects to modern 
liberalism’s push for a more positive notion of liberty (i.e. a freedom to act rather than a 
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freedom from (state) action) is better exemplified along these ‘outer limits’ to the polis, 
as suggested in Menander’s description of Glykera as ‘her own mistress.’288 
 
Second, the status of the outlaw is produced through at least a partial adherence to the 
normative categories of subjectivity found within the polis. These ‘others’ are socially 
intelligible in their physical form (e.g. as ‘women’ or ‘men’) but not in the attributes or 
behaviours they participate in, leaving their identities as ‘homosexual men’ or ‘sexually 
autonomous women’ incoherent. The myth of Caeneus, found in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, provides a good example of this code of intelligibility (and the 
gendered nature of Classical consent.)  Caeneus was a king’s daughter who had rejected 
all of her suitors before being coerced into sex by Poseidon who agreed to grant her any 
wish she desired in return for her submission.  Her wish was never to have to consent 
again and so Poseidon gave Caeneus an ‘impenetrable’ body – that of a man.289 A 
woman with the authority (or sufficient ‘self-ownership’) to refuse consent was an 
unintelligible subject within the polis, demonstrated by Caeneus’ wish manifesting itself 
in a gender reassignment. A similar circumstance can be seen in the story of Antigone, 
as told by Sophocles. Antigone lacks the socio-political status of a legal subject both 
because of her gender and the fact that she was the daughter of an incestuous union.  
Her brother is declared a traitor of the state by Creon, her uncle and the newly crowned 
king of Thebes, and is denied a proper burial.  Antigone violates these orders and buries 
her brother’s body.  When she is called before Creon to speak to her crimes, her 
transgressions against the state become two-fold: first, in her initial act of disobeying 
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Creon’s orders; and second, in her act of appearing before the state to speak to her 
crimes.  This latter act would have been one reserved for male citizens, thus, in asking 
Antigone to respond to her initial act of disobedience, Creon imparts a status to 
Antigone that she is not entitled to. This is explicitly acknowledged in the play when 
Antigone is called ‘manly’ by the chorus and when Creon accuses his son, Haemon 
(who is engaged to be married to Antigone), of being ‘inferior to a woman’ for his 
attempts to support her.
290
  Here, Antigone’s autonomy – her act of independence and, 
arguably, self-rule (as opposed to obedience to state sovereignty) – is unintelligible. 
Moreover, as Butler has suggested, ‘[h]er act is never fully her act.’291  Rather, the 
autonomy Antigone exercises is not hers but that of a man and thus, it exists only in her 
transgression of the norms of intelligibility that serve to delegitimize her identity as an 
autonomous subject.  As Butler notes: 
[Antigone] asserts herself through appropriating the voice of the other, the one 
to whom she is opposed; thus her autonomy is gained through the appropriation 
of the authoritative voice of the one she resists, an appropriation that has within 
it traces of a simultaneous refusal and assimilation of that very authority.
292
 
 
This is akin to the paradox (discussed in the previous chapter) that is housed within 
contemporary understandings of consent, where the autonomy that consent is meant to 
embody must ultimately be unrealisable so as to continue to hold the promise of 
universal applicability.  This is particularly evident when this claim to autonomy (via 
consent) is made by those whose very status or subjectivity challenges the norms of 
intelligibility upon which the consent-as-autonomy story is built.  Antigone, Caeneus, 
Glykera, and other transgressors of these rules of the ancients may be seen to act 
autonomously, but in so doing, they move out of the frame of intelligibility, and thus, 
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out of the scope of consent.  Through a set of preconditions to consent, they are made, 
to employ Butler’s language, ‘stateless within the state.’   
These spectral humans, deprived of ontological weight and failing the tests of 
social intelligibility required for minimal recognition include those whose age, 
gender, race, nationality, and labor status not only disqualify them for 
citizenship but actively “qualify” them for statelessness. This last notion may 
well be significant, since the stateless are not just stripped of status but accorded 
a status and prepared for their dispossession and displacement; they become 
stateless precisely through complying with certain normative categories.
293
 
 
While this lack of coherence in the consent-as-autonomy story may be more visible 
when examining a historical context where the rules of exclusion from socio-political 
recognition are more starkly or explicitly stratified, the question remains as to whether 
consent and its contemporary preconditions function all that differently today.  In the 
Canadian Supreme Court case of Mara, for example, (where charges of obscenity were 
laid against a tavern when its dancers allowed patrons to touch and kiss them during 
performances), the court dismissed the issue of consent on the grounds that the acts in 
question fell too far outside the realm of common decency. Writing for the court, 
Sopinka J stated: 
It is unacceptably degrading to women to permit such uses of their bodies in the 
context of a public performance in a tavern.  Insofar as the activities were 
consensual, as the appellants stressed, this does not alter their degrading 
character.  Moreover, as I stated in Butler, at p. 479, ‘[s]ometimes the very 
appearance of consent makes the depicted acts even more degrading or 
dehumanizing.’294 
 
In this case, the ‘autonomy’ that consent is meant to signify is denied on the basis that it 
was enacted in ways that did not conform to dominant understandings of women and 
female sexuality.  Akin to the effect a woman’s consent could be seen to have on an 
offence of hubris in the Classical context, ‘the very appearance of consent’ in the Mara 
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case serves as an aggravating factor to the alleged harm.  Moreover, this case 
demonstrates that the ‘freedom’ to consent is one that must be enacted in compliance 
with prescribed ways of being and acting in order to be recognizable, suggesting that the 
denial of autonomy experienced by Antigone is a more familiar experience for non-
conforming subjects in the present day than the consent-as-autonomy story would lead 
one to believe. 
 
(Post)Modern Reflections 
This chapter’s survey of how early Greek and Roman societies addressed sexual consent 
has demonstrated that consent has performed functions and housed meanings that run 
contrary to the foundationalist story of autonomy.  In contrast to contemporary views of 
consent as a signifier of an ethical or equitable transaction, there have been both 
circumstances and subjects for whom consent aggravates rather than mitigates 
inequality.  This is a concern raised by many of the left-leaning critiques examined in 
the previous chapter which strive to remove a distinction between the individual and her 
society.  Rather than positing individuals as autonomous agents, these critiques suggest 
that subjects are tied to the communities in which they act, thus limiting and influencing 
the parameters of their choices.  Subjects of any given socio-legal structure are not 
‘free’ from the constraints of these systems.  Rather, legal rights are correlative to 
others’ vulnerabilities.  Thus, even critical reformulations of the liberal account of 
consent are subject to the criticism that they do not adequately account for the 
relationship between juridical rights and socio-economic and cultural restraints.
295
 
Wendy Brown, in her examination of ‘constitutive dualisms’ in liberal discourse, 
suggests that women are situated (ontologically within and through consent) as 
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submitting, assenting to terms that they do not participate in framing.
296
  Consent and its 
various ontological roles are not, then, power neutral, yet liberal theories of consent and 
their critiques seem ill-equipped to address how consent functions as a license not to 
property rights or sexual access, but to cultural recognition.
297
  Explorations of Athenian 
rape laws and attitudes involve ‘examining not just the sorts of behaviour they 
regulated, but the sorts of people whose behaviour they seemed to problematise or the 
sorts of people whom they sought to protect.’298 I would contend that the same should 
be said for investigations into consent today.  While Omitowoju describes female 
consent in Classical Athens as ‘illegitimate’ in that it performed different functions than 
contemporary theories of consent would anticipate (e.g. aggravating or altering the 
offence as seen in the case of hubris), I would argue that consent in the ancient context 
reveals more a story of intelligibility than of legitimacy given its role in determining 
what subjects are recognizable rather than what actions are justified. 
 
This is perhaps best illustrated by the population of ‘outlaws’ examined in the previous 
section. Rather than simply representing various incarnations of ‘illegitimate’ or 
incomplete forms of consent, consent functions within the Athenian polis to not only 
regulate this population but, in the first instance, to produce it. The outcast represents 
the ‘necessary other’ for the creation and control of the ideal citizen, the latter made 
visible only through the transgressions of the former.
299
 My examination of sexual 
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a discourse founded in an (autonomously) acting subject. 
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populations as both marginal and in need of control. Take, for example, his comments on the ‘success’ of 
the prison system in his seminal work, Discipline and Punish: 
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consent in early Athens and Rome reveals a legal concept that is applied selectively and 
differentially on the bases of gender, social status, age, and sexual practice (discretions 
that are arguably as evident in contemporary articulations of consent). Some might 
suggest that this shows consent to be a right or privilege only available to certain 
subjects, be those men or free citizens or married, heterosexual couples. This might lead 
reformists to suggest that the problems with consent and its application can be remedied 
by simply expanding the category of persons to whom this right or privilege is 
available.  The foundation for making discernments about this expansion project would 
vary depending on which theoretical camp critiques of consent were coming from; yet, 
these analyses and their reform projects presume a fixed quality to consent. It is merely 
a tool that needs to be picked up and redirected in the ‘right’ way.  The dominant 
narrative of consent as a form of freedom, whether to contract or to self-determine, is 
maintained.
300
  
 
Further, while some commentators might argue that the outcasts of ancient Athens and 
Rome represent an explicit example of socio-economic inequity where the law can be 
seen to service the interests of the wealthy and privileged, these analyses fall short of 
explaining how these exclusions contribute to, rather than contest this ‘natural’ story of 
consent as a freedom pre-existing the subject who enacts it. I would suggest that what is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the 
hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well introducing delinquency, a specific type, a 
politically or economically less dangerous -and on occasion, usable- form of illegality; in 
producing delinquents, in an apparently marginal, but in fact centrally supervised milieu; in 
producing the delinquent as a pathologised subject (n 213), 277. 
300
 See, for instance, the critique of radical feminist approaches to sexual consent offered by Moore and 
Reynolds, ‘Feminist Approaches to Sexual Consent: A Critical Assessment’ in Cowling and Reynolds (n 
13). While recognising the difficulty presented by a context where women have only a ‘partial 
engagement in an unequal sexual contract’ and sexual consent is ‘the ideological misrepresentation of 
hetero-patriarchal sexual ownership, control and abuse,’ Moore and Reynolds maintain a commitment to 
this dominant narrative of consent-as-autonomy.  They state: ‘A concept of sexual consent that cannot 
appreciate the meaning of women’s agency and autonomy, even under conditions of social and sexual 
inequality, will be of little use in theorising women’s ownership of their sexuality short of radical social 
and structural change’ (n 13), 29-30. 
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at issue in contemporary applications of consent is not the quality of free action, 
property protection, or the capacity for reasonable self-control, but rather the 
constitution of the public domain. Law has the power to give expression to imagined 
boundaries and spatialisations and to define the parameters for who might inhabit these 
spaces.
301
 Further, although many critical legal theories might suggest that the outcast 
population represents a ‘failed approximation’ of the ideal citizen and thus presents an 
opportunity to subvert or transform the norm, Butler’s work posits such constitutive 
failings as produced by the norm itself (through a demarcating of the ‘other’) and 
indicative (if not productive) of the norm’s plasticity and strength.  Thus, when the law 
fails, it is re-imagined and re-tooled, but not rejected.  The very difference or diversity 
which demonstrates the law’s inadequacy is used to legitimise its borders.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to investigate the ‘conditions of possibility’ for 
reconceptualising sexual consent within the ancient eras of Athens and Rome. It began 
with an examination of three legal categories in which sexual behaviour was regulated 
in the Classical period, including the offences of hubris, bia, and moicheia or stuprum. 
How consent could be seen to operate in each of these offence categories as a form of 
proprietorship in relation to the familial interests of free, male citizens was constrasted 
with the experiences of consent among the state’s outcasts, where consent was seen to 
serve as a form of juridical and cultural recognition.  In each case, a destabilisation of 
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the liberal grammar which dominates contemporary theories of consent was sought, 
particularly through a contemplation of those subjectivities for whom neither the ancient 
nor modern conceptions of consent provided adequate explanation. 
 
In this way, this chapter might be seen as a comparison of the ‘consent of the Ancients’ 
with the ‘consent of the Moderns,’ yet my own analysis lacks the certainty with which 
Constant advocated a revised notion of liberty on the basis of his comparative analysis. 
Instead, my project is not one of revision or reform but merely of reflection.  This 
chapter’s earlier discussion of sexual offence regulation suggests that within the 
Athenian polis, consent operated with a presumption that citizens use their bodies 
reasonably and without shame – a mandate that, as the next chapter will demonstrate, 
was carried through into the medieval period’s treatment of consent (albeit reformulated 
into a Christian paradigm).
302
 This suggests that exploring narratives of consent within 
contexts that challenge the ahistorical story told of consent-as-autonomy reveals that 
law’s use of consent may implicate questions of prescriptive subjectivity and socio-
political recognition as much as (if not more than) notions of autonomy.  Finding these 
counter-narratives, however, is not easy work.  It requires reading against the grain of 
powerful and pervasive stories of consent that boast the persuasion of the ‘common 
sense.’  There is likely no area of law where this autonomy story is more secured than in 
the field of medical law and its doctrine of informed consent.  Reading against this story 
is the work of the next chapter. 
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 Foucault’s observations of paederasty in the second volume of his History of Sexuality provide some 
evidence to support this ethos of moderation, suggesting an early Greek view of temperance in the 
exercise of power where the ‘ethics of pleasure’ required ‘subtle strategies that would make allowance for 
the other’s freedom, his ability to refuse, and his required consent’ (n 241), 199.  It is important to note, 
however, that the ‘consent’ being referenced in this passage was that of either fully-fledged male citizens 
or their younger counterparts.  The notion that consent, within the ancient context, could have entailed a 
‘right to refuse’ for anyone else would not have been an intelligible contention.  
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CHAPTER THREE – MEDIEVAL MEDICINE 
 
 
 
My God, my God, how soon wouldst thou have me go to the physician, 
and how far wouldst thou have me go with the physician?
303
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The field of medical ethics is one where change is both expected and exigent. 
Developments in biotechnology and its applications create a host of possibilities for 
clinical medicine while complicating existing frameworks for treatment and decision-
making.  Debates concerning reproductive technologies, organ donations and 
transplants, life support systems, death assistance, and genetic research represent only 
some of the places where medicine, law, and ethics converse about the value and limits 
of human life. Despite the vast differences both between and within these fields, the 
doctrine of informed consent provides a common platform for these varied analyses, 
leading some commentators to suggest that consent serves as a lynchpin for bioethical 
research and its regulation.
304
  This pivotal role for consent within medical law and 
ethics scholarship persists notwithstanding a significant number of problems, often 
positioned in the literature as deficiencies in the doctrine’s level of specificity or 
scope.
305
  Scholars of all stripes question the justificatory bases for consent and whether 
the requirements for establishing informed consent are sufficiently stringent or extend to 
an adequate array of arenas of medical research and practice.  
 
Bioethicists are, however, fairly uniform in their view of informed consent as a modern-
day construction established against long-standing traditions of paternalism and power 
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within doctor-patient relationships. Histories of the informed consent doctrine often 
begin with a citation of the Hippocratic Oath, highlighting its implicit endorsement of 
deception to gain patient trust and a ‘doctor knows best’ approach to decision-making, 
before moving ahead to an ‘emergence’ of informed consent in the twentieth century.306 
This has positioned the Nuremberg Code of 1947 as medical law’s first appearance of 
ethical regulations based on informed consent.
307
 This view of informed consent as a 
historically specific and legally created doctrine creates a ‘truth’ about consent and how 
it operates in medical law which is bound to these roots of paternalism and their 
presumed counterpart of patient autonomy. Informed consent requirements, procedures, 
and their efficacies are assessed in contemporary scholarship in relation to how well 
they advance patients’ rights to self-determination and choice.308  Further, even critiques 
or proposed reforms of the consent doctrine must reference this paternalism debate to be 
intelligible; they must re-engage with this discourse of individual choice and its 
liberties.
309
  This persists even amidst apparent paradoxes created by the ever-increasing 
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 See: Faden and Beauchamp (n 81); Jackson (n 114); and Peter J. Murray, ‘The History of Informed 
Consent’ (1990) 10 Iowa Orthop. Journal 104 as examples of this practice. 
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 The 1972 U.S. case of Canterbury v. Spence (464 F.2d 772, D.C. Cir.) has been heralded by some 
scholars as ‘the pinnacle of informed consent case law’ given its determination that physicians would be 
held to a standard set by law; Wolf (n 5), 1632.  This standard  (later characterised as the ‘reasonable 
person’ standard) is informed by a ‘more robust right grounded in the moral principle of autonomy’ rather 
than a professional standard established by what similarly situated colleagues might disclose; R. Veatch, 
(ed) Cross-Cultural Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Jones & Bartlett 2000), 146.  Veatch describes the 
Canterbury case as one which ‘overturn[ed] the more paternalistic Hippocratic professional standard,’ 
158.  
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 Note, for instance, the critiques offered by Manson and O’Neill which reject autonomy models (in 
favour of frameworks for consent which prioritize ‘agency’ as a form of communicative action), while 
still recognizing the necessity of engaging with the discourse of autonomy in analyses of consent. They 
state: ‘Appeals to informed consent and its role in justifying clinical and research practice are now so well 
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demand for more explicit and expansive forms of consent, each aimed at providing 
patients with greater opportunities for ‘free choice.’  In a passage that echoes some of 
the tensions inherent in consent’s hypothetical status that were explored in Chapter One, 
Manson and O’Neill contend that:   
Explicit consent cannot be necessary, because it is not always possible. Implied 
consent can be replaced by explicit consent in some, but not all, cases… [I]t 
would not be possible to do entirely without implied consent, because any 
explicit consenting presupposes and relies on implicit assumptions and 
agreements – including assumptions about the methods and conventions for 
requesting, offering and refusing consent.
310
 
 
Thus, while the demand  for more specific procedures and forms of consent is often 
viewed as raising ethical criteria for clinical practice, the effect is a demand for 
‘formalistic, uniform, and, strictly speaking, impossible procedures and standards.’311 
Consent in this context is tasked with altering an age-old history of paternalism while 
securing patients’ personal and bodily integrity. As a result, medical law has 
increasingly granted an integral, if not all-encompassing, role to consent when 
determining the rights and responsibilities of medical relationships.
312
 As noted by 
Draper and Sorrell, ‘[i]n comparison to what it asks of doctors, mainstream medical 
                                                                                                                                                                          
entrenched that their presence, indeed their necessity, and their justification are rarely questioned,’ (n 
305), 2.  
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 Manson and O’Neill (n 305), 12. 
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 Manson and O’Neill (n 305), 11. 
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 In their 2007 volume, Rethinking Informed Consent, Manson and O’Neill point to empirical research 
highlighting the prominence of informed consent scholarship in the medical field.  They cite their own 
search results from the database MedLine for the year 2002-2003 where the terms ‘informed consent’ 
appear in the titles of more than 300 articles (in English) and in the subject field of more than 1800 
articles, (n. 305), 1. My own search of the same database for the year 2012-2013 reveals similar 
prominence for the terms with 244 (English language) articles with ‘informed consent’ in the title and 
3383 articles where the terms are used in the Keyword field.  These numbers increase substantially when 
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portion of the year).  The number of (English language) articles available in the MedLine database for the 
year 2011-2012 which feature the terms ‘informed consent’ in the title and keyword field are 355 and 
4567, respectively.  
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ethics makes very few demands of patients, and these usually begin and end with 
consent.’313  
 
Consent, therefore, in the modern context, is positioned as a simple matter of exercising 
choice or enacting a freedom each patient is presumed to have.  Rethinking informed 
consent within this frame means tweaking the circumstances in which this choice occurs 
(e.g. revisiting the requirements for physician disclosure), rather than examining how 
this conception of consent prefigures the frame in which it is revisited or whether 
alternative accounts of the doctrine and its function might exist.
314
  Consent as choice or 
self-determination gains an indisputable status in this narrative, linked to notions of 
freedom and personal rights.  Yet, as Wendy Brown has argued, ‘rights are never 
deployed “freely,” but always within a discursive, hence normative context.’315  This 
normative context, in terms of informed consent, is deeply entrenched in a liberal 
grammar of (patient) autonomy, thus making attempts to find understandings of medical 
consent which do not invoke and reinstate this rights-based foundation rather fruitless – 
at least in modern scholarship.
316
 Hearing a different story will require a context that is 
situated before ‘autonomy’ became, to employ Foucault’s terms, ‘permanently 
established in the realm of truth.’317 
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This chapter will thus continue the project’s genealogical investigation of consent by 
examining a period far removed from the discourses of autonomy operating in 
contemporary bioethical scholarship – Europe’s Middle Ages.  Although the term the 
‘Dark Ages’ has been largely abandoned by historians following the discovery of much 
intellectual and cultural development during the period, this label continues to be an apt 
description of the medieval era’s reputation in the field of medical ethics.318  This is 
even more so with respect to notions of patient autonomy or consent to medical 
treatment, given the general view of depravity which many medieval and medical 
historians have applied to medical practice of the time, leading some commentators to 
quip ‘all medieval medical practice was malpractice.’319 The period is further plagued 
by images of supernatural belief systems and charletan practitioners. As one medieval 
history commentator suggests: 
Because of their simple Christian faith, most medieval folk resorted for healing 
to saint's relics and superstitious charms. Furthermore, they were misled by 
medical quacks, old witches with their herbs and incantations, midwives, and 
blood-letting barbers. Such is the average mental image of medieval medicine.
320
 
 
Yet, despite this reputation, a great number of ethical codes for medical practice and 
physician conduct within the medieval era exist, including what some scholars have 
suggested are ‘consent forms.’  Translations of these texts suggest they are contracts for 
medical treatment, each outlining a particular medical act to be performed by a named 
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physician.
321
  Further, George Fort observed that the Laws of Valentinus, enacted in 368 
A.D. marked one of the first appointments of a public surgeon who was paid by the state 
to administer to the poor, sparking a series of regulations over medical practice.
322
  
These regulations mark the state’s forays into the governance of physician conduct, 
creating areas of liability and demarcating the correlative consequences for 
malpractice.
323
 Further, these early allocations of medicine to a public domain of 
regulation fostered an interest in the profession’s deontology, spurring many medieval 
theologians to examine the doctor-patient relationship and its ethical parameters. 
Contrary to popular characterisations of the period and its medical practices, consent 
figures prominently in many of these philosophical treatises, most notably in the work 
of medieval theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas and Nicolas de Cusa.  
 
The following section attempts to track these discussions in pursuit of a different kind of 
story of consent.  Similar to the skewed glance which the exploration of sexual consent 
in Antiquity provided, investigating the uses of consent in a period thought to precede 
concerns of patient autonomy by centuries should serve to disrupt the ease with which a 
consent-as-autonomy story can be read.  The chapter contains four substantive sections.  
It begins with a descriptive overview of medieval medicine, including its educational 
schemes and forms of practice, focusing on the commanding influence (if not 
monopoly) that the Christian Church can be seen to have exercised over the field both in 
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terms of regulating access to the profession and with respect to what knowledge would 
be deemed valuable enough to learn. This is in no small part attributable to a particular 
theological epistemology which ran deep throughout the Middle Ages, invoking a 
multitude of images of the ‘divine’ and supernatural forces to explain illness and the 
path to health. This relationship between science and faith, rationality and belief is the 
backdrop of this chapter’s second section, designed to provide a historically-specific 
frame within which to contemplate the medieval doctor-patient relationship and the role 
of consent within this.  The discussion’s third section considers some other forums 
where consent figured in medieval thought, including cases of Christian conversion, 
marriage formation, and trade and commerce.  These sources help to construct an 
understanding of consent as a form of submission (to God), made evident through a 
regime of self-management.  This alternative understanding of consent is examined in 
the chapter’s fourth section where the implications of a conception of consent as an 
existential act of faith are explored.  How this understanding might speak to the modern 
context is alluded to in the chapter’s conclusion. 
 
Medieval Medicine: A Monastic Enterprise 
Before the heralded medical centres of Salerno and Chartres, the task of educating and 
employing physicians fell to monasteries. This was for both ecumenical and economic 
reasons. In the first instance, ministering to the sick was thought to represent a form of 
Christian charity. Both medical education and treatment were monopolized by the 
clergy with monastic infirmaries (which exclusively served members of the religious 
order) and cleric-run hospices (which treated ‘pilgrims’ and other ‘unfortunate souls’) 
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serving as the only forms of hospitals throughout much of the Middle Ages.
324
  Disease 
was also understood as a divine intervention, a demonic or sinful presence in the body 
that only God might remedy.
325
 Who better, then, to administer to the inflicted and 
decree successful treatment than those called to holy service?  
 
Aside from the Christian ideal of brotherly love and a belief in the divine origin of 
disease, there were significant economic reasons for monasteries serving as the 
medieval centres of medical theory and practice.  They were likely one of the few places 
of the period which would have had the necessary resources in materials, time, and skill 
both to undertake medical study and to compose one of the most valuable enterprises of 
both medical practice and ethics in the Middle Ages: the illuminated manuscript. 
Described by some as ‘medical catechisms,’ these manuscripts were thought of as 
treatises of collected medical wisdom.
326
  Produced in monasteries, given the resources 
such institutions were able to offer by way of time, money, and literacy, these medical 
texts outlined classical theories and illustrations of human anatomy, trusted plant and 
herbal sources for remedying known ailments, diagrams denoting known injuries and 
common surgical or cautery procedures, as well as guiding principles and techniques for 
diagnosis and treatment.  These manuscripts offer a unique insight into the medieval 
medical world, particularly as woodcutting technology gained ground and the copying 
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of such texts was made easier, improving their distribution (and signalling the move 
towards mass medical education.)
327
  
 
More specifically, these manuscripts provide a means of understanding how both the 
study and practice of medicine in the Middle Ages were strongly controlled Christian 
domains. This dominion can be seen on at least three levels, namely: (i) exclusive 
access to medical education; (ii) an imposed (and hierarchical) dichotomy between 
medical theory and its practice; and (iii) a process of de-paganization of source material. 
Each of these is examined in greater detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
(i)  Regulating Access 
The first means by which the Church exercised control over medieval medicine was in a 
stringent regulation of access to the profession.  Aside from the obstacle of literacy, 
aspiring physicians who wished to become educated in the art of medicine had to do so 
under the tutelage of monks or other clerics. Admission to the medical profession thus 
came with a number of ‘Christian’ requirements, including enforced celibacy and 
prohibitions against marriage.
328
 Some commentators have suggested that the anomic 
conditions that were characteristic of the Middle Ages created a habitual practice of 
persecution against non-Christian groups in an attempt to secure the ‘power and 
influence of a literate élite.’329  The Catholic Kings of 15th century Spain, for instance, 
created laws which required evidence of ‘purity of the blood’ for all those who wished 
to learn or practice medicine, effectively prohibiting all non-Christians (and their 
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descendants) from entering the profession.
330
   These and similar regulations both 
established and relied upon prevailing understandings of the ‘ideal physician,’ one 
which was certainly male, Christian,
331
 and university or monastically trained.
332
  
 
(ii)  Prioritizing Theory over Practice 
In addition to the regulation of access to medical education, the Church also exercised 
control over the medieval medical field at an epistemological level, authorising both 
eligible ‘knowers’ and sources for what was ‘known.’  While monasteries served as the 
primary sources for medical education, this instruction was largely a theoretical 
enterprise which promulgated disdain for the uneducated practitioner.
333
  The more 
practical components to medicine were given a dishonourable status following a decree 
of the Lateran Council in 1215 which forbad clerics from all major Orders to engage in 
the ‘base’ activities of cautery and surgery.334 This left those interested in the medical 
field’s more technical components largely to their own devices.  As MacKinney puts it, 
‘[i]f a young man chose to perfect himself in the medical art, he must find an expert.’335 
Thus, practical knowledge was gained outside of monasteries through systems of 
apprenticeship.  This did little to help the already suspicious reputation medical 
practitioners had during the era.  Aside from links which the general populace drew 
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century Spain; (n 329).  
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between the medical profession and superstitious or ‘quack’ practices, the scarcity of 
available training forced many practitioners to travel in order to apprentice and learn 
within the trade, resulting in a ‘foreigner’ status that came to be distrusted among 
medieval societies.
336
   
 
The period’s illuminated manuscripts also provide evidence of medical theory’s 
primacy over its clinical applications.
337
 They served to familiarise readers with 
accepted bodies of knowledge while delegitimizing other forms of medical conduct.  
Users of the manuscripts would have had to have been learned, which many 
practitioners, such as blood-letters, surgeons, barbers, or apothecaries were not.  
Further, many of the remedies administered during the period would have employed 
supernaturally sourced remedies or pagan rituals, yet these find no place amidst the 
manuscripts copied by the same scholars who produced prayer books and bibles. 
MacKinney observes:  
Inasmuch as clerical writers were chiefly interested in religious healing, they 
gave no details concerning medical practice. An occasional reference to 
medicines, cauterizing, surgery, and cupping glasses and sponges for blood-
letting is about all. Churchmen made little reference even to the simplest 
instruments which would be necessary to the surgeon.
338
 
 
This disjuncture between the way medicine was authorised to be studied by the Church 
and the means by which it was practiced is found not only in the images offered in these 
illuminated manuscripts but also in the languages in which they were written.  The 
introduction of medieval vernacular languages into written form, particularly in the 
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areas of science and medicine during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, demonstrate 
the ways in which clinical knowledge was subordinate to the more theoretical pursuits 
of the Church.
339
 Prior to the written vernacular, all specialised or professional texts had 
been composed in Latin, allocating the emerging English language texts to a second-
class status.  As the vernacular gained written ground, medical practitioners were able to 
engage in the composition of medical ‘literature,’ collecting what might be thought of as 
‘best practices’ guides to sit alongside the more scholarly works of medical theory. 
Scholars of both the medieval and modern period were quick to draw a distinction 
between these collections (described in the literature as ‘anthologies’) and the more 
scholastic manuscripts employed in a curricular fashion within monasteries.
340
 The 
latter collection was referred to as the Articella and consisted of a series of short texts 
which were adopted as an official curriculum by many existing universities in France 
and Italy by the end of the twelfth century.
341
  These included Galen’s Isagoge 
(outlining his theory of humours) and Hippocrates’ texts, Aphorisms, Prognostics, and 
Regimen in acute diseases, among others.  
 
(iii) Christian alignment of Ancient sources 
This practice of vesting epistemological authority in early Greek, Roman, and Arab 
writers could not have been without its theological difficulties for the medieval scholar 
of medicine.  The endorsement of Galen, one of the second century’s most prominent 
physicians, among monastic medical writers, for instance, is incongruous on many 
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levels given his beliefs in polytheism, his views on the human soul as tripartite, and 
Galen’s own criticism of the ‘intellectual failings of the Christians.’342  Some of his 
works (such as his statements on visual perception) were even labelled as heresy and 
rejected by members of the medical community in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.
343
 And yet, his and other works from the Classical period maintained an 
authoritative status within medical theory.  In fact, departing from these early treatises 
was regarded as a sign of uneducated and unskilled medical practice.  Observing the 
enactment of medieval laws aimed at regulating the medical profession, George Fort 
notes, ‘the cause alleged for this stringent law is a positive attestation of the debased 
condition of the medical men of the period, who apparently preferred to wander from 
the footsteps of Hippocrates and Galen.’344  As such, much effort appears to have been 
taken to move Galen and his works away from the perception of paganism toward a 
more Christian ideal – a task largely left to the clerics engaged in copying and 
translating his works in the illuminated manuscripts.  Few biographical accounts of 
Galen can be found in these medieval texts and they are often vague if not ambiguous 
when they do appear, thus preventing his exclusion from Christian ideals. In some 
instances, Galen is presented as a contemporary of Christ, having heard about his 
miracles of healing and travelled to learn more of the healing art from him.
345
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This suggests that the Church-imposed hierarchy of the theoretical study of medicine 
over its practice in the medieval era did not serve a scholarly purpose so much as a 
deontological one.  Allying the moral theories which would guide the choices of 
physicians and patients with Christian ideals was imperative and, at times, explicit.  
Aside from merely copying and including early Greek authorities, their placement and 
characterisation within these early treatises suggests attempts to ‘Christianise’ them or 
at least bring them into accord with the Church’s ideals.346 The image of the Hippocratic 
Oath offered in Figure 3.1 (below) taken from the 12
th
 century demonstrates this rather 
overtly, given its rendering in the form of a cross.
347
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dominant place and authority the works ascribed to Hippocrates enjoy in medieval 
medical treatises is itself an interesting example of this practice of Christian alignment.  
Nutton has observed that the Oath, which begins with an invocation to Apollo and other 
Greek gods, was often copied with Christian revisions, replacing these pagan phrases 
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with obligations more akin to Christian theology.
348
  Ludwig Edelstein has also noted 
that the Oath’s prohibitions on suicide and abortion were atypical of Classical Greece 
which did not censure either act until the advent of Christianity at the turn of the first 
century.
349
 These historical incongruities prompted Edelstein to suggest the Oath was a 
Pythagorean document – a position that is not without its critics.350 Yet, the argument 
does provide a possible explanation for the enduring authority of the Oath given how 
well the doctrines of Pythagoreanism align with those of Christianity.
351
  
The prominence of Galen and his work in many of these early manuscripts may also be 
attributable to how well his theory of humorism could be employed as an authority for 
the Christian view of the human passions and the need to keep them well managed.  
Galen posited the body as made up of four substances or ‘humors,’ each corresponding 
to different fluids in the body, (i.e. black and yellow bile, phlegm, and blood) which 
might wax and wane, depending on diet and activity.
352
  When a patient was suffering 
from a surplus or imbalance of one or more fluids, then his or her personality and 
physical health would be affected.  Health was attained through ‘complexion,’ the Latin 
term for the Greek word ‘crasis,’ meaning a balanced temperament, one not upset by the 
list of ‘non-naturals’ Galen identified as correlative to disease, such as food and drink, 
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passions, emotions, and ‘accidents of the soul.’353  Galen and his works make frequent 
appearances in these early medical manuscripts despite the diminutive clinical benefit 
his theories would have provided the medieval world. The copying and re-writing of his 
texts did not serve to advance medical knowledge.  It was repetitive and often in conflict 
with advancements in anatomy or surgery of the day and so poses as an interesting 
example of this process of Christian alignment or ‘depaganization,’ to borrow a term 
from Vivian Nutton.  As Nutton puts it: 
[T]he take-over by the later Middle Ages of Galenic-Hippocratic medicine [is 
not] a story of the triumph of scientific truth over religious obscurantism. 
Hippocrates was no Copernicus, Galen no Galileo. The effectiveness of Galenic-
Hippocratic therapeutics was hotly disputed in the Classical World… the most 
popular works among the Carolingians represented a much more practical, non-
theoretical type of medicine… Galenic medicine was far from being the obvious 
choice it might seem to us, and its eventual triumph owed not a little to its 
compatibility with Christian, Muslim, and Jewish theology.
354
 
 
This de-paganization or re-alignment of medical authorities from antiquity served to 
create an exclusively Christian ethic for both medieval medicine’s practice and its 
intellectual history.
355
 ‘To the Greeks of mediaeval Byzantium, Hippocrates and Galen 
had become almost divine, worthy of being commemorated in fresco alongside 
patriarchs and prophets as heralds of Christian truth.’356  Coupled with a system of 
social and epistemological stratification on the basis of (monastic) theory and practice, a 
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‘canon’ of medieval medicine begins to emerge that takes form within a Christian 
framework. What, then, is this canonical story of consent?   
 
Perhaps predictably, this narrative is not one of autonomy, but submission.  There was a 
prevailing understanding in the Middle Ages of disease as a divine intervention, 
resulting in an ethic of self-care borrowed from the Ancient period, where the virtue of 
balance was preferred to the errors of excess.  Within a context where physicians were 
viewed as agents of the divine, consent was the means by which patients might align 
themselves with God in the hopes of attaining good health.  To aid in uncovering this 
medieval understanding of consent, the next section examines the medieval doctor-
patient relationship in further detail, including the relevant legislation and ethical codes 
of the period.  How this scheme and its participants informed medieval uses of consent 
is explored in Section III. 
 
Medieval Doctors and their Patients: A match made in heaven 
Very little has been written about the doctor-patient relationship in the Middle Ages, an 
oversight which has elicited comment among both medieval and medical historians.
357
 
Determining how the medieval physician practiced medicine and the ethical principles 
which guided these routines is thus a kind of patchwork project, assembling the various 
texts and images of the period to form as clear a picture as history may allow. Certainly, 
the early legislative schemes of the Romans and later the Visigoths at the turn of the 
sixth century serve as a reasonable backdrop given their influence on much of the 
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medieval era’s approach to medical licensing and regulation.358  The Romans awarded a 
number of privileges to doctors who agreed to live within the city limits, including 
rights of citizenship and some tax exemptions.
359
 Yet, Roman society had a scattered 
scheme of medical licensing with few formal restrictions on who could practice 
medicine or any clear delineation of what requirements were needed to do so. Any 
number of unskilled persons might enjoy the privileges of the medici without any of the 
training.
360
  The Lex Visigothorum arose as a response to this lack of medical regulation 
under the Roman empire.  These laws stipulated the requisite conduct for practising 
physicians, including a number of prohibitions specifically aimed at regulating the 
doctor-patient relationship. Under the Lex I Antiqua, for example, physicians were not 
permitted to cup or bleed a free or nobly born woman without the presence of her legal 
guardian or to visit any female patient in her home without a family chaperone.
361
 
Doctors were also disallowed, under the Lex II Antiqua, from entering any prison 
without official accompaniment so as to prevent the physician from dispensing 
euthanizing drugs.
362
  These decrees are largely understood among social and medical 
historians as having launched, in general, a ‘new epoch in legal history’ and more 
particularly, a contract model for doctor-patient relationships.  This is made explicit 
under the third set of regulations in the Code, Lex III Antiqua: 
If anyone should request that a physician treat him for a disease or cure his 
wound under contract, when the physician  has seen the wound or diagnosed the 
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illness, immediately he may undertake the treatment of a sick person under 
conditions agreed upon and set forth in writing.
363
 
  
Some of these medical contracts have survived, revealing a practice of naming the 
physician, the patient, the relevant risks and/or liabilities of the procedure, as well as 
lists of any witnesses to the contract.
364
  The introduction of a contractual relationship 
between doctor and patient was accompanied with a set of rather stringent punishments 
addressing malpractice, ranging from fines to death depending on the social status of the 
patient (where ‘malpractice’ was often inferred from unsuccessful, rather than negligent, 
treatments).
365
  
 
These legal frameworks, however, provide only one view of the medieval doctor’s 
practice.  The physician understood medicine as imposing certain obligations on him, 
where the ethical principles which might guide this duty were directly derived from not 
simply his daily practice, but the belief systems of the social world in which it took 
place.  As such, the medieval story of disease as a divine act looms large in these codes 
aimed at regulating the doctor-patient relationship. Sickness was believed to be the 
consequence brought upon by persons who had led sinful or unbalanced lives.
366
  Here, 
the physician’s role was merely one of mediator.  ‘Sufferers could be ministered to and 
their pain eased, but healing must perforce be left to God or nature.’367  Further, such 
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healing was unlikely to come where patients refused to submit to God’s will and 
(re)align themselves with the ‘good’ life, devoid of excess and sin.  The ‘caladrius,’ 
pictured below in Fig. 3.2 is an interesting symbol of this view.
368
  Represented as a 
mythical white bird, the caladrius is thought to have made its first appearance in the 
second century text, Physiologus.
369
  Such accounts suggest the bird would visit the 
sick, pre-telling the patient’s prognosis. If the bird looked at the patient, she could 
expect to recover. If the bird looked away, she would not.  The description of the bird in 
the Physiologus remarks on these healing attributes: 
There is another kind of flying animal called the charadrius mentioned in 
Deuteronomy which is entirely white with no black part at all. His excrement is 
a cure for those whose eyes are growing dim and he is found in the hall of kings. 
If someone is ill, whether he will live or die can be known from the charadrius. 
The bird turns his face away from the man whose illness will bring death and 
thus everyone knows that he is going to die. On the other hand, if the disease is 
not fatal, the charadrius stares the sick man in the face and the sick man stares 
back at the charadrius, who releases him from his illness. Then flying up to the 
atmosphere of the sun, the charadrius burns away the sick man's illness and 
scatters it abroad.
370
 
 
Medieval manuscripts often associate the caladrius with Christ, particularly in marginal 
decorations of manuscript illustrations.
371
  Thus, if the patient was ‘aligned’ with Christ, 
able to engage in a reciprocal glance with the divine, balance would be restored and 
healing would ensue. If, however, the patient could not return the glance, could not ‘see 
eye to eye’ with Christ, redemption was lost. 
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The medieval physician was understood to be tasked with overseeing this balancing act. 
Bloodletting, for instance, was a treatment based on an understanding of the human 
body as a hydraulic system with the doctor serving to ‘fine-tune’ the body’s fluids.372   
The story of an eleventh century physician known only by the signature, ‘John, 
physician’ (which he left on a document in 1046), alludes to the doctor’s role as monitor 
of the human passions. MacKinney describes John as one of King Henry I of France’s 
personal physicians who garnered ‘chief fame… from the fact that he lost an important 
case (no less a personage than his royal master), without losing his own reputation or 
life.’373 MacKinney, using two separate accounts of the incident, describes John as 
having given the king a purgative with strict instructions not to drink anything 
immediately afterwards.  The king disobeyed and died the following day. Despite a 
suggestion of physician error (in delivering an overdose of purgative), John is said to 
have ‘escaped with a nickname, “the deaf,” to remind him of his failure to detect the 
king’s violation of orders in time to avert fatal results.’374 
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Fig. 3.2: Caladrius pictured from a 13th 
century French manuscript (author 
unknown) Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, lat. 14429, Folio 106v. 
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This depiction of a requirement in medieval physicians to ‘hear’ the internal desires of 
patients suggests doctors were expected to have a heightened level of knowledge or 
awareness than the average person. Moreover, as some of the discussion in the 
following section highlights, knowing the truth of another’s ‘inner will’ was a matter 
thought to belong to God alone (despite the practical difficulties this elusiveness 
brought to theologians, jurists, and political theorists).
375
  MacKinney notes a sixth 
century letter used for the (royal) appointment and instruction of the Ostrogothic 
regime’s public doctors which reads in part: 
The physician helps us when all other helpers fail. By his art he finds out things 
about a man of which he himself is ignorant; and his prognosis of a case, though 
founded on reason, seems to the ignorant like a prophecy.
376
 
 
The medieval physician, then, was expected to have some level of transcendent or 
perhaps ‘divine’ knowledge given the number of sources which depict doctors as 
appointed by God.  The first known ethical treatise for the doctor-patient relationship, 
titled ‘Practical Ethics of the Physician,’ was composed by Ishāq ibn ‘Alī al-Ruhāwī, an 
Arab scholar writing in the ninth century.
377
  The text describes the doctor as an agent of 
Allah, the ‘real physician,’ leaving the ‘ethic of the physician [as] an extension of that 
of a religious man serving his Creator.’378 St. Augustine made the same claim, 
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positioning Christ as the ‘true physician’ of souls and bodies.379 Many medieval 
manuscripts contain comparable contentions, including translations of the Hippocratic 
Oath which suggest physicians must administer to both body and soul.
380
  Similarly, 
MacKinney cites an eighth century manuscript which employs excerpts from the work 
of Pope Gregory I, Isidore of Seville, and the Bible to associate medicine with a deific 
purpose.
381
   
 
This view of the doctor as a divine agent is a marked departure from the physician of 
Greek antiquity, whose calling and motivations were viewed as purely humanitarian. 
Understood as the genesis of the model of the doctor-patient relationship of 
beneficence, the physician of antiquity was motivated by philanthropia, or a ‘love of 
humanity’ as a means of finding personal fulfilment or the ‘good life.’382 In this context, 
the physician and patient were mutually engaged in the medical act, albeit for different 
ends. Katz contends that while philanthropia served as the doctor’s motivation, the 
patient’s interest could be kindled with the physician’s success at curing what ailed 
them, understood as philotechnia, or love of the medicinal art.
383
  The Hippocratic 
essay, ‘On Precepts’ reflects this when it suggests ‘where there is love of man, there is 
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also love of the art.’384 This changed with the Middle Ages and the advent of 
Christianity’s influence on medicine and its practice. As Jones notes: 
In medieval times, divine authority replaced philanthropia as the doctor's 
contribution to the physician-patient unity of will. Faith replaced philotechnia as 
the patient's contribution. The typical routine prior to surgery included the laying 
out of instruments, prayer with the patient, and finally the technical process of 
care.
385
 
 
This, again, highlights the religious backdrop of the medieval doctor-patient 
relationship. If physicians and their patients understood themselves as engaged in a 
‘unity of the will’ as a result of faith and divine authority, where does this leave consent, 
the ‘lynchpin’ of the modern era’s medical ethics? The following section examines this 
inquiry in greater detail, exploring the medieval era’s canonical story of consent. It 
includes a brief epistemological analysis of the basic structures of medieval ways of 
knowing and how these served to establish ‘authorized knowers.’ How this 
epistemological structure influences how ‘consent’ was understood and enacted in the 
medical practice of the Middle Ages also forms part of the ensuing discussion. 
 
Medieval Consent: ‘The way, the truth, and the life’ 
When consent appears in medieval medicine, it does so tacitly. Henri de Mondeville, a 
fourteenth century surgeon cautioned physicians against proceeding with a treatment 
which the patient’s family did not endorse or to which the patient was violently 
opposed, suggesting some consideration of a patient’s wishes.386 Many illustrations 
within medieval medical manuscripts depict the patient as an active participant in 
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medical procedures, such as holding a urine flask for the physician’s analysis or 
carrying a cupping vessel during instances of bloodletting.
387
  This could suggest some 
level of implicit consent in the medieval doctor-patient relationship.  And some scholars 
have argued that a model of consultation and joint decision-making within doctor-
patient relationships was endorsed in Ancient Greece.
388
  However, there are far more 
explicit statements which seemingly speak against a consideration of the patient’s will 
in the medieval doctor-patient relationship. The majority of these are found within the 
context of medicine’s divine story which foretold a patient’s cure only alongside a 
patient’s obedience to the physician’s instructions. As Mondeville wrote: 
The surgeon… should promise that if the patient can endure his illness and will 
obey the surgeon for a short time he will soon be cured and will escape all of the 
dangers which have been pointed out to him; thus the cure can be brought about 
more easily and more quickly… If the patient is defiant, seldom will the result 
be successful.
389
  
 
Faden and Beauchamp identify Mondeville’s statements as exemplifying the 
beneficence model of doctor-patient relations, attributing to Mondeville the belief that 
‘the maintenance of hope [is] of sufficient therapeutic benefit to justify deception.’390 
Certainly, outright deception is found in many medieval codes of conduct although few 
in as colourful a language as Mondeville offers, counseling doctors to keep up patients’ 
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spirits by ‘music of violas and ten-stringed psaltery, or by forged letters describing the 
death of his enemies, or if he is a churchman, by telling him that he has been elected to 
a bishopric.’391 While these overt recommendations for dishonesty within the doctor-
patient relationship suggest an element of paternalism (i.e. doctor knows best) was 
present during the medieval period, de Ros notes that outright deception on the part of 
the physician would not have been regarded favourably in the Middle Ages. ‘[T]he 
physician who deceived was seen as doing the patient harm,’ he writes, ‘and was 
therefore behaving in a morally incorrect way.’392  Some commentators have suggested 
that this call for deception among physicians represents a medieval consideration of the 
patient’s role in decision-making practices. Pernick, for instance, maintains that 
Mondeville’s instructions not to accept a case where the patient violently opposed the 
treatment amount to a prohibition against treating patients without their consent
393
 – a 
contention that both Katz and Faden and Beauchamp dispute, maintaining that the 
medieval view was that uncooperative patients did not make for successful cases.
394
   
Instead, deception was counselled only as a means of facilitating a patient’s 
acquiescence.  The divine authority thought to have been bestowed upon the physician 
must have influenced patients’ own perceptions of obedience and acquiescence to 
doctors’ knowledge. Is a concept of consent within medieval doctor-patient 
relationships completely elided here?  
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Consent was discussed explicitly by many medieval theologians with respect to a 
number of areas of medieval life. For the most part, it was a concept treated much the 
same as it is today, i.e. presumed to be present but for evidence of its negation, usually 
in the form of fraud, duress, or coercion. This creates the familiar difficulty of 
determining what medieval consent was rather than simply what it was not.  Further, 
there is a tendency among contemporary scholars to rule out the presence of a medieval 
consent within the doctor-patient relationship on the basis that very little evidence of 
consent serving as an expression of autonomy can be found in the Middle Ages.
395
  
Consent was, however, given significant and explicit commentary in at least three areas 
of medieval life, namely: marriage formation, religious conversion, and trade and 
commerce.   
 
Coupling, Conversion, and Commerce 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the religious backdrop of the medieval doctor-patient 
relationship, consent was largely regarded as a matter of sacramental concern rather 
than legal interest.
396
  This juxtaposition reveals a disjuncture between the legal 
approach to consent, which was concerned with external factors (e.g. words spoken, acts 
performed), and the theological, which dealt with the state of a person’s internal will. 
For Aquinas, the difficulty in such cases arose from the view that no one but the would-
be-consenter and God might know the truth of these external signs of consent.
397
  In 
religious conversion cases, for example, the act of baptism often served as the 
signification of the converter’s consent and, as Farber notes, while  
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consent thus presented a theoretical difficulty in recognizing conversion, it did 
not constitute a significant practical problem. People who watched the convert’s 
baptism had no way of knowing whether she had truly consented to the baptism, 
but at the same time they did not really need to know… [O]thers could treat her 
as though she were baptized, and if she were not it would be her sin, not 
theirs.
398
 
 
The situation was made more complicated, however, with the involvement of a third 
party such as in marriage formation cases or the doctor-patient relationship.  In such 
instances, the ‘truth’ of one’s consent had a more practical consequence, whether that 
was in terms of establishing a valid marriage or, in the case of medicine, obtaining good 
health.  Of particular concern in these circumstances was the presence of factors that 
might render one’s consent inauthentic, such as the presence of fraud, fear, or pain.  
Determining how much coercion or duress was needed to negate one’s consent was a 
complicated matter and medievalists tended to rely on Roman law for these 
determinations.  This was a high standard, requiring extraordinary levels of force to 
vitiate consent, leading some medieval lawyers to suggest that even ‘forced will is 
will.’399  This represents a distinction the Romans saw between force and compulsion, 
the former involving no will at all but rather a physical over-powering that results in an 
undesirable action and the latter understood to be ‘a declaration of will which is elicited 
under pressure.’400  This understanding of a forced will (or ‘coerced consent’ as was 
examined in Chapter Two) stems from Aristotle’s observations on responsibility in the 
seventh book of his treatise, Nichomachean Ethics in which Aristotle considers a moral 
paradox in Socrates’ assertion that ‘no person acts against her better judgment.’401 
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Aristotle, disagreeing with Socrates, suggests that there are many circumstances where 
one might act against one’s preference, the most prominent of these being dire need. 
Aristotle offers the example of a captain forced to throw cargo overboard during a 
severe storm to save the ship and its crew. This exercise of will was considered by 
Aristotle to be of a ‘mixed’ character: involuntary in that external factors had forced the 
captain into making an undesired choice and yet still voluntary in that they are ‘worthy 
of choice’ (and, in fact, resulted in one being made). Thus emerges the Roman notion 
that even a forced choice is a choice.  The challenge, of course, was in determining how 
much force, duress, or fear might be sufficient to negate the will behind the choice.   
 
The difficulties in assessing these ‘coercive’ factors were made all the more serious 
when consent’s role in securing a patient’s healing was considered.  Just as in the case 
of a sacramental bond, a cure for what ailed the patient was only attainable if a true 
divine union had been achieved.  Such was the contemplation Thomas Aquinas pursued 
when he responded to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in an attempt to determine 
whether acts of mixed or forced will might still be considered sinful. For most 
canonists, the mixed nature of a will was not relevant in determining an act’s sinfulness. 
‘People never acted according to pure will, they believed, because people are by 
definition fallen and tied to their bodies.’402  Thus, a diminished will did not diminish 
one’s responsibility. Instead, such instances were merely signs of one’s will having been 
influenced by one’s passions or appetites, rather than negated entirely. As Diana Wood 
has suggested of the medieval period: 
Living a righteous life involved the voluntary limitation of appetites and desires 
and the avoidance of extremes. The Christian had to live in the world and 
survive, but this involved a permanent balancing act between the often 
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incompatible needs of body and soul – physical comfort in this world against 
eternal salvation in the next, material claims against spiritual ones.
403
 
 
Control of the appetite and its related passions was thus not simply prescribed in the 
Hippocratic Oath with respect to the role of the physician, but it was also an integral 
component to a patient’s ability to ‘truly’ consent.  This was depicted in medieval 
medical manuscripts, where the margins were often marked with bestiary images, 
displaying animals playing the roles of humans who had given in to their passions, 
always to fatal consequence.
404
  Similarly, the fabled caladrius would not return the 
glance of a patient who had not adequately managed these appetites in alignment with 
God – an imbalance that was often understood through the lens of Galen’s humours.   
 
The physician was thus positioned as both a monitor of this human susceptibility to 
passion in others and as a model of restraint in himself.
405
 For Thomas Aquinas, the 
words spoken or acts performed by the parties involved were secondary considerations 
to whether a true union had been created. What mattered was the truth of the parties’ 
internal will – and this couldn’t be known, or at least not by any earthly figure.406   
 
This provides some insight into not simply how consent figured in medieval thought but 
also how knowledge itself was ordered and understood in the Middle Ages.  Bakos has 
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described the medieval period as a ‘finalistic-teleological Aristotlean-Christian 
universe,
407
 a world where things are what they are for, and where all these ends relate, 
ultimately, to God.  Within this frame, people understood the human soul to have two 
components: the intellectus, whereby a person came to think and understand the world 
around her; and the voluntas, that which governs human desire and willing. Much of the 
theology of the medieval period aimed to determine which of these two faculties was 
superior and while contemporary readers might view such debates as overly esoteric, 
Bakos insists that they were of tremendous practical value during the medieval period 
given their influence on how one might choose to live one’s life.408 In keeping with the 
era’s teleological quality, these two components to the human soul were understood 
only in relation to their end. Thus, any knowledge – including science or medicine – 
must necessarily find its purpose in the divine. For medievalists, ‘the essence of human 
knowing and willing consists of becoming (more and more) a likeness of God.’409  To 
seek knowledge merely for its own sake was thought of as a sinful activity in medieval 
times, understood as a form of vanity or vana curiositas mundi, a ‘vain curiosity of the 
world’ given its eschewal of the divine.410  Similarly, to leave the intellect unengaged, 
to avoid knowing God was to commit the opposite moral sin of pride (or superbia), 
assuming one knew all there was to know – an acquaintance with the world reserved 
only for God.  The desired middle ground between these two points was sapientia, a 
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‘wisdom’ understood in the medieval period as a competence in practical knowledge, 
i.e. knowing how to live a good or ‘godly’ life.  
 
This picture of the medieval world as framed within a religious epistemology results in 
a convergence of knowledge and belief such that there could be ‘no sound rationality 
without sound faith.’411  Thus medicine, like any scientific inquiry, was rooted in a 
quest for divine likeness; to seek truth or further awareness of the world was to seek 
God. Only His knowledge was true knowledge.  As Bakos notes: 
According to the Bible, Christ himself said: ‘I am the way, the truth, and the 
life.’ In this biblical dictum, the practice (the way), the epistemological (the 
truth), and the existential (the life) dimensions of (medieval) knowledge meet.
412
 
 
The difficulty this posed to medievalists, however, lay in the unseen nature of God. 
Despite the belief of having been created in God’s image, human knowledge of the 
divine was limited by corporeality and its ‘blinding’ effect.413  Yet some avenues to 
divinity remained. Augustine was one of many medieval theologians who espoused the 
view that divine truth had been revealed to humans in two forms, the Book of Nature 
(which was unreadable after the Fall) and the Revealed Book, or book(s) of the Bible.
414
  
This understanding led to a prominent belief in the Middle Ages that the world was 
replete with symbols of God. Given that human failings prevented an unmediated view 
of the divine, the search for truth entailed a constant attempt to see the unseen, to 
interpret the symbols of God which lay hidden in their mundane, earthly forms.
415
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Aquinas understood this exercise of mysticism as cognito dei experimentalis, or 
‘knowledge of god through experience.’416 This amounted to a search for signs in 
almost all aspects of medieval life, where everything visible might represent the 
invisible.
417
  
 
This same task was applicable to the human quest for unity with God. Seeking God and 
aligning one’s life with His was the teleological end of all activity in the Middle Ages, 
including scientific (or medical) pursuits. And while such human acts and ways of 
knowing were necessarily imperfect, striving for this skewed view of the divine, for a 
recognition of God in all that was not God was imperative for a good (and healthy) life. 
This may explain the prominence of beliefs in magic during the medieval period, 
particularly in terms of medicinal remedies or treatments that were thought to bring 
good health.
418
  In a world replete with hidden signs of the divine, such a belief would 
be entirely rational.  As Kieckhefer remarks 
The people in medieval Europe who used the term ‘magic’ thought of it as 
neither irrational nor nonrational but as essentially rational…  [Those] who used, 
feared, promoted, or condemned magic, and who identified magic as such, not 
only assumed it worked but could give (or assumed that authorities could give 
for them) reasonably specific explanations of how it worked.
419
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Many of these ‘magical’ practices and rituals were, however, often in conflict with the 
medical teachings of the Church, and so Christianity held that God Himself had 
provided a model for seeking the ‘unseen.’ As noted in John 4:12, ‘No man hath seen 
God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in 
us.’  Bakos elaborates on this notion: 
God’s activity and happiness consists of the fact that He knows and loves 
Himself (within the Trinity); and that He knows and loves Another than Himself 
(in the Creation).  Since man’s task is that of becoming similar to God, man has 
to arrive at knowledge of and love for God in something other than God… 
Through understanding and loving this Other, humans can understand and love 
God Himself (in this Other).
420
 
 
This openness to the other is understood in Christian theology as agapeic service, i.e. an 
engagement with the other in a state of unselfish love, akin to the love God is 
understood to have for Himself and humans. Agape is often articulated as a groundless 
or ‘unmotivated’ love, offered to another without judgment or prerequisites. ‘It does not 
look for anything in man that could be adduced as motivation for it.’421  Yet, because 
agape is a divine love, human efforts will necessarily be only approximations of it, thus 
leading to a dominant understanding in Christian theology of faith as the ‘human 
response to God. Through faith, the believer may participate in agape toward the 
neighbour.’422  And in so doing, the groundwork is laid for achieving a communion with 
God.
423
  This communion with the divine is the goal of sapienta – a medievalist’s guide 
to practical living which avoids the sins of excess and, as we have seen, the risks of 
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disease. Bakos suggests that ‘in Christianity, agapeic service shown to the Other counts 
as the noblest and most precious – indeed Divine – activity.’424 
 
This suggests that for the medieval subject, unity with the divine was the governing 
mandate, whether that was achieved through spiritual service to the Other or through 
‘magic.’  This can be seen in a wide array of contexts in the Middle Ages, including a 
number of forums where ‘magic’ might seem a bit incongruous for the modern reader, 
including both medicine and the field of trade and commerce.  In both of these contexts, 
however, the imperative to align oneself with God is the underlying function of 
‘consent.’  In particular, the medieval marketplace is worth examining given how well it 
demonstrates that consent was not a concept associated with individualism, but rather 
with community – understood in terms of the relationships medievalists sought with 
their neighbours, but also in terms of the act of ‘communing’ with God.  Medieval 
economic thought, Wood observes, was largely a theological enterprise.
425
 Labours of 
the soul were exalted, whereas struggles towards economic betterment were not.  
Money-making of any kind was generally frowned upon by the Church, and in some 
forms, explicitly prohibited (as the canonical ban on usury in 1311 exemplifies).
426
 Yet 
increased populations in towns and the early forms of industrialisation saw a shift in 
medieval perceptions towards economic life in the years leading up to the fourteenth 
century.  These developments created tension between the spiritual aims of medieval 
life and its material circumstances perhaps best witnessed in the struggles scholars, 
merchants, traders, and buyers encountered when attempting to determine acceptable 
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pricing schemes for goods and services.
427
 As noted earlier, medical practice was far 
from exempt from these market schemes, as fee regulations, liability provisions, and 
service contracts (or ‘consent forms’) rose in response to the general suspicion of 
physicians and the ‘just price’ of their craft. Determinations of this just price were 
determined by both scholars, who tended to employ natural law for its invocations of 
the divine, and lawyers, who relied on the jurisprudential traditions of the Romans.
428
 
This resulted in a wide range of approaches to price determination.
429
  
 
Wood notes that price negotiations at any level would often involve an overlap of these 
three models, yet, I would argue sapienta is best evidenced in how medievalists reached 
understandings of the ‘just price.’ Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics was a key text in 
these determinations given its approach to justice as a virtue and the imperative it 
brought to subjects to act rightly – even where matters of economic advancement were 
concerned.  Virtue, for Aristotle, was a state of mind or disposition (hexis) which 
brought about particular feelings and subsequent actions and relations with others.
430
  
Further, Aristotle defined virtue as a mean, a condition founded between the vices of 
excess and deficiency.  For Aristotle, how this mean might be reached was necessarily 
contextual.  Some circumstances might call for a ‘balance’ of vices which favoured 
more anger than another or less reason. He writes: 
By virtue I mean virtue of character; for this is about feelings and actions, and 
these admit of excess, deficiency, and an intermediate condition. We can be 
afraid, for instance, or be confidant, or have appetites, or get angry, or feel pity, 
and in general have pleasure or pain, both too much and too little, and in both 
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ways not well. But having these feelings at the right times, about the right 
things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the 
intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue.
431
 
 
Aristotle’s critique of the invalid or unequal trade rested on a distinction between the 
use of money and money itself, emphasising that virtue was found or lost in the choices 
made for using money and how well these choices approximated the mean.
432
  ‘The fact, 
then, that we might be forced by circumstance into a trade we would not make 
otherwise is a condition of having bodily needs and being subject to circumstances in 
general, rather than a sign of an invalid contract.’433  The valid exchange is thus one 
where each party to the trade feels as though the value for the goods or services traded 
has been reciprocated.  Was the exchange virtuous?  Did it avoid extremes? For 
Aquinas, these circumstantial factors result in negotiations which themselves need to be 
guided by a principle of ‘proportionate reciprocity’ in order to achieve an equality of 
things exchanged – a prerequisite in his mind for communities to be able to live 
together.   
 
Contemporary scholars will often position consent as the marker of this equality in 
medieval (and modern) trade arrangements, a signifier of two minds meeting in 
agreement. Yet similar to the feeble role words play in ensuring the formation of 
marriage or one’s religious conversion, medieval consent cannot be tangibly known or 
made present in language, thus determining its truthfulness in trade circumstances 
presents the same difficulties as it might in the doctor-patient relationship.  What 
mattered more within the medieval era was that parties to a trade or to a contract for 
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medical service had reached some form of ‘communion’ with one another – not simply 
for the purposes of being able to, as Aquinas notes, ‘live together,’ but also for the aim 
of living in the likeness of God (and enjoying the good health this would entail). 
 
This interest in the communion with the divine can also be seen in its practical form in 
the development of the practice of conciliarism among medieval canonists. Nicolas de 
Cusa, a fifteenth century cardinal of the Catholic Church, composed an influential text 
on conciliar theology in an attempt to reconcile rising conflicts between the pope and 
competing Church councils. De Cusa argued that the practice of reaching concord or 
consensus within a council mirrored Christ’s own marriage with the Church, in the way 
that an initial desire for unity was actualised in the parties’ agapeic service to one 
another. Thus, the council’s principle of acting only with the consent of all parties ‘was 
not merely procedural, but was rooted in a shared way of life,’434 not dissimilar from 
Aquinas’ own concern with consent within trade and commerce as the only means by 
which a community might live together. Bakos, writing on de Cusa’s text, De 
Concordantia Catholica (1433), suggests: 
Consent here has at least two meanings. First, it is an initial concord in the 
Catholic faith, and secondly, it refers also to the willingness to consent during 
the actual discussion. It is thus faith in the form of existential commitment that 
makes the actual consensus possible.
435
 
 
How does this understanding of consent as an existential act of faith inform the 
medieval doctor- patient relationship? Moreover, what does this canonical story of 
consent help us understand about the conditions of possibility of the contemporary 
consent-as-autonomy story?  The following section probes these inquiries in further 
detail. 
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Revisiting the Medieval Doctor-Patient Relationship: Consent as an act of Faith 
The preceding discussion has suggested that acts of faith, in the medieval period, were 
both rational and highly pragmatic, particularly where one’s health was concerned.  This 
is a difficult pill to swallow in the twenty-first century, given dominant views of the 
incongruity of faith and rationality. Yet within the medieval period’s faith-based 
epistemological frame, faith is rationality; it is a ‘condition of possibility’ for reason 
itself.  Believing is the only way to know(ledge of the Divine) and the practical 
maintenance of a good and healthy life. Coupled with the medieval understanding of the 
physician as an agent of God and a view of disease as a form of divine intervention 
visited upon those who have failed to adequately align themselves with Christ, consent 
within the context of medieval medical practice begins to take shape.   
 
At first glance, one might be tempted to view medieval consent as the rather familiar 
notion of choice. Yet, the specific faith-based epistemology of the medieval era also 
allows for a reading of consent through the lens of agapeic service to the other. As noted 
earlier, the view of practicing physicians as ‘outsiders’ was prevalent during the Middle 
Ages. This suggests that some patients may have considered obedience to their 
physician’s orders as a form of agapeic service. Doctors were, after all, considered to be 
agents of the divine.  Further, while faith is understood within the medieval context as a 
rational act, it is also an act of obedience, thus the ‘choice’ medieval medical consent 
represented was an agreement to align oneself with Christ. This was done in the most 
immediate of circumstances in the hope of attaining good health or ridding oneself of 
disease, thus prompting physicians’ demands for obedience (and their prescriptions for 
deception to attain it). As Al-Ruhāwī instructs physicians: ‘It is essential that the 
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physician not follow the will of the patient unless it benefits him in his improvement; he 
should not fear him in this nor any desire in this of his individual rights. On the 
contrary, it is only God that he fears and entreats.’436  Thus, while some patients’ 
obedience might have been in pursuit of good health, this was understood to be a joint 
endeavour between the patient and physician, where only through communion with one 
another might unity with the divine (and its ensuing good health) be achieved. The 
patient’s body could be known to the physician. It existed in the realm of the seen. So, 
too, would the patient’s words or stated intentions.  The truth of these words, however, 
was not a matter for human assessment.  True knowledge and the healing it might offer 
were available only in the unseen, the transcendental.  Together, in concord, the 
physician and the patient seek the divine in what is not visible. Through this consent, 
both might find the divine and live in alignment with God.  Healing was the sign of this 
success; the external indicator of the unknowable inner commitment of the patient.   
 
The emphasis on prognosis (over diagnosis) within medieval medical practice provides 
some support for this view.  In the first instance, this might be attributed to the Classical 
Greek practice of making diagnosis subservient to prognosis.
437
  While some 
components to this tradition involved beliefs and practices characterised as ‘pagan’ by 
medieval (monastic) scholars (such as the consideration of the planets or the signs of the 
zodiac in assessing a patient’s ailments), the Greeks’ ontological reasons for elevating 
prognosis over diagnosis were fairly compatible with Christian theology.  As Pagel 
notes, for the early Greeks ‘[t]here is no such thing as disease; there are individuals who 
fall ill.’438 Thus, the consideration of an individual’s constitution, temperament, or 
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behaviour were important for gaining knowledge of the subject and her nature rather 
than the (dis)functioning of her organs. Within the medieval context, this would have 
required access to knowledge only God might now, thus positioning prognosis as a form 
of ‘divine revelation.’  Wallis notes that no medieval (Latin) word existed for 
‘diagnose,’ rather the term cognoscere is often found in its place, meaning ‘I know’ or 
‘I am acquainted with.’  She argues ‘[t]he word diagnosis has no technical connotation 
for Galen, for example; it simply means knowledge, decision or judgement about 
present matters.’439  These would have been visible matters, thus the medieval medical 
manuscript’s emphasis on urine analysis, pulse, and other visual signs of illness. The 
physician is instructed that the patient’s case may be ‘easily judged’ on these visual 
symptoms.
440
 This judgment is limited by the doctor’s own knowledge, resulting in an 
emphasis on therapeutic treatments; however, a prognosis on the patient’s fate – this 
was a matter of divine revelation. Following this argument, Wallis likens diagnostic 
techniques in the Middle Ages to an ‘ordeal,’ positioned, by her, as a ‘means of finding 
the truth about things which are hidden.’441  She employs the example of a crime 
without a witness. The accused is tested; in the typical medieval ordeal this is the 
application of a hot iron. If the accused’s arm is healed in three days, she is innocent.  
God thus serves as the witness – he sees what is unseeable.442 Prognosis gains its status 
as prophecy.  
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Within the medieval context, then, consent was a sign of virtue. It was not a simple 
matter of choice or a stated agreement to share one’s inner will with God, but rather it 
was an act of aligning it with Him, through a balanced and moderate ‘application of the 
movement of appetite to something that is to be done.’443 Medieval consent is thus not a 
form of autonomy, but rather an existential commitment; a submission to the divine in 
both will and conduct, measured externally by one’s balance of the passions and 
alignment with Christian ideals. If one did not truly make this commitment, if one 
lacked the requisite faith, consent (and its promised virtues) was not possible.  This is 
not unlike the role consent was seen to play among the Ancients where consent marked 
the boundaries of social and juridical recognition – a sense of belonging that was itself 
subject to a strict regimen of prescribed behaviours and identities.  The canonical story 
of consent found in the medieval medical context reveals this onto-epistemological role 
of consent even more starkly, where certain ways of being served as prerequisites for 
ways of knowing.
444
  Consent is thus an existential commitment to this schema.  It is an 
act of submission to the terms (of another) that make the very act of submission 
intelligible. 
 
The suggestion that consent is more an act of submission than autonomy is one that a 
number of legal and political scholars have made – many of whom were canvassed in 
Chapter One. Yet despite an explicit acknowledgement within many of these critiques 
that consent serves as a form of subordination to terms set by another (and often in 
opposition to the interests of the consenting), the vision of consent as a signifier or 
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enactment of personal freedom is left intact. Further, the role the narrative of consent-
as-autonomy plays in facilitating this submission is obscured.  It is only by visiting 
contexts where contemporary understandings of autonomy simply don’t ‘work’ that this 
story is disrupted, revealing consent to be less a marker of personal freedom and more a 
signifier of compliance with dominant norms of intelligibility. In the Antiquity context 
examined in the previous chapter, this submission was to the state, establishing the 
boundaries of juridical and socio-cultural recognition.  What the canonical story of 
consent revealed in this chapter’s survey of medieval medicine provides is a view to the 
way in which consent, understood as a form of submission to the divine, operated to 
regulate the soul.  Is this merely a medieval tale of consent, long since forgotten as the 
Dark Ages came to a close?  Or do some remnants of this onto-epistemological power 
of consent continue to operate today?  Is there still a way in which the ‘magic’ of 
consent to transform human error is dependent on an internal alignment with dominant 
ideals of ‘good citizenship’ or ‘good morality’?  How might consent continue to operate 
today as a site of personal salvation – or damnation – and what form might these 
prescriptions of subjectivity take?  What existential commitment does consent-as-
autonomy ask us to make?   
 
Conclusion 
In a context where consent serves as an existential act of faith performed in agapeic 
service to the other, we can begin to understand its role in maintaining epistemological 
control over medieval life (and its hereafter) and an ontological control over its 
inhabitants.  This chapter reviewed the various ways the Christian Church was able to 
maintain a monopoly over medieval medicine, including who might learn its theories, 
who might be granted the authority to engage in its practice, and who might benefit 
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from its grace.  Medieval consent, following on the heels of an Ancient belief in the 
benefits of moderation, was a virtue – a precursor, perhaps, of contemporary scholars’ 
habit of endowing consent with a moral transformative or ‘magic’ power.  And while 
contemporary patients can hardly be said to be trying to attain divinity when they sign 
consent forms for surgery, they may be trying to beat death, attain immortality, 
understand the unknowable, view the unseen, or place their bets on magic. These are 
some of the remnants of the canonical story of consent, unearthed from the medieval 
medical world. 
 
What happens, then, when these echoed acts of faith are named ‘free’?  What operations 
of self-surveillance or submission are obscured when consent is configured as 
autonomy?  Understanding medical law’s doctrine of informed consent within a context 
of power relations is not a new line of thought.  Bioethicists and medical legal scholars 
have long argued that unequal power relationships between the doctor and the patient 
create significant doubt as to the realisability (or desirability, in some cases) of a fully 
autonomous patient.  As Wilson notes in her examination of the United Kingdom’s use 
of the ‘Expert Patient policy,’ the ‘ideal patient is both compliant and self-reliant.’445 
While this model of self-reliance has roots in the ethic of self-care developed in the 
medieval period’s approach to consent, the contemporary law’s treatment of the 
consenting subject operationalizes this ethic within a capitalist logic.  This is seen 
explicitly in the next chapter’s investigation of the use of consent within sport – a 
context chosen for the same opportunity it presents for providing a ‘skewed glance’ at 
the consent-as-autonomy story.   
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CHAPTER FOUR – MODERN SPORT 
 
 
 
You consent to assault when you lace up your skates. It’s what hockey is all 
about. 
- Dave ‘Tiger’ Williams, NHL career leader in penalty points446 
 
 
The Roman people is held together by two forces: wheat doles and public shows. 
- Fronto, 2.216447 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Many commentators have noted the rising level of violence in both professional and 
amateur sporting activities in the last decade, with a number of incidents making 
headlines when injuries have been severe enough to warrant legal intervention.
448
 
Coupled with recent medical findings which suggest that a number of premature deaths 
among professional athletes are attributable to irreparable brain damage incurred during 
in-game violence, professional sports leagues and their administrators are being 
pressured to take a hard look at bodily harm in sport.
449
  Interpreting their reticence to 
do so within the context of multi-million dollar player contracts and an industry with a 
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multi-billion dollar price tag,
450
 further complicates the role of consent in discerning 
liability. Take, for instance, the recent class action suit filed by a number of former 
professional ice hockey players against the National Hockey League (NHL) for 
‘fraudulent concealment’ of the level of risk and seriousness of injury players should 
expect when participating in the game.
451
  Players launching the class action are alleging 
that they did not receive full disclosure of the risks of bodily harm that the game 
entailed, suggesting that ‘for decades the NHL has nurtured a culture of violence’ while 
‘purposefully profit[ing]’ from it.452  This issue of non-disclosure is an important one, 
given the way in which the preconditions of consent (examined in Chapter One) operate 
within criminal law to authorize certain forms of harm and not others on the basis of a 
subject’s voluntary, informed, and rational participation. The logic is that players cannot 
be held to have voluntarily participated in an activity (and consented to the harm it 
might incur) if they have not been adequately informed about the activity’s risks.  Yet, 
as was evidenced by some of the case law examined in Chapter One, even voluntary and 
well-informed decisions to engage in self-harm can be overridden if the activity in 
question is not deemed to be sufficiently reasonable – a requirement that has been 
interpreted in the criminal law context as largely concerned with notions of social 
utility.   
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This suggests there is perhaps no other place in law where rhetoric about the ‘common 
good’ and the cultural values and ideals of personhood it implicates is as explicit as it is 
in the criminal law’s consideration of consent where bodily harm occurs within the 
context of presumably consensual activities. In such instances, the law is tasked with 
assessing what forms and levels of violence are of sufficient public utility or social good 
as to fall within the ambit of consent.  And as the criminal law’s adjudications in the 
field of ‘play’ have demonstrated, these determinations of social utility are often 
troubled, perhaps no better evidenced than the now infamous English case, R. v. 
Brown.
453
 As noted in Chapter One, the court’s assessment of acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of violence in Brown was made in connection to an understanding 
of ‘harm’ that many commentators have suggested relied on hegemonic understandings 
of masculinity and heteronormativity – all housed within legal definitions of 
‘reasonableness.’454 Not unlike the previous chapters’ historical examinations of consent 
as a form of submission, might the same paradigm be applicable in the modern legal 
context?  Do criminal law consent cases reveal a prescriptive demand for conformity to 
dominant norms of intelligible personhood and action?   
 
This chapter pursues these inquiries within criminal law cases that address the defence 
of consent for assaults which occur during contact sports.  Of central concern is an 
examination of how judicial treatments of ‘harm’ (as a delimiter of consent) serve a 
grander scheme of entrenching ideals of hegemonic masculinity and the use of bodily 
capital.  The chapter begins with a review of the existing case law on the availability of 
consent to vitiate otherwise illegal violent activity, highlighting the courts’ 
consideration of ‘harm’ in its adjudication of the activities which might be carved out as 
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exceptions against assault liability. This harm principle is then discussed alongside an 
examination of hegemonic forms of masculinity which privilege (and demand) the 
commodification of the body as capital in exchange for civic virtue.  How these ideals 
of sporting masculinity become embedded in cultural life is explored through an 
examination of how sport and play are treated judicially in cases where the defence of 
consent is raised to charges of assault that occur ‘on the field.’   
 
In Harm’s Way: The consent defence in sport 
‘[T]he nature of any assault offence imports the notion of violence, and violence  
certainly is not something that is countenanced in the Canadian society.’ 
- R. v. Bertuzzi455 
 
‘I went to a fight last night and a hockey game broke out.’ 
- common Canadian joke 
 
The consent defence in criminal law holds a somewhat paradoxical position with respect 
to the relationship between the citizen and her state. Vestiges of early liberalism’s social 
contract abound in both legal and philosophical accounts of the liberty individuals 
should have from state intervention. Each person is thought to be entitled to the 
‘freedom to be left alone’ and consent is thought to enshrine this principle of 
independence.  Yet there are instances where the law acts coercively, denying 
individuals the (legal) capacity to consent when exercised in a way that causes harm.
456
 
This tension between a principle of non-interference and the state’s acts of legal 
paternalism often comes to the fore in the contexts of sport and play given the long-
standing perception of these recreational activities as forums for social ‘time outs,’ 
where citizens could relinquish some of the responsibilities associated with everyday 
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life.
457
  Two claims are usually made in favour of the law’s application within the 
spheres of sport and play. The first is some version of the ‘rule of law,’ or a principle of 
universality, where it is argued that the law extends to all persons and activities that fall 
within the jurisdiction of the state.  This is the argument J.S. Mill makes in his text, On 
Liberty, where he maintains that these acts are well within the jurisdiction of the state as 
it carries out its mandate to ensure the general welfare of all citizens.
458
 Mill is rather 
clear that these interventions must be done to prevent individuals from doing harm to 
others, yet, in the judicial treatment of consent in both North America and the United 
Kingdom, this restriction is applied when the perceived harm is done to others as well as 
oneself.
459
  For Mill, as well as many of his contemporary adherents, the exemption of 
self-harm is to prevent the practice of legal paternalism in law’s adjudication of an 
individual’s free choice, a view aptly demonstrated by H.L.A. Hart (1963) in the 
following passage: 
Choices may be made or consent given without adequate reflection or 
appreciation of the consequences; or in pursuit of merely transitory desires; or in 
various predicaments when the judgment is likely to be clouded; or under inner 
psychological compulsion; or under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be 
susceptible of proof in a law court. Underlying Mill’s extreme fear of 
paternalism there perhaps is a conception of what a normal human being is like 
which now seems not to correspond to the facts.
460
 
 
The normative component to law’s assessment of harm is made explicit in Hart’s 
commentary and points to the second common justification for the law’s intervention in 
sport and play: the enforcement of a common morality.  Sir Patrick Devlin is an oft-
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cited proponent of this view, having argued that law is meant to serve a normalizing 
function which, in turn, serves to police private immorality.
461
  This ‘common morality’ 
is what Devlin suggests is ‘part of the bondage’ that one’s participation in a society 
entails.  
Each one of us has ideas about what is good and what is evil; they cannot be 
kept private from the society in which we live. If men and women try to create a 
society in which there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil they 
will fail; if, having based it on common agreement, the agreement goes, the 
society will disintegrate. For society is not something that is kept together 
physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought.
462
 
 
Interestingly, Devlin’s argument that society is held together by the ‘invisible bonds of 
common thought’ is not unlike the medieval view of consent (examined in the previous 
chapter) as an act of existential commitment that is required before consensus might be 
reached.  John Locke’s notion of tacit consent seems to have played a similar role, as 
Chapter One delineated, where one’s use of the ‘common sense’ marked one’s 
membership in a community and an agreement to comply with its principles of right and 
wrong.   
 
This ‘moralizing’ function of the criminal law is well evidenced in much of the North 
American and English case law on the defence of consent to various charges of assault, 
where a number of ‘allowable’ forms of bodily harm have been recognized.463 These 
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include body piercing and tattooing, parental discipline, reasonable surgery,
464
 religious 
or ceremonial acts (e.g. circumcision, flagellation),
465
 ‘horseplay’ or ‘rough housing.’466 
Contact sports have also been listed within this field of exception, although subject to a 
number of qualifiers. Where an act can be said to be ‘harmless,’ the principle of non-
interference demands that it fall outside the ambit of state intervention; however, the 
content and scope of this requisite ‘harm’ is open to wide interpretation, often invoking 
cultural values and norms which privilege some forms of action while marginalising 
others.  The ensuing discussion attempts to trace the establishment of these moral 
delimiters through a review of some of the relevant case law. Emphasis is placed on 
British and Canadian cases given the jurisprudential leadership which these countries 
have taken on the issue.
467
 
 
 
 
                                                          
464
 In Brown, the House of Lords suggested surgeries that were deemed “necessary” would fall within the 
exception. This suggests that optional and presumably more normatively complicated surgeries (e.g. 
cosmetic, sex reassignment) might not be deemed “reasonable” within the jurisprudence. For commentary 
on this, see: J. Anderson, ‘No licence for thuggery: Violence, sport, and the criminal law’ (2008) 10 Crim 
LR 751; and P. Alldridge, ‘Consent to medical surgical treatment: The Law Commission’s 
recommendations’ (1996) 4 Medical LR 129. 
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 Some commentators have suggested that Lord Templeman’s claim that ritual circumcision fell within 
the lawful exceptions to violent offences was obiter dicta. See, for example: M. Fox and M. Thomson, ‘A 
covenant with the status quo? Male circumcision and the new BMA guidance for doctors’ (2004) 31(8) 
Journal of Med. Ethics 463.  See also the New Zealand Court of Appeal case, R v Lee [2006] 5 LRC 716 
involving a fatal ‘exorcism.’ In that case, religious practice was rejected as a ground where consent would 
always be operative. Rather, the same contemplation of the factors of recklessness and intention would 
need to be considered (as in other areas of the consent defence).  
466
 Brown, (n 27). See also A. Houlihan, ‘When “No” means “Yes” and “Yes” means Harm: HIV Risk, 
Consent, and Sadomasochism Case Law’ (2011) 20 Law & Sexuality 31 for some discussion of these 
exceptions. 
467
 Paul Farrugia notes: “Canada was among the first to respond to [public] concerns [about sporting 
violence] and followed the line taken by British courts, making more than one hundred criminal 
convictions for offences involving player violence in the 1970-1985 period.” One could argue with 
Farrugia’s depiction of Canadian jurisprudence as subsequent to Britain’s given how much reliance 
British courts have placed on Canadian sports cases and, in some instances, adopted the governing 
principles of the Canadian approach to the defence of consent (e.g. Cey). Similarly, many suggest the 
high intensity of the bodily contact incurred during ice hockey games has been a precipitator of these 
legal interventions in North America; P. Farrugia, ‘The consent defence: sports violence, sadomasochism, 
and the criminal law’ (1996) 8 Auckland U. L. Rev. 472, 477. 
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United Kingdom 
Early common law positions with respect to violence in contact sports were concerned 
with the subjective state of mind of the accused and whether it was sufficient to satisfy 
the mental element of the offence in question.
468
  In such configurations, consent did not 
arise as a pertinent issue to the determination of criminal liability.  Lord Hale, writing in 
1778, espoused the view that any death which occurred during a contact sport would 
constitute manslaughter on the grounds that the accused had intended to cause harm to 
her opponent.
469
 Hale was writing in opposition to another prominent contention at the 
time put forth by Sir Michael Foster in his 1762 publication, Crown Cases, which 
suggested the ‘mutual consent’ of the parties would vitiate the accused’s malicious 
intention.
470
 The courts would later seek a compromise between these two approaches in 
a trilogy of late 19th century cases, namely Bradshaw
471
, Moore
472
, and Coney
473
, 
establishing a form of implied consent for sporting activities which would take into 
account the intent concerns raised by Hale while establishing grounds of exception for 
bodily harm incurred during activities which Foster held to be of particular social 
value.
474
 Foster based these assessments of public utility on whether the activity in 
question was one of the many ‘manly diversions’ of the day intended to ‘give strength, 
skill and activity’475 such as ‘friendly exertions of cudgeling, fencing and trials of 
                                                          
468
 This has led some commentators to debate whether consent serves as a defence to charges of assault or 
is better positioned as a justification (i.e. a negation of the mental element). See G. Hughes, ‘Two views 
of consent in the criminal law’ (1963) 26 Modern LR 233. 
469
 Hale mentions the specific contact activities of wrestling and ‘cudgens,’ a martial art performed with a 
singlestick that was popular in the Middle Ages and continued well into the modern period in Europe.  M. 
Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (E. Rider 1778), 472; as cited in Note, ‘Consent in Criminal Law: 
Violence in Sports’ (1976) 75 Mich. L.R. 148, 170. 
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 M. Foster, Crown Cases (Clarendon 1762), 260. 
471
 (1878) 14 Cox C.C. 83. 
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 (1898) 14 T.L.R. 229. 
473
 (1882) L.R. 8 Q.B.D. 534. 
474
 Anderson (n 464) refers to this as the ‘implied sporting consent’ principle.  
475
 Foster, (n 470), 260. 
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strength involving wrestling and sparring.’476 This association of social value with 
masculine endeavours is perhaps not surprising given that the first known commentary 
on the issue of consent in contact sports marked out an exception for playful activities 
‘done only for disport and trial of manhood.’477 This view was carried forward in the 
case law into the late nineteenth century, as British courts considered the legality of 
prizefighting,
478
 and North American courts followed suit.
479
 This convention worked to 
produce certain understandings of masculinity through sport, namely physical strength, 
skill, risk, recreation, and – as the English cases of Brown (1993) and Wilson (1996) 
would later make explicit – heterosexuality.480  
 
These cases highlight the normative quality of the criminal law’s consideration of the 
public interest and the ways in which standards of reasonableness are linked with ideals 
of masculinity. This suggests consent must be articulated in ways that reflect a 
recognised (and arguably, normative) way of being in the world in order to be 
recognisable and deemed valid, thus enabling an avoidance of criminal liability. The 
majority in Brown suggested ‘common sense’ would dictate a point where the harm 
incurred would cross a line of severity where after considerations of consent would be 
                                                          
476
 Anderson (464), 40. 
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 M. Dalton, The Countrey Justice. (The Company of Stationers 1635), 246. 
478
 Prizefighting was effectively banned in Britain following a series of cases where public fighting 
exhibitions were dissociated from the allowable ‘manly diversions’ on the basis of their potential (and 
presumed intent) to disrupt the public peace. Sir Edward East’s 1803 treatise, Pleas of the Crown, served 
as a basis for many of these judgments. Writing in response to Foster’s earlier category of exceptional 
activities, East writes: 
But the latitude given to manly exercises of the nature above described, when conducted merely 
as diversions among friends, must not be extended to legalise prize fightings, public boxing 
matches, and the like, which are exhibited for the sake of lucre and are calculated to draw 
together a number of idle and disorderly people (270; as cited in Anderson (n 464), 38). 
479
 See, for instance, the U.S. case of State v. Burnham (1884) in which Foster’s category of ‘manly 
diversions’ is employed to distinguish between legal sport (in that case, boxing) from events thought to 
breach the public peace (namely, fist/prize fighting); (1884) 48 Am Rep 801, as cited in Anderson (n 
464), 58, n. 62. Similarly, see R. v. Jobidon [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714, the Supreme Court of Canada case 
which found consent to be inapplicable as a defence to assault charges arising from a fist fight on the 
grounds that it held no social value. 
480
 For an insightful discussion of these associations, see Thomson (n 454), Ch #6. See also: Houlihan (n 
466).  
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‘irrelevant.’481 This is in keeping with the discussion in Chapter One of the role of 
‘common sense’ in producing and enforcing normative ways of being and acting in the 
world.  Certainly, the meaning that ‘common sense’ has been given jurisprudentially 
lends credence to this claim. As one commentator has suggested: ‘In addition to the 
cognitive, volitional, and formal requirements, the appropriate act of tacit consent must 
meet the criterion of generality... something virtually every person does.’482   
 
A dominant interpretation of this generality principle in the criminal law’s articulations 
of consent is a ‘regularity of behaviour,’ i.e. an assumption about the gestures and 
actions which can be expected from people on the basis of conventionality.
483
 This is 
particularly prominent where implied consent is at issue in criminal law, where 
unwritten rules of conduct or behavioural expectations inform the reasonableness of a 
subject’s consent.  Thus, silence might be understood as a form of (implied) consent 
where the circumstances in which it occurs create the expectation or convention for this 
accepted signification.
484
  Articulated in law as a standard of common sense,
485
 implied 
consent relies on a shared understanding of gestures or circumstances from which 
particular significations are interpreted as acts of volition or informed choice.  Certainly 
the development of the defence of implied consent in sporting activities has rested on 
these presumptions of generality.  Courts have accepted the defence of consent for what 
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 Giles (n 158), 108. 
482
  E.A. Harris, ‘From Social Contract to Hypothetical Agreement: Consent and the Obligation to Obey 
the Law’ (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 651, 660. 
483
  J.A. Simmons, ‘Political Obligation and Consent’ in Miller and Wertheimer (n 108),  316. 
484
 Emily Jackson offers the example of an outstretched arm offered to a nurse holding a needle; Jackson, 
(n 114), 219.  This same circumstance was the subject of the 1891 case, O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co. 
where the charge of battery (for injuries sustained following a vaccination on a passenger ship) was 
unsuccessful following the court’s determination that the passenger’s outstretched arm constituted a valid 
form of (implied) consent (154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266) 
485
 As F.G. Miller has put it: ‘valid consent in ordinary life is often implicit or tacit.  We presume that 
competent adults will know what they are consenting to when they offer a token of unforced consent, 
absent deception, based on either common-sense understanding of how the world works or an expectation 
that it is up to them to undertake inquiry about whether what they consent to is in their interest’; Miller, 
F.G. ‘Consent to Clinical Research’ in Miller and Wertheimer (n 108), 380. 
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would otherwise be considered criminal conduct provided some rendering of ‘regularity 
as rationality’ or reasonableness is made out. British case law has relied on a series of 
Canadian cases addressing injuries sustained during both professional and amateur ice 
hockey games when determining the nature of this ‘regularity.’486 That case law is 
reviewed below. 
 
Canada 
The brief review of British cases provided above has demonstrated how the courts have 
employed consent to vitiate the wrongdoing of bodily harm provided the injuries took 
place during one of the ‘exceptional’ activities courts have recognized in the past. Sport 
has long fallen within these exempted grounds; however, even this exception has been 
subject to legal limiters. One of these, as discussed above, has been the subjective (and 
problematic) construal of the ‘public good.’ Aside from the moralising effect of these 
determinations of social utility, the consent defence in sporting contexts has posed a 
further difficulty for the courts given that the bodily contact that takes place in most 
sports is sufficient to pass the threshold of assault or battery.  This might explain the 
predominance of Canadian jurisprudence in the area of consent in sport, given the 
velocity, aggressive style of play, and average size of the players in both amateur and 
professional ice hockey games.
487
 Echoing Lord Hale’s early consideration of the 
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 This is arguably due to the higher level of violence which occurs in ice hockey games.  As noted by 
Anderson (n 464), 756: ‘To a much greater depth than the applicable English jurisprudence, the Canadian 
courts have attempted, mainly through the frequency of prosecutions taken on foot of injuries sustained 
during ice hockey games to identify the circumstances when an accused might be held to have exceeded 
the scope of that exceptive (and implied) sporting consent.’ 
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 Although some might envision American football to be a more dangerous game given the larger (on 
average) size of its players, a 2003 study done by researchers at the neurosurgical unit of Toronto’s St. 
Michael’s hospital found that ‘[d]irect fatality and injury rates for football are half those for hockey: 1.8 
per 100 000 football players in high school and 7.0 per 100 000 in college.  Nonfatal catastrophic spinal 
cord and brain injury rates are 2.6 per 100 000 hockey players and 0.7 per 100 000 football players among 
high school athletes’; A. Marchie and M.D. Cusimano, ‘Bodychecking and concussions in ice hockey: 
Should our youth pay the price?’ (2003) 169(2) CMAJ 124.  These rates would presumably increase (for 
both sports) in the professional realm. 
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mental element in assessing criminal liability, both British and Canadian courts have 
struggled with determinations of intent amidst the common threshold-meeting injuries 
in heavy contact sports.  As one Canadian court put it in Green (1971), the first case in 
history to see criminal charges laid against a professional (NHL) player for an in-game 
fight: 
One now gets to the most difficult problem of all, in my opinion: since it is 
assumed and understood that there are numerous what would normally be called 
assaults in the course of a hockey game, but which are really not assaults 
because of the consent of the players in the type of game being played, where do 
you draw the line?
488
 
 
The Green case concerned an altercation between Wayne Maki of the St. Louis Blues 
and Ted Green of the Boston Bruins. Both players were charged with assault following 
an on-ice fight, although neither case led to a conviction on the basis that the incident 
was construed as ‘part of the game.’  When acquitting Green, the court stated: 
I think within our experience we can come to the conclusion that this is an 
extremely ordinary happening in a hockey game and the players really think 
nothing of it. If you go behind the net of a defenceman, particularly one who is 
trying to defend his zone, and you are struck in the face by that player's glove, a 
penalty might be called against him, but you do not really think anything of it; it 
is one of the types of risk one assumes.
489
  
 
Five years later, a Manitoba court took judicial notice of the same difficulty in Watson 
(1975), a case involving a fight in a minor league hockey game: 
Hockey is a fast, vigorous, competitive game involving much body contact. 
Were the kind of body contact that routinely occurs in a hockey game to occur 
outside the playing area or on the street, it would, in most cases, constitute an 
assault to which the sanctions of the criminal law would apply. Patently when 
one engages in a hockey game, one accepts that some assaults which would 
otherwise be criminal will occur and consents to such assaults. It is equally 
patent, however, that to engage in a game of hockey is not to enter a forum to 
which the criminal law does not extend. To hold otherwise would be to create 
the hockey arena a sanctuary for unbridled violence to which the law of 
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 [1971]  16 D.L.R. (3d) 137, 142. 
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 Green, (n 488), 140. 
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Parliament and the Queen's justice could not apply. I know of no authority for 
such a proposition.
490
 
 
This rhetoric of acts and intentions which would otherwise be considered criminal being 
merely ‘part of the game’ has circulated in Canadian courts’ treatment of sports 
violence for decades.
491
 In some instances, it has been used to establish the 
reasonableness of the players’ actions or, in others, to vitiate their intent.492 This 
contextual approach to consent in sport has been prominent in Canadian courts’ 
treatment of in-game assaults and has been replicated in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. In the English Court of Appeal case of Barnes,
493
 the Court (somewhat 
contentiously, as some have argued)
494
 suggested the ‘threshold level’ for criminality in 
sporting contexts might not always be triggered by conduct that was ‘outside the rules’ 
nor even conduct that warranted ‘being penalized… a warning or even a sending off.’495 
Rather, the court in Barnes made reference to a 1989 Canadian case, Cey, in an attempt 
to identify an objective test for this criminal threshold.
496
 In Cey, the accused cross-
checked
497
 his opponent into the boards during an amateur ice hockey game, resulting in 
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 (1975) 26 C.C.C. (2d) 150, [20].  Similar commentary can be found in the early English cases 
regarding the violent nature of football.  For instance, Justice Hawkins in the 1898 case, Bradshaw, noted: 
‘Football is a lawful game, but a rough one, and persons who play it must be careful to restrain 
themselves so as not to do bodily harm to any other person’: (n 471), 229.  See also the judicial 
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 American courts have adopted the same view of violence as ‘commonplace’ in hockey. See: McKichan 
v. St. Louis Hockey Club, L.P. 967 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); and the commentary offered in P.K. 
Thornton, ‘Rewriting Hockey’s Unwritten Rules: Moore v. Bertuzzi’ (2009) 61 Me. L. Rev. 205, 214-215. 
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 This was explicitly the case in Green, where the court held that the accused’s act of swinging his stick 
at Maki was ‘instinctive’ and thus lacking in intent; see Note, (n 469), 161. 
493
 Barnes (n 3). 
494
 Anderson (n 464). 
495
 Barnes, (n 3), [15]. 
496
 Cey (n 27). 
497
 ‘Cross-checking’ is defined in the National Hockey League’s Rulebook as: ‘The action of using the 
shaft of the stick between the two hands to forcefully check an opponent’ (Rule 59.1, NHL Official Ice 
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a number of facial injuries. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal established a set of 
factors to be considered when assessing the defence of implied consent, each aimed at 
aiding the court in determining whether the activity in question involves ‘such a high 
risk of injury and such a distinct probability of serious harm as to be beyond what, in 
fact, the players commonly consent to, or what, in law, they are capable of consenting 
to.’498 These factors represent a kind of modified objective test given their inclusion of 
the victim’s subjective state of mind as well as a series of other game-specific 
circumstances. The court in Ciccarelli phrased these as: 
(a) the nature of the game played; whether amateur or professional 
league or so on; 
(b) nature of the particular act or acts and their surrounding 
circumstances; 
(c) the degree of force employed; 
(d) the degree of risk of injury, and 
(e) the state of mind of the accused.499 
 
These principles provide some frame for interpreting the legal preconditions that are 
applied to consent, namely knowledge, reasonableness, and voluntariness. The criminal 
law’s defence of consent has long recognised a person’s free will in consenting to 
particular activities; however, to be considered valid, consent must be given voluntarily. 
As was noted in Chapter One, this level of volition is assessed in conjunction with what 
a reasonable person can be considered to have done with the knowledge she had at the 
time.  English courts have adopted this Canadian standard where, as Lord Mustill put it 
in Brown (1993), ‘some level of violence is lawful if the recipient agrees to it... 
enquiring whether the recipient could really have tacitly accepted a risk of violence at 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hockey Rules). Online at: <http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26351>. Last accessed 19 December 
2013.  A ‘check’ is a defensive move employed to disrupt an opposing player’s possession of the puck. 
498
 Cey, (n 27), [31]. 
499
 Ciccarelli, (n 27), 126.  When the court applied these factors in Ciccarelli’s case (one involving an on-
ice assault during a professional hockey game), the accused was found guilty, sentenced to one day in jail, 
and fined $1000. 
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the level which actually occurred.’500  This approach is not meant to override 
considerations of duress, where both force and threats of force will be regarded as 
sufficient to vitiate consent.
501
 Nor is it meant to remove the possibility of findings of 
recklessness or wilful blindness – both of which would serve to negate a player’s 
‘reasonable expectations.’502 Instead, these findings represent negations of consent’s 
central components (i.e. knowledge, voluntariness, and reason). Consent operates when 
players can be shown to have known what the risks of injury were and voluntarily chose 
to engage in the activity for a ‘good reason’ (Brown). 
 
How then to determine what players knew or ought to have known when participating in 
the sport? David Archard uses ‘game’ language explicitly when addressing this question 
in the broader context of consent’s operative scope. He contends: 
the simplest and most plausible model [of consent] is that of ‘playing by the 
rules of the game.’ If I take part in an activity which is constituted by some set 
of rules, then I may be taken as agreeing to abide by those rules.  More 
generally, I may be taken as agreeing to accept what, normally and reasonably, 
may be expected to follow from taking part in this rule-governed behaviour.
503
 
 
Further, the case law reveals a practice of courts taking judicial notice of not only the 
official rules of the sport but also the ‘playing culture,’ which might include unwritten 
codes of conduct and player customs.
504
 Many Canadian cases have explicitly 
recognised the physical nature of many contact sports will involve a certain degree of 
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  Brown (n 27), 592H-593D; as cited in UK Law Commission Paper No. 134 (n 129), 21. 
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  See, for instance, the Canadian sexual assault case R. v.Martin (1980) 53 C.C.C. (2d) 250, where the 
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502
  See McSorley, (n 28), where the Crown argued that if McSorley had not deliberately struck the victim 
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this case may be likened to wilful blindness - ignoring a known risk’ [60]. 
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 Archard (n 49), 8. 
504
 Cey, (n 27). See also: David Archard, ‘“A Nod’s as Good as a Wink”: Consent, Convention, and 
Reasonable Belief’ (1997) 2 Legal Theory 273. 
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‘routine body contact’505 and players’ participation in the activity will be held to 
represent an implied consent to this bodily contact as well as other acts of aggression or 
violence which can be deemed to be ‘closely related to the play.’506 As the court in the 
1973 case, Leyte noted: 
the players in competitive sport such as this game must be deemed to enter into 
such sport knowing that they may be hit in one of many ways and must be 
deemed to consent thereto so long as the reactions of the players are instinctive 
and closely related to the play and whether or not a foul is being committed.
507
 
 
Unearthing these ‘unwritten’ players’ codes has proven to be a complex matter, 
demonstrated by two high-profile Canadian cases involving on-ice fights in NHL 
hockey games, R. v. McSorley
508
and R. v. Bertuzzi.
509
 In the first instance, Marty 
McSorley was charged with assault with a weapon after having ‘slashed’ an opposing 
player, Donald Brashear, with his hockey stick.
510
 Brashear fell to the ice, suffered a 
seizure, and lost consciousness, suffering from a grade 3 concussion.
511
 In finding 
McSorley guilty, the trial judge took notice of the discrepancies presented at trial 
between the official position taken by the NHL (as per the Rulebook) that slashing was 
an illegal act in hockey subject to penalty and the position taken by McSorley and other 
players who submitted evidence that slashing was an accepted means of starting a fight 
– another illegal yet unwritten component to hockey, argued the defence.  As the trial 
judge stated: 
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 This was applied to an incident of violence that broke out between two handball players in the 
Canadian case, R. v. Leyte, [1973] 13 C.C.C. (2d) 458, where the accused knocked the victim into a wall 
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 Leyte, (n 506), 459. 
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 McSorley,(n 28). 
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 ‘Slashing,’ according to the National Hockey League’s (NHL) Official rulebook (2010-2011) is ‘the 
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 McSorley,(n 28), [59]. 
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[T]hose written rules are only part of the picture. There is also an unwritten code 
of conduct, agreed to by the players and officials, that is superimposed on the 
written rules. This code of conduct deals mainly with situations where the 
written rules are breached, and the code then comes into play. For example, the 
written rules prohibit slashing with the stick, but the unwritten code says that 
slashing is permissible as long as it is during play, and not to the head…Another 
example deals with fighting.
512
 
 
Fighting, although officially an illegal component to the game of professional ice 
hockey, is the subject of twenty-two rules in the NHL’s Rulebook which examine and 
delineate various acts of on-ice aggression into the minutia.
513
 Similarly, as Patrick 
Thornton has observed: ‘The word “enforcer” or “hockey goon” does not appear in 
the… National Hockey League (NHL) rulebook.  However, every player and coach 
knows the meaning of those words.’514 The court in McSorley took note of the accused’s 
frankness with respect to his role in the game and observed that ‘[i]t was his job to fire 
up the team, and he did so by fighting Brashear - obviously a formidable undertaking by 
which the other players should have been inspired.’515 McSorley’s claims of being an 
‘enforcer’ on the team were not backed up at trial by his team, his coach, or the NHL, 
each of which maintained the position that fighting – and fighters – were not a 
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 See Rules 46.1-46.22. Examples include dictations on which players drops his gloves first (46.11) or 
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February 1997; as cited in M. Robidoux, Men at Play: A Working Understanding of Professional Hockey. 
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NHL. (Triumph Books 2006). 
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 McSorley (n 28), [84].  The court goes further than this, observing that McSorley was ordered out onto 
the ice with only twenty seconds left in the game with the instructions to fight.  ‘There was no line change 
- he was the only player sent out. From his experience, and knowing his role on the team, this was a clear 
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sanctioned or official part of hockey. McSorley was convicted of assault, suspended for 
the remainder of the season and one additional year, and never played in another NHL 
game again. 
 
Four years later, a similar incident occurred during a game between the Vancouver 
Canucks and the Colorado Avalanche when Vancouver’s Todd Bertuzzi punched 
Colorado’s Steve Moore in the head from behind. Moore fell to the ice immediately and 
suffered fractures to two vertebrae, some facial lacerations, and a concussion.
516
 
Bertuzzi maintained he had been instructed to engage Moore in a fight in retaliation for 
a hit the Canucks’ star player had received from Moore in an earlier game,517 yet, 
similar to the McSorley case, ‘hockey's unwritten rule dealing 
with enforcers and hockey's code of retaliation’ was not recognised by the NHL.518 
Rather, Bertuzzi’s team was fined $250,000 by League and its commissioner, Gary 
Bettman, announced on an international sports television broadcast: ‘The message we're 
sending is that this is not part of our game, it has no place in our game and it will not be 
tolerated in our game.’519  
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 Thornton includes an excerpt from Bertuzzi’s deposition in support of this view: 
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Q. All right, and did that play a role in your decision to go after Steve Moore in the third period? 
A. I think it influenced him being challenged by a lot of players yes; (n 491), 211. 
518
 Thornton observes that ‘[l]eading up to the match, several Canucks made statements to the effect that 
they would retaliate against Moore. In fact, the threats became so well known that NHL Commissioner 
Gary Bettman and Executive Vice President and Director of Hockey Operations of the NHL, Colin 
Campbell, attended the game,’ (n 491), 211. 
519
 Rick Westhead, ‘Bertuzzi Suspended for Season and Playoffs,’ New York Times, (New York 12 March 
2004) D1; as cited in Thornton (n 491), 208.  Bettman has, however, publicly acknowledged fighting as 
part of the game in other places, see Thornton (n 491), 216. This paradox has not gone unnoticed by 
sports commentators. As Michael Farber notes: 
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So the rules of the NHL game of hockey consist of the written rules in the 
rulebook, a coexisting unwritten code of conduct impliedly agreed to by the 
players and officials, and guidelines laid down by the officials from game to 
game. It is within this somewhat indefinite framework that players must play the 
game.
520
 
 
These cases reveal that the task of determining the parameters of what is ‘reasonable’ or 
‘normal’ is both daunting and ripe for normative bias. Similarly, these factors do not 
work to remove what appears to be an over-riding principle of public policy 
considerations within the jurisprudence.  As noted by the UK Law Commission in its 
1994 Report on Consent: 
The law clearly reserves the right to say that some activities do not qualify for 
special exemption at all; just as it reserves the right to say that, within a lawful 
sport, public policy requires that injury caused by some of the sport’s practices, 
even though accepted by the injured player, should be dealt with as criminal in 
nature.
521
 
 
The bodily contact incurred in physically demanding and fast-paced sports such as ice 
hockey, rugby, and (American) football is often more than sufficient to meet the 
threshold for criminal liability. Further, the level of violence in some sports is raised 
when the unwritten code of fighting as ‘part of the game’ is considered.  Former NHL 
player and federal Member of Canada’s Parliament, Ken Dryden, has commented on 
this component of the game, noting not simply the violent nature of hockey but that 
aggressive intent is an included characteristic of the game: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The sickening irony is this: If before the mugging Moore had chosen simply to turn and fight 
Bertuzzi, who had been stalking Moore, tugging on his jersey and goading him throughout the 
third period of a lopsided game, Moore wouldn't have ended up face-first in a pool of his own 
blood with two broken vertebrae in his neck and a concussion. The two players could have 
pounded on each other for a while, and the world would have paid no notice. Because in the 
National Hockey League there is acceptable violence and unacceptable violence, a distinction 
that makes sense in the skewed, internal logic of the sport but is inexplicable to almost everyone 
outside the game's cocoon; (M. Farber, ‘Code Red’ Sports Illustrated, (New York 22 March 
2004).  
520
 McSorley (n 28), [24]. 
521
 UK Law Commission (n 129), 22-3. 
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What is the possible intent of hitting someone into the boards from behind, 
except to injure? There is no other understanding. The same for a hit to the head. 
You can stop someone dead in his tracks with a hit to the shoulder or hip. The 
only reason to hit someone on the head is to hurt him. Even if you say, ‘Well, I 
didn't want to really hurt  him,’ you wanted to shake him up, put him off his 
game, intimidate him, just not put him in hospital. But the intent to injure is 
there.
522
 
 
Still, the definition of these acts as ‘harmful’ depends on a judicial consideration of 
public policy and/or the perceived reasonableness of player expectations. How do these 
inform one another? Is public policy always reasonable? The jurisprudence in the area 
of sport and play provides an interesting case study for these inquiries. The court in the 
McSorley case declared some injuries too ‘perverse’ to be eligible for consent, stating 
‘there are some actions which can take place in the course of a sporting conflict that are 
so violent it would be perverse to find that anyone taking part in a sporting activity had 
impliedly consented to subject himself to them.’523  Yet, despite the explicit recognition 
of in-game fighting among players and commentators of hockey, the courts have not 
always found such instances to fall within the reasonable expectations of play but nor 
have they equated in-game violence with the social disutility of fist-fighting (as was 
done in the barroom brawl case, Jobidon).
524
  Something about violence in sport must 
be of ‘use’ to the state. 
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In some of its earliest articulations, the rejection of the defence of consent to self-
inflicted bodily harm reflected foundations of political liberalism where state legitimacy 
was grounded in the consent of its political subjects. Liberty was a sacred principle such 
that a person could consent to anything other than severing one’s own limb(s).  
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England explains this was to prevent 
deprivation to ‘the king of the aid and assistance of one of his subjects.’525 Might 
contemporary public policy discourse within the case law be achieving the same end?  
Judicial treatments of consent in cases involving voluntary self-harm have emphasised 
the general principle that interference with individual liberty is justified only where a 
strong reason to do so exists, invoking language of the ‘common good’ or public 
interests to construct the content of this reason.  How is the state’s interest in producing 
and maintaining eligible subjects serviced by these configurations of ‘harm’? The 
following sections attempt to probe these questions, reviewing the relationship between 
contact sports, ideals of masculinity, and the use of bodily capital. 
 
‘No Sissy Stuff’: Harm and Hegemonic Masculinity in Sport 
 ‘Pain is one of hockey’s measuring sticks.’ 
- Dave King, former coach of the Montreal Canadiens526 
 
Play has long been recognised as a ground where cultural norms take root, where 
‘civilization arises and unfolds in and as play.’527  This is, perhaps predictably, not a 
value-neutral process. A glance at other dominant social ethos, (Michael Oriard offers 
the examples of ‘mass culture’ or ‘consumer culture’) suggest ways that these are 
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  Wright's Case (Leicester Assizes 1604), reported in J. Beale, Cases on Criminal Law (3
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 edn, 
Harvard Law Review Publishing Assn 1915), 209; as cited in R. Binder, ‘Consent Defense: Sports, 
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‘rooted in conspicuous playfulness of a kind that Huizinga considered not truly playful 
at all.’528 Rather, they provide a structure or schematisation for human relations – a 
frame for interpreting (and prescribing) specific subjectivities and their ontologies. 
‘Norms articulate knowledge and power, cognitive and normative expectations, and this 
articulation is reflexive; normative expectations make the world visible in a particular 
way.’529  Histories of play detail how its coerced systematisation has been employed to 
discipline social relations or alter cultural assumptions.
530
 Fundamentally understood as 
an activity that is ‘not serious’ and immersed in the realm of the imaginary, play can be 
posited as outside of or apart from ‘reality.’ This allows it to be understood as timeless, 
ahistorical, and apolitical and thus easily positioned as ‘objective’ and authoritative 
about social life. Play is able to assume a presocial status, fortifying it against critique – 
it is simply ‘natural’ or ‘always been this way.’531 In this way, play and its 
organisational structure of human roles and relations becomes common sense.
532
 These 
common assumptions, in turn, inform judicial interpretations of the reasonable 
expectations players of a game might have about its inherent risks and acceptable levels 
of harm – key components to the delineation of the defence of consent’s scope.   
 
Perhaps one of the most prevalent components of this ‘common sense’ is a prescriptive 
form of masculinity.  Sport and play have long been recognized as formative places for 
                                                          
528
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 A. Pottage, ‘Foucault’s Law by Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick (review)’ (2011) 74 Modern LR 159, 
160. 
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the development and entrenchment of gender schematics.
533
 Working from Judith 
Butler’s formulation of gender as a performance, sex roles are understood not to be 
stable signifiers of a particular way of being but rather ‘repeated stylization[s] of the 
body… within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of substance.’534 Certainly, the organisation of play into modern sport meets 
the requirement of just such a frame of social (and ontological) regulation. In particular, 
sport’s contributions to cultural understandings of masculinity have served as an 
operative means of privileging some subjects while excluding others.  As Rowe et. al. 
have remarked, ‘sport has been one of the most significant means by which gender 
boundaries have been marked.’535  Michael Thomson employs the example of the public 
school system of the Victorian period to highlight how values of aggression, 
competitiveness, order, and discipline were pitted as ideals of masculinity through the 
introduction of organised sport in the curriculum. He notes that ‘the Victorians moved 
to more firmly secure the feminine within the sphere of the home and of reproduction. 
Her physical frailty and weakness left her unfit for challenging exercise and the rigors 
of sport. The competitive public arena was naturally the world of men.’536 Christine 
Skelton, remarking on the same period, notes how football was viewed (by the capitalist 
class) as ‘beneficial’ to working class men as it kept them ‘away from the pubs after 
collecting their wages Saturday lunchtime.’537 This view has been furthered by other 
scholars who have suggested the incorporation of football in physical education 
                                                          
533
 Huizinga does note a difference between ‘sport’ and ‘play’ (or ‘games’) that reflects the former’s 
relation to capitalist interests. This is explored in further detail in this chapter’s third section; Huizinga (n 
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curriculum at the public school level served as a ‘political strategy to teach upper and 
middle class males to be leaders and to induce discipline in working class males.’538  
 
The encouragement of young boys to participate in sport while young girls are expected 
to take up more passive activities didn’t end with the Victorian era, as many scholars of 
sex segregation in education and athletics maintain.
539
  While the explicit division 
between male and female roles in physical activity are not as overtly orchestrated in 
modern sport, studies of both sport participation and the ‘business’ of sport (including 
its televised coverage and the professional careers it offers) continue to be male-
dominated regimes.
540
 As masculinities scholar, Michael Kimmel, has noted: ‘Sports 
has become both metaphor and reality of American masculinity – its language 
dominates other discourses as metaphor, while sports have become increasingly 
important among young boys as the arena of demonstration and proof.’541 
  
This postulation of the sports arena as a ‘proving ground’ for young men has an 
extraneous effect of establishing particular traits of male superiority for both on and off 
the field.
542
  R.W. Connell has explained how these cultural accounts of gender can 
adhere to produce behavioural codes which dictate not simply how one should act but 
effectively who one is.
543
 This marks the normative quality of definitions of masculinity 
which serve to offer a standard of what men ought to be, often with reliance on 
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essentialist understandings of sex roles and differences.  These traits can be seen to 
inform judicial assessments of the kinds of activities that can be considered ‘rational’ or 
desirable for men to engage in, which, in turn, serve to establish the limits of the 
consent defence in sports violence cases.  Perhaps more insidious, however, is the role 
the consent-as-autonomy story plays in cementing this idealized subjectivity.  Connell’s 
theory of hegemonic masculinity maintains that not all masculinities are equally 
practiced, valued, or even available. Instead, it is hegemonic masculinity that ‘in any 
given setting, [is] the pattern of masculinity which is most honoured, which is most 
associated with authority and power, and which – in the long run – guarantees the 
collective privilege of men.’544  When assessing the ‘reasonableness’ of harm incurred 
during a sporting activity, courts will often rely on these idealized traits of ‘manliness’ 
when determining that a player’s ‘choice’ to subject himself to in-game violence is not 
simply a rational exercise of his autonomy, but a culturally desirable one, thus 
establishing such forms of harm as having sufficient social value. 
 
One of the dominant examples of these normative frameworks of masculinity was 
provided in Robert Brannon’s oft-cited ‘blueprint of manhood’ wherein he offers a four-
fold typology of idealised forms of male roles, each of which can be actively seen in 
sport, particularly the culture of high-contact sports.
545
  Brannon’s criterion of ‘no sissy 
stuff’ is sometimes cited as the ‘first and foremost’ principle of idealised masculinity.546 
It demands the rejection of all things ‘feminine,’ where femininity is understood to be 
weakness, passivity, and emotional sensitivity.
547
 Men must not resemble women in 
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their appearance or emotive responses, thus giving minimal attention to hygiene, body 
work, and physical attire.
548
 By way of contrast, Sandra Bartky has remarked on the 
idealised form of femininity at work in appearance norms for women. She notes that 
‘[a] woman’s skin must be soft, supple, hairless, and smooth; ideally, it should betray 
no sign of wear, experience, age, or deep thought.’549 Hegemonic masculinity requires 
the adoption of an opposite aesthetic, where physical ‘wear and tear’ is heralded as the 
mark of a ‘real man.’ This conforms to Brannon’s criterion that ‘real men’ engage in an 
ethos of ‘give ‘em hell,’ exalting hostility and risk taking. Men are expected to ‘exude 
an aura of manly daring and aggression’ while aiming for power, thrills, and success 
(‘the big wheel’) which are often measured in capitalist terms.550  Further, they are 
expected to do this as ‘a sturdy oak,’ showing little to no emotions, specifically, 
vulnerability.   
 
Many scholars have noted the ill-effects each of these ideals can have on men’s health, 
often as a result of normative pressure to conceal illness, refrain from discussing 
symptoms, and refusal to seek medical advice or treatment.
551
  In some instances, the 
demand for player toughness and the presumption that professional athletes are 
expected to ‘play through the pain,’ has been the basis for claims of civil negligence, 
where these idealised forms of masculinity form a central part of judicial treatments of 
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‘reasonableness.’  In the case, Brady v. Sunderland Association Football Club Ltd.,552 
the Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for damages for the club’s breach of 
duty in failing to address his complaints of injury.  In determining that the club had not 
failed to meet its requisite standard of care, the Court held that the football club’s 
assumptions (that the player’s injuries were not as serious as he made out) were 
reasonable, particularly in light of the rarity of the plaintiff’s condition and the 
inconsistency with which the player complained about the pain. This finding was 
reached despite the Queen’s Bench Division decision explicitly acknowledging 
evidence that when the player complained of pain, he was admonished by his coach for 
having a ‘bad attitude’ and demonstrating a poor work ethic. As cited from the 
plaintiff’s witness statement: 
[The coach] was telling me that I had an attitude problem and in particular in 
relation to training. I didn't really realise there was something physically wrong. 
I just wasn't able to keep up all the time. From time to time I would try and 
explain to him in training sessions why I was unable to keep up but he did not 
want to listen and told me it was to do with my attitude. Over the following 
month his opinion about my attitude seemed to harden… He told me that he 
wasn't going to put up with any more nonsense. He told me that I couldn't stop 
and to keep going. He then sent the other players off in a different direction and 
he ran with me along the coast lecturing me about my attitude and telling me I 
just didn't like hard work.
553
 
 
A further (and often most prominent) component of hegemonic masculinity is 
compulsive heterosexuality, denoted most often by an explicit rejection of 
homosexuality. Similar to the proscription against ‘sissy stuff,’ idealised masculinity 
often asserts itself through homophobia and the characterisation of non-conforming 
males as gay.
554
 Kimmel, in his research on this issue, cites an interview with rap 
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musician, Eminem, to illustrate the social authority of hegemonic masculinity’s 
heterosexist script: 
The lowest degrading thing that you can say to a man… is to call him a faggot 
and try to take away his manhood. Call him a sissy. Call him a punk. ‘Faggot’ to 
me doesn’t necessarily mean gay people. ‘Faggot’ to me just means taking away 
your manhood.
555
 
 
This practice is prominent in sports rhetoric both among players and sports 
commentators. The requirement within hegemonic masculinity that men ‘give ‘em hell’ 
has led some masculinities scholars to suggest that ‘[v]iolence is the single most evident 
marker of manhood.’556  The use of the moniker ‘Cindy’ among online critics to 
describe professional hockey player, Sidney Crosby, when observations about his 
playing style and behaviour fail to conform to the ‘tough guy’ ideal of masculinity, 
serves as a good example.
557
 After Crosby (a player who is widely recognised as the top 
player in the league)
558
 suffered a severe concussion following hits to the head in back-
to-back games during the 2010-2011 season, he was removed from the playing roster 
for over ten months, prompting remarks that he was a ‘wimp’ who was failing to ‘man 
up.’559 Similarly, identical Swedish twins Henrik and Daniel Sedin, who both play ice 
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hockey for the Vancouver Canucks, were labelled the ‘Sedin Sisters’ by sports media 
and opposing players for failing to initiate physical contact with players on the ice.
560
 
North America’s recent debate about the role of fighting in ice hockey has also sparked 
rhetoric that reinforces these idealised notions of maleness where ‘good’ players are 
expected to take risks, not shy away from on-ice violence, and ‘play through the 
pain.’561 This attitude is well evidenced in CBC sports commentator Mike Milbury’s 
(rather offensive) lament in 2009 that banning fights in hockey would lead to the 
‘pansification’ of the sport.562  
 
This relationship between the sporting world, manhood, and homophobia has been 
identified by some scholars as forming a kind of ‘sporting masculinity,’ where 
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hegemonic masculine ideals are bolstered through and within sport.
563
 Not only does 
sports rhetoric and playing culture dictate how young boys are to become men through 
its rules, commentary, and direct instruction, it also cements hegemonic understandings 
of men as tough, aggressive risk-takers by admonishing alternative models of ‘being 
male.’ This is found explicitly in the juridical treatment of ‘harm’ in decisions 
addressing the defence of consent in incidents of sports violence, where ‘harm’ is 
configured as a failure to enact hegemonic masculinity. The Brown (1993) case offers 
one of the clearest instances of this (re)construction of the harm principle where, as 
Thomson suggests, ‘sporting language and imagery is deployed in a judicial setting to 
distance, marginalise, and ultimately penalise an already subordinate masculinity.’564  
The subordinate masculinity in Brown was, of course, homosexuality, further 
complicated by the introduction of consensual sadomasochistic activity.  Interestingly, 
an initial analysis might suggest the acts of the appellants in Brown conform to a 
number of ideals of hegemonic masculinity. Participants enthusiastically engaged in 
aggressive acts of violence where the risk of injury was ‘played through’ by a group of 
men seeking thrills and power. These events took place over a ten year period during 
which time no participant had ever sought medical treatment for any of the injuries they 
sustained nor voiced complaint about the events or ‘wimped out.’565 Yet, the court in 
Brown goes to great lengths to move the behaviour of the appellants away from the 
domain of hegemonic masculinity which, as Thomson has argued, is accomplished by 
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constructing the appellants as not simply ‘unmanly,’ but also unhealthy.566 This is a 
familiar technique for the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity: 
The ‘homosexual’ becomes one who has transgressed the boundaries not only of 
the sexual, but also of the civilized, through acts of depravity that require the 
reaffirmation of social norms. The events are symbolic in that they reaffirm 
definitions of normalcy, and are designed to expurgate the gay men from the 
realm of the social to a pathologised sphere of decay, illness, and to an 
unavoidably brutal, and ironically, seductive death.
567
 
 
Given this construction, ‘consent’ must be removed from the appellants’ capacity. It is 
the marker of the normal, the civilised, the ‘man’ of contemporary society.  To leave the 
‘homosexual’ eligible to consent would be to disrupt the frame of exclusion and 
privilege necessary for the preservation of an idealised masculinity – not unlike the 
disavowal of autonomy among those without sufficient status in Ancient Greece. Thus, 
despite sadomasochism’s valorisation of pain, toughness, violence, and the enjoyment 
thereof, the court in Brown is unable to reconcile this with the heterosexual demands of 
hegemonic masculinity. Instead, the court distances the appellants’ conduct from the 
acceptable and ‘reasonable’ forms of violence that occur in organised sports on the basis 
of the former’s lack of masculinity. Not only is the appellants’ activity without ‘good 
reason,’ but it is deemed to be against the public’s interest on the basis that its deviation 
from the ‘manly diversions’ of sport and skills contests, and thus is unhealthy and 
harmful.
568
 
 
Brown is a case which has received significant criticism from legal scholars and 
commentators, particularly with respect to what is perceived to be blatant homophobia 
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in the court’s reasoning.569 Contrasting judicial approaches to other forms of ‘rough 
horseplay’ outside of the sadomasochistic realm, however, reveals similar 
considerations of harm and hegemonic masculinity.  The Jones (1986) case involved a 
group of teenaged boys on a youth club playground.
570
 The older boys in the group took 
hold of two younger children and after some brief ‘play fighting’ (as one of the 
participants described it) involving a headlock, some punching and some kicking, 
managed to throw the two young boys in the air. Each landed on the ground, one 
suffering a ruptured spleen (which required immediate surgery and hospitalisation) and 
the second, a broken arm. In exempting the activity from criminal liability on the basis 
that it fell within the established grounds of ‘horseplay,’ the court argued this was 
merely an example of typical boyhood mischief. While recognising the activity was 
likely to cause injury, the court dismissed the need for criminal sanction, suggesting 
that: 
though they anticipated that they might get the odd bruise, as boys do in 
playground roughness... [t]hey thought that it was being taken as a joke by their 
victims. True, their victims protested and claimed that they were being hurt, but 
that was common form among the boys in order to achieve an escape.
571
  
 
A similar approach was taken in the (1992) case, R. v. Atkin, where the appellants were 
officers in the Royal Air Force who were celebrating the conclusion of their flight 
training.
572
 After consuming a large quantity of alcohol, the appellants began to set fire 
to the fire resistant suits of two officers who, the court relays, ‘treated it as a joke.’573 
Later in the night, one of the officers indicated he was retiring to bed at which point the 
appellants poured white spirit on the victim and ignited it, resulting in serious burns. In 
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characterising these events as ‘rough and undisciplined horseplay,’ the court suggested 
that the victim’s ‘knowledge of the course which celebration evenings such as the one in 
question was likely to take and his continued presence with the others demonstrated an 
acceptance by him that horseplay of the nature perpetrated upon him might well take 
place.’574 It is hard to imagine the court taking this approach to implicit consent (while 
sleeping) in any other instance of criminal assault without reliance on normative 
understandings of masculinity and ‘horseplay.’575  
 
Judicial use of the ‘rough horseplay’ exception in defence of consent cases has garnered 
significant criticism among legal commentators, some suggesting it amounts to nothing 
more than a ‘bully’s charter.’576 Their position highlights the juridical practice of 
equating ‘harm’ with non-conformity to hegemonic masculinity by placing it in a 
context of homophobia: 
This seems to be a bully's charter. It is extremely far-fetched to suggest that boys 
being held by several others to prevent them running away are genuinely 
consenting to being thrown in the air. To say that boys in such a situation can 
consent to grievous bodily harm, but that sado-masochists, who are genuinely 
consenting, cannot consent to actual bodily harm provides an interesting 
insight into the way some of our judiciary view the world. Violence in the 
playground or barrack room is what is expected and normal in the male world; it 
is a ‘manly diversion’. Two men wishing to express their sexuality together and 
in private are not doing the sort of thing ‘real men’ do. It is an ‘evil thing’ and 
‘uncivilised’ and cannot be the subject of valid consent.577 
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This association of social violence that would normally trigger the criminal law with the 
‘rough horseplay’ that common law exemptions have recognised is often an explicitly 
gendered one. Take, for instance, the Canadian (2006) case, R. v. Beahm, where the 
accused held a knife to an employee’s throat while on the job.578 Although the court did 
not allow the defence of consent, it was not on the grounds that this behaviour fell 
outside the ambit of allowable social violence but instead was untenable given the 
surrounding circumstances and their influence on what the victim could reasonably have 
expected.
579
 The judgement situates the inquiry within the context of hegemonic 
masculinity from the onset, opening with the following paragraph: 
The fishing industry in Newfoundland and Labrador was traditionally dominated 
by males. As such these males, in attempts to show their male prowess or for 
other male generated reasons, would at times engage in verbal and physical 
jousting in the work place. This would take the form of verbal comments, both 
in general and more colourful language, and in everything from minor poking 
and bumping of one person against another to more engaging physical 
activity.
580
 
 
These cases suggest the ways in which dominant understandings of masculinity are used 
to distinguish allowable forms of violence from those which will incur criminal liability. 
These views of ‘manliness’ are often positioned as so commonplace, so ‘natural’ as to 
be beyond explanation – they are merely the expected outcomes of ‘male community 
life.’581  Sport remains an essential component of this male community where it is often 
‘mobilized as a signifier of appropriate (that is, hegemonic) masculinity.’582 Thus, 
where the horseplay of young men can be likened to sport (with allusions to rules or 
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‘tacitly agreed understandings or conventions’),583 consent is permissible. Further, the 
invocation of consent works to naturalise these ideals by positioning the activity as one 
which the participants chose to partake in.  Consent serves as the ‘badge’ or public 
statement of a masculinity that assumes risk, endures pain, and welcomes violence 
without complaint or sign of vulnerability. But it is only in circumstances where these 
traits are enacted in ways that do not challenge hegemonic masculinity that they are 
deemed not to be ‘harmful’ or contrary to public policy. What socially utile end does 
this ‘ideal man’ serve?  
 
The following section examines how this cultural conditioning of the traits of desirable 
masculinity is deployed in service to state interests of capitalism. It explores a second 
juridical construction of harm in consent sports cases, i.e. the misuse of body capital. 
 
Capitalism with the Gloves Off: Consent and Body Capital in Sport 
‘These guys are trading money for brain cells.’ 
- Chris Nowinski, former Harvard football player and professional 
wrestler
584
 
 
For as much as sport can be seen as a forum for the construction and maintenance of 
cultural understandings of masculinity, it is arguably even better understood as a site of 
struggle – between winners and losers, participants and spectators, amateurs and 
professionals, and élite and populist classes of activity.
585
 Moreover, these struggles are 
both political and corporeal, waged with certain authorized bodies and with certain uses 
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of those bodies.  Like any exercise of disciplinary power, sport employs expert 
knowledge to facilitate desired outcomes of these struggles, including medical 
professionals, coaches and trainers, and in some instance, the courts.
586
  Further, the 
professional sports associations and administrative bodies that govern sporting activities 
are vested with the power to discipline players and practices that might fail to conform 
to official (and unofficial) rules of play.  As was noted within the context of sport’s role 
in enforcing ideals of hegemonic masculinity, often these ‘rules of play’ implicate 
behaviour off the field where players are expected to conform to standards of 
‘toughness’ with a stoic tolerance of pain.  These standards are enforced through both 
formal and informal social controls, the latter of which often proves the most influential. 
Concealing injuries and ‘playing through the pain’ are not simply expected of players, 
but are acts deemed reasonable both for the avoidance of personal ridicule
587
 and the 
establishment of a hard-working reputation.  
 
This points to a particular characteristic of modern sport as a form of labour where, as 
Loïc Wacquant has suggested, sport ‘looks like a cross among prostitution, the 
performing arts, solidiering, and bartering.’588 Attitudes towards pain among players 
and spectators of heavy-contact sports provide a useful example.  Aside from the 
insistence that injured players ‘man up’ (or the reverse scenario examined earlier where 
players are emasculated for failing to do so), a class frame is often employed to portray 
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players who do ‘play through the pain’ as more hard-working and thus, valuable. Kristi 
Allain’s work has noted the use of the term ‘lunch pail’ players in ice hockey leagues589 
to refer to players who ‘[l]ike their working-class equivalents… are thought to do 
“dirty” and unglamorous jobs on the ice’ and are understood to be ‘less about beauty, 
and more about grit.’590  While this work rhetoric is prominent in a number of sports 
contexts, it is most prevalent in professional leagues where athleticism is often assessed 
on the basis of occupational achievements, themselves often signified by risk-taking, 
violence, and injury.  Nick Trujillo, in his study of American baseball, identifies a 
number of factors which contribute to the understanding of sport-as-work, including the 
differentiation of sport from play
591
 and the commodification of players, where they are 
‘sold’ or ‘traded’ in a competitive marketplace.  
 
Understanding the professional sporting world as a marketplace is not an imaginative 
exercise, particularly when the high-end salaries and ancillary benefits of pro athletes 
are considered. The introduction of in-game violence, however, alters the standard view 
of sport-as-work. In a recent book detailing his career as an NHL enforcer, Georges 
Laraque writes about the stresses and difficulties of being ‘paid to fight’: 
[Most] tough guy[s] in the league would rather do anything but fight on the ice. 
They would love to score tons of goals, become more and more talented, and 
earn bigger salaries, all the things hockey players dream of the moment they 
become hockey players. And I was one of those. I never enjoyed fighting. I did it 
because it was my job and the only way for me to keep playing in the NHL. 
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Period… I could be injured, hurting everywhere — it didn’t matter. If I had to 
go, I simply had to.
592
 
  
Similar accounts have been given by other game enforcers, each noting the stress and 
anxiety associated with their ‘jobs’ as in-game fighters.593  In some instances, a player’s 
refusal to engage in violent conduct results in the end of his or her professional sporting 
career.
594
  This has led many to comment on the exploitive nature of sport, described by 
Wacquant as ‘show business with blood,’595 a factor further complicated when the 
distinctive class locations of many contact sports players are considered. Boxers, for 
instance, have been noted as largely coming from ‘poor, working-class backgrounds. 
Many are members of minority groups for whom boxing may seem to be one of the few 
ways out of the misery they were born into.’596  The use of a class analysis allows for a 
view of the differential ‘stakes’ at risk in sport violence where subproletarian players, 
‘shorn of all social and economic security, subjected to the cycles of employment in 
unskilled and unstable labour’ are frequently forced into less rationalized management 
of body capital in pursuit of socio-economic betterment.
597
 As the boxing club manager 
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of Wacquant’s study points out to him, ‘if you want to know who’s at d’bottom of 
society, all you gotta do is look at who’s boxin.’598  
 
Within this context of labour exploitation, how is the ‘freedom to consent’ meant to be 
understood?  The law’s interventions into the sporting realm are rare and hinge on 
determinations of whether the harm incurred exceeded what public policy or ‘good 
reason’ will allow players to consent to. Despite the psychological burdens and the 
dangers associated with violent confrontation (often when players have pre-existing 
injuries), normal protections by way of work safety standards or even legal sanctions are 
not applicable to the sports context unless the conduct can be deemed to fall outside the 
reasonable expectations of play.  Coupled with the criminal law’s use of the ‘public 
interest’ as a delimiter of consent, the effect is to construct certain forms of violence as 
‘reasonable.’ This establishes not just what is acceptable (and valuable) on the playing 
field, but also within the surrounding social order itself.  In some of the more contact-
oriented sports, (such as rugby, ice hockey, or American football), ‘the borders between 
the permissible and the inadmissible are not always very clear-cut. Both are inherently 
violent.’599 This distinction is even more difficult when the unwritten codes of players 
are considered.  Some have suggested unsanctioned violence is best defined alongside a 
notion of ‘fair play,’ where something ‘that is not supposed to come to light, to be 
exposed, because it is not directed to the unfolding of the game but to the private goals 
of rage or revenge, to “get at” a specific opponent, to “prove” oneself.’600  However, 
most players’ accounts of unwritten codes and their own expectations of in-game 
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violence don’t adhere to this classification, particularly when the ideals of hegemonic 
masculinity are considered. As one commentator observed with respect to the unwritten 
code in rugby: ‘you do not allow yourself or your team-mates to be publicly brutalized 
by an opposing team in the course of play. You are duty bound to level the score.’601 
This accords with ice-hockey players’ (and fans’) accounts of fist-fighting as ‘part of 
the game’ of hockey and the goals of intimidation and retaliation which many contact-
sports players report as inciting (and justifying) in-game violence.
602
  Further, these 
characterizations of violence in sport as merely ‘part of the game’ are not made by 
spectators or players alone, but have also formed part of judicial determinations of 
criminal liability.  As was noted by the British Columbia Provincial Court in its 
sentencing of Todd Bertuzzi (a professional ice hockey player) for his assault against an 
opposing player:  
I am not so naïve as to suggest that fights are not a part of hockey. I will leave 
aside the issue of whether they should be, but the fact of the matter is that 
hockey is a sport in which there is significant physical contact, and in certain 
circumstances fighting is considered to be part of the game. It is not a sanctioned 
part of the game, but it is a part of the game.
603
 
 
Where physical violence does garner criticism in sports circles, it is rarely because the 
violence has reached an unprecedented level but rather because it was for the wrong 
ends. In other words, it is where players have misused their body capital.  Loïc 
Wacquant has observed the practice of ‘managing’ body capital that is prevalent among 
both amateur and professional boxers where the French expression ‘payer de sa 
personne’ is an apt description of a pugilist’s ethic.604 He notes how successful careers 
are dependent on ‘a rigorous management of the body, a meticulous maintenance of 
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each one of its parts… an extraordinarily efficient relation to the specific capital 
constituted of one’s physical resources.’605  Further, the use or misuse of one’s body 
capital also serves as the foundation for critiques among players about the 
reasonableness of in-game violence. Wacquant cites an example of a boxer in his study, 
Curtis, who was criticized by his peers for going too many rounds with a rather vicious 
opponent. ‘Curtis ain’t gonna go too far if he lets hisself get beat up by guys like that, if 
he don’t know how to economize hisself better than that. It’s a long road,’ one of the 
other boxers confides in Wacquant, drawing attention to the capitalist model that not 
only instructs determinations of reasonable or rational physical violence but is 
supported by them.
606
  Against this backdrop, players’ decisions to engage in violence 
(which would otherwise be illegal) so as to maintain employment, intimidate an 
opposing team, garner revenge for past losses or attacks on key players, or simply to 
assert personal pride are rational, for ‘good reason,’ and not sufficiently harmful to 
trigger the criminal law. Instead, they are examples of a player’s estimable work ethic 
and occupational ambition.
607
  
 
This is recognized in contemporary judicial treatments of the defence of consent 
alongside a recognition of the ‘nature’ of sport and its participants.  In keeping with 
idealized notions of masculinity, court decisions on the applicability of the consent 
defence in cases where bodily harm has been incurred during sporting activity often 
include commentary on the  inherent competitiveness of sport and the ‘naturalness’ with 
which it heightens aggression, risk-taking behaviour, and the ‘passions’ of its 
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participants. Where in-game violence can be linked to these qualities, the defence of 
consent is often permitted, irrespective of the degree of injury or level of violence 
employed.  Take, for instance, a recent decision of a Canadian provincial court where 
the accused faced charges of assault causing bodily harm after having kicked the 
complainant repeatedly in the face (while wearing cleats) during an amateur soccer 
game.
608
 The complainant suffered serious injuries, including severe facial lacerations 
and long-term breathing difficulties. In dismissing the charge and allowing the defence 
of consent, the trial judge relied on assumptions about how participants in such a 
‘competitive setting’ could easily be caught up in ‘the heat of the match.’609 These 
characteristics were deemed central components to the (amateur) game’s ‘playing 
culture.’ Thus, despite a finding that the accused had used ‘reckless force,’ it was 
determined to be in service to ‘a legitimate sporting interest in both players striving to 
gain control of the ball; one to score, the other to defend.’610  The judge in allowing the 
defence of consent makes note of the accused’s lack of intent; however, this can only be 
understood within the context of the playing culture the judge establishes – one that 
valourizes risk and injury in pursuit of victory: 
Struggle for control of the ball is part of the essence of soccer, particularly close 
to a goal. In such a competitive setting as was the match here, it cannot be said 
that players do not consent to the high risk of injury and the potential of 
receiving reckless force from an opponent in such a struggle for a loose ball in 
the penalty area proximate to one side's goal. [The accused] was quite within his 
rights under the playing culture of soccer to pursue his scoring chance…611 
 
Where, however, harm is incurred in circumstances that either challenge these 
‘legitimate’ uses of bodily capital or don’t support them, consent is rarely permitted. 
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One common instance of this is found in cases where the violence occurs after play has 
stopped or where victory is deemed unlikely.
612
   
 
Although these cases speak to the contemporary context, the interpretation of ‘harm’ as 
linked to bodily capital has long-standing roots in the common law treatment of the 
defence of consent to bodily harm. As early as 1604, the defence of consent was limited 
to acts that would not deny the king of the corporeal use of his subjects and their 
limbs.
613
 This limitation was explicitly linked to the criminal law’s consideration of the 
‘public interest’ in the 1882 English case, R. v. Coney, where in denying the defence of 
consent to participants of a prize fight, Hawkins J noted: 
it is not in the power of any man to give an effectual consent to that which 
amounts to, or has a direct tendency to create, a breach of the peace; so as to bar 
a criminal prosecution. In other words, though a man may by his consent debar 
himself from his right to maintain a civil action, he cannot thereby defeat 
proceedings instituted by the Crown in the interests of the public for the 
maintenance of good order. He may compromise his own civil rights, but he 
cannot compromise the public interests.
614
 
 
In this instance, the social utility of sport hinges on the perceived dangers it might foster 
among its participants and its spectators.  One of the earliest judicial delineations of the 
social utility of sport eliminates activities undertaken solely for profit for exactly this 
reason. In a 1763 English text, Sir Michael Foster distinguishes between ‘cudgelling or 
wrestling’ and ‘prize-fighting and public boxing matches or any other exertions… of the 
like kind which are exhibited for lucre’ on the basis that the latter ‘serve no valuable 
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purpose’ but rather encouraged ‘a spirit of idleness and debauchery.’615  Although the 
criminal law’s approach to sport-for-profit has changed dramatically, these early cases 
demonstrate a long-standing preoccupation with the misuse of bodily capital within 
judicial determinations of consent and its limits.  
 
Bourdieu has argued that one’s relation to one’s body marks a particular class habitus or 
set of attitudes and values, where the use of body capital is the mark of the 
disenfranchised not simply because of a lack of other available resources (as in 
Wacquant’s subproletarian pugilists) but also because of the ethos that such corporeal 
use represents.  Bourdieu notes 
weight-lifting, which is supposed to develop the muscles, was for many years, 
especially in France, the favourite working-class sport; nor is it an accident that the 
Olympic authorities took so long to grant official recognition to weightlifting, 
which, in the eyes of the aristocratic founders of modern sport, symbolized mere 
strength, brutality and intellectual poverty, in short the working classes.
616
 
 
This suggests that the legal regulation of sport serves a disciplinary function, 
influencing how the body of the ‘lunch pail’ athlete is shaped and valued and, in turn, 
how the rules and parametres of sporting practice, including its violence, will be set and 
enforced. This suggests not only a differential valuation of bodies within sport 
according to the supply they can offer a politicized social demand, but also hints at the 
ethos produced through this process.  Michael Robidoux provides some insight on this 
in his study of sporting activities during the British settlement period in Canada, noting 
that 
[t]he intent of making sport and physical activity more socially democratic was 
threefold: to acquire levels of control over increased amounts of leisure time 
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made possible by industrialization and a shorter workweek; to reduce class 
conflict by enabling male participants of various backgrounds to compete on an 
equal playing field; and to build a physically fit yet subordinate workforce, 
ensuring maximum levels of industrial production.
617
 
 
Sport can thus be understood to serve as a site for the negotiation of hegemony. In a 
recent study of early North American sporting events, Kenneth Cohen explores how the 
public spaces of athletic events in frontier America created opportunities for 
socialisation across class lines but argues against the view that sport merely mirrored 
already existent class relations. Instead, the sporting events staged in public taverns, 
fields, and raceways of the newly independent United States created a shared culture (of 
risk) which served to entrench capitalist ideology.  
In posh ‘refined’ sporting spaces, the old tenets of gentility – which privileged 
mental skill over physical force, heterosocial accord over homosocial discord, 
and urged an etiquette based on self-control to enforce these priorities – were 
reaffirmed and men of all ranks abided by strictures of politeness. In coarse 
‘physical’ spaces, however, confrontations frequently degenerated into fistfights 
instead of arguments. Each type of space served particular purposes in a risk 
culture linking sport to business, as men sought to establish both their reputation 
and their raw manliness in the throes of a boom-and-bust economy riddled with 
rampant failure and decreasing opportunities for advancement. Since failure, 
stagnation, and hardening class lines threatened men’s reputations and their very 
masculinity, ‘various classes of persons’ resorted to the two types of sporting 
environments to recuperate both.
618
 
 
Cohen’s study takes note of how sport was initially employed by the bourgeoisie of 
early America with the intention of fostering deference among the lower classes, i.e. a 
sense of respect and reverence for the social and cultural authority of the business élite. 
Many of the sporting events were supported as a show of philanthropy and investors 
created ‘genteel’ spaces from which to consume the coarseness of physical sport (rather 
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than participate in it).
619
 Predictably, this fostered enmity among the excluded, 
effectively shifting investor aims of deference to economic and political return. Cohen 
observes that in this way, sport served as the site where a capitalist ideology could take 
root, ‘heightening the contest for status that lured people to participate even as the 
expense and bureaucracy needed to stage these activities hardened the power and 
control of wealthy Americans.’620 
 
This demonstrates a use of sport to ‘condition the savage body’ while using the defence 
of consent to entrench the ideologies that such social divisions could be justified upon.  
Where individuals act in pursuit of idealized masculinity and profit, their acts of 
aggression, risk, and violence are intelligible.  Where, however, individuals act in ways 
that challenge these values, these behaviours lack the ‘good reason’ that enables 
recognizable consent.  Much like the requirements in Ancient Greece that one conform 
to the requirements of citizenship before one’s consent could be intelligible (and 
juridically recognizable), contemporary treatments of consent are accompanied by 
normative preconditions which appear to be in service to the state.   Hegemonic 
masculinity demands a commodification of the body, put to use for the pursuit of profit.  
Provided these ideals are what has motivated a player’s choice to incur bodily harm, the 
violence will be deemed to have sufficient social utility to enable the defence of 
consent.  Where, however, the harm incurred has not been in accordance with these 
masculine ideals or the bodily harm suffered was incurred as a result of foolhardiness, 
the errors of this ‘mismanaged’ self are the player’s to bear.  In this way, consent can be 
seen to operate in a manner similar to its functions in the historical periods examined in 
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previous chapters in that it demands conformity to certain prescribed subjectivities in 
order to be intelligible.  Yet, in the contemporary context, there is an additional 
capitalist logic which operates through the ‘public utility’ exemption to the consent 
defence.  Poor decision-making, miscalculated risk, and a mismanagement of body 
capital are an individual’s error in judgment and the consequences fall not to the state to 
remedy, but within the realm of individual responsibility.  As Fiske has observed with 
respect to televised portrayals of masculinity, the conception of ideal maleness as 
ceaseless labour, boundless achievement, and propensity for risk creates a ‘superhuman’ 
archetype, its own inaccessibility necessary ‘to keep men striving for more and more 
achievement in order to maintain the ‘naturalness’ of the ideological concept of progress 
which is so central to capitalism.’621    
 
This quality of ‘inaccessibility’ echoes the fictional role consent is understood to have 
in liberal accounts of state legitimacy, as examined in Chapter One.  The consent-as-
autonomy story is premised on the presumption that each person has the right to self-
govern, to act in the world as one wishes. Yet this freedom is limited by a prohibition 
against harming others, the nature of which is informed by unwritten codes of practice 
and cultural norms of intelligibility.  Autonomous action must conform to these codes 
and norms to not simply be allowed but to be recognizable as autonomy.  One must be a 
certain kind of person and act in a certain kind of way to be free.  Contemporary 
treatments of consent, in this way, are not unlike the acts of submission seen in the 
medieval medical context, where despite an understanding of the promise consent 
makes (of autonomy or of union with the Divine) being understood as intangible and, in 
many circumstances, unrealisable, it is pursued nonetheless.  In fact, if the observations 
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made by Fiske (above) are to be accepted, it is this unrealisability that prompts the 
pursuit, while concealing its ideological imperatives. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter’s examination of how the criminal law approaches charges of bodily harm 
incurred during sporting activity demonstrates how the defence of consent is used to 
produce and entrench a code of conduct for players which makes it both rational and 
laudable to subject oneself to violence, provided it bolsters cultural, social, and 
economic capital. This marks a preservation of not only a (privileged) hegemonic 
masculinity but one in service to capitalism. Sports, constructed as a marketplace, is not 
simply a domain of jurisdiction within which law might act, but it is also a site for the 
formation of truth, where a set of rules and attitudes are established that grant 
adjudicative authority to law to assess what is ‘harm’ and what is simply ‘fair play’ in 
ways that support class division and corporeal commodification. Wacquant has 
suggested that many of the hardships now facing the United States, including the 
collapse of the housing market, increased costs in food and oil, and unprecedented rates 
of unemployment don’t reveal what some have termed the ‘ownership society,’ but 
rather demonstrate neoliberalism’s success in instituting a normative principle that 
moralizes the punishment of those who haven’t amassed sufficient ‘human capital.’622 
The criminal law’s interventions in regulating (or ignoring) violence in sporting arenas 
demonstrates how consent acts as a key component in the construction of this ‘human 
capital.’ In the sports context, consent is denied to those players who haven’t learned 
how to ‘man up’ or ‘play through the pain,’ or those who have expended their body 
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capital in ways that either don’t contribute to these hegemonic ideals or reveal 
disjointedness in the rationality of the market or the natural equality of economic man.  
 
Are these the new conditions of possibility for consent as it operates today?  How 
should the consent-as-autonomy story be understood within the contemporary context? 
How does its promise of ‘freedom’ operate within a capitalist logic?  The following 
chapter explores these inquiries through a more in-depth examination of neoliberal 
rationality and its influence on the current operations of consent. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONSENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have focused on three of the subject areas where law contends 
with the notion of consent, namely the regulation of sex, the requirements for lawful 
medical treatment, and defences to assault. In each instance, consent appears to perform 
a wide variety of functions that differ from the dominant story of consent-as-autonomy. 
Whether a guardian of proprietary and patrilineal interests, a path to spiritual 
enlightenment through submission to the Other, or an enactment of hegemonic 
masculinity, these forms of consent do not appear to produce, facilitate, or enact 
personal freedom so much as they represent acts of submission to conformist 
subjectivities. Yet the understanding of consent as an attestation of autonomy prevails.  
Amidst the evidence unearthed in previous chapters of these alternative understandings 
and functions of consent, it seems important to determine how this autonomy story of 
consent has become both dominant and obscuring of all other narratives. Further, what 
purpose does this obfuscation serve?  
 
In an effort to address this central inquiry, this chapter is organized in three parts.  It 
begins with a brief exploration of the current logic within which consent operates today:   
neoliberalism. This portion of the chapter is meant to position neoliberalism as more 
than a theory of economic activity and instead a form of political and legal rationality. 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality might be thought of as the engine that drives an 
analysis of this kind, where an understanding of how power operates to both produce 
and delimit intelligible personhood necessitates an examination of the political 
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rationalities that support these conformist subjectivities.
623
 As such, a component of the 
first section of this chapter includes an overview of Foucault’s own observations on 
neoliberalism and the market as a site of truth, moving to a fuller examination of what 
freedom (and autonomy as ‘self-governance’) might mean within this regime.  As part 
of this analysis, neoliberal rationality is positioned as a foundationalist discourse, where 
the ahistorical story of capitalism is explored for the contribution it makes to securing 
market rationality as ‘common sense’ in the modern era and the implications this has for 
the role which consent is allotted in contemporary law. 
 
The second section of the chapter seeks to test the prevalence of this neoliberal 
rationality within contemporary deployments of consent in each of the two legal areas 
examined historically in previous chapters, namely: consent to sex, and informed 
consent to medical treatment (although some reference to the sports context is also 
included).  This section explores two of the central components of neoliberal rationality 
as they operate through consent in these legal areas, namely: individualism and 
responsibilisation. As part of this discussion, the law’s deployment of arguments of 
social utility and risk are examined for their own contributions to maintaining neoliberal 
understandings of the self.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications 
of a legal doctrine of consent that is entrenched and enacted within a capitalist logic, 
paying particular attention to its consequences for subjectivity, where self-governance 
and risk management become the centrepieces of the consenting (neoliberal) subject. 
The chapter is thus concerned with the politics of consent and how they operate to not 
only naturalize particular (economic) rationalities and ontologies but to also produce the 
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subjects needed to enact them. In this respect, it is engaged in the political economy of 
consent.  
 
Neoliberal Rationality: Touched by an Invisible Hand 
In order for a narrative to secure its place as a foundationalist discourse, it must do more 
than simply out-voice other accounts. It must secure itself as truth. As Foucault 
suggested in his own exploration of the rise of neoliberalism in his lectures at the 
Collège de France in 1979, part of the success story of neoliberalism is its ability to 
naturalize the very social conditions it requires to survive. Thomas Lemke furthers this 
point when he suggests that neoliberalism is ‘a political project that endeavors to create 
a social reality that it suggests already exists.’624  There are arguably two components to 
such an endeavour.  The first is the task of obscuring the social and political events, 
processes, and customs which made it possible for a different way of acting and being in 
the world to develop.  These are what can be thought of as the ‘conditions of existence’ 
for neoliberalism.  In the case of the consent-as-autonomy story, this has meant 
positioning the underlying components of classical liberalism (i.e. self-interest, self-
regulation, possessive individualism) as both ‘natural’ (in terms of what human beings 
inherently want or do) and ahistorical, i.e. as coming into existence merely as a result of 
the development or evolution of these natural human tendencies.   
 
A second – and related – component to the establishment of a foundationalist discourse 
is the creation of a (necessarily) fictitious subject for whom these tendencies are natural 
and thus, ‘rational.’625 This not only creates a pre-social and ahistorical ontology (which 
itself serves to obscure alternate subjectivities) but it also provides justification for the 
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norms of intelligibility that establish the ‘normal rules of play’ among citizens of the 
order. Thus, certain constraints on what a person may do (or be) within a neoliberal 
world are not only deemed rational on the basis that such actions or desires are not what 
‘normal’ people ‘naturally’ want to do, they are also removed from the realm of what is 
desirable in the first instance. It should therefore hardly be necessary to force 
populations to abide by ‘the rules’ given that they merely represent what ‘everyone 
knows everyone wants.’626  
 
Neoliberalism – as both a set of economic policies and their underlying political 
rationality – fulfils each of these two components of a foundationalist discourse.  In the 
first instance, it benefits from the ahistorical story of capitalism told by classical 
economic liberalism which has ‘naturalized’ the neoliberal subject. This, in turn, has 
served to imbue the principles of self-interest, wealth maximization, possessive 
individualism, and competition with a ubiquitous truth, allowing for prescriptions about 
what human beings are (and should be) that are then used to delimit the boundaries of 
acceptable desires, wills, and actions.  The previous chapter’s examination of the 
defence of consent within the contemporary sporting context provides some evidence of 
this, demonstrating how modern day uses of consent function within a logic where it is 
rational to subject oneself to violence – provided it bolsters cultural, social, and 
economic capital.  This lends credence to Wendy Brown’s claim that in the 
contemporary sphere of existence, ‘not only is the human being configured exhaustively 
as homo economicus, but all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market 
rationality.’627  
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Yet, neoliberalism is not the only foundationalist discourse at work in the law’s 
treatment of consent. As delineated in Chapter One, the autonomy narrative that is so 
closely associated with consent is also positioned as ahistorical and ‘natural’ – both in 
terms of what human beings might want and in terms of what constitutes ‘normal’ 
personhood.  Further, the ways in which these two foundationalist discourses work in 
tandem are rarely investigated. Instead, the conditions of existence for the consent-as-
autonomy narrative are obscured, leaving its liberal origins (and its role within the 
ideology of capitalism) unexplored.  It should then not be surprising that consent is 
itself cast in proprietary terms, where autonomy is often described as a form of ‘self-
ownership.’ What, then, becomes of exercises of freedom when envisioned as 
dispositions of commodities? Who, in contemporary legal treatments of consent, is 
entitled to ‘self-own’? What does autonomy mean in a neoliberal world?  To address 
these inquiries, some preliminary work needs to be done to disrupt the ahistorical status 
of the consent-as-autonomy narrative.  This will necessitate a brief investigation into the 
emergence of classical liberalism, its impact on the practices of the medieval market, 
and the conditions of existence for capitalist thought. The following sections attempt to 
chart this course. 
 
The market rationality: An origin-less story 
Best evidenced by the cardinal principle of laissez-faire, classical liberalism 
conceptualizes freedom in opposition to constraint, (i.e. freedom from as opposed to 
freedom to).  Within this frame, the capitalist state is understood as merely the ‘natural’ 
consequence of removing barriers to free action, effectively leaving markets (and their 
actors) ‘free’ to develop as they might be naturally inclined to do.  As Ellen Meiksins 
Wood has observed, in ‘most accounts of capitalism and its origins, there really is no 
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origin.’628 Instead, capitalism is presented as inevitable, omnipresent, or simply lying 
dormant in wait for its release from any variety of restrictive conditions.
629
 This is 
certainly the argument underlying one of the more common explanations for the rise of 
capitalism: the end of feudalism. In such formulations, capitalism is positioned as 
merely ‘an acceleration of universal and transhistorical, almost natural, tendencies’ 
where ‘industrialization is the inevitable outcome of humanity’s most basic 
inclinations.’630  
 
An endemic theory of neoliberalism (i.e. as an inevitable development of the basic 
human characteristics of greed and need) would thus seem to owe something to the 
origin-less story told about capitalism.
631
  This claim to an inherent or intuitive nature is 
further cemented by a fairly opaque view of neoliberalism’s own genesis – something 
that some commentators have suggested is facilitated by the name ‘neoliberalism’ itself. 
‘[F]ree trade and “competitive advantage” is 200 years old,’ Paul Treanor argues. 
‘There is nothing “neo” in [this] liberalism.’632  And yet, other scholars warn against 
adopting the view that neoliberalism is merely an extended, saturated form of capitalism 
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or the natural evolution of an ever-expanding practice of rationalization.
633
 Such views 
tend to overlook the very direct forms of intervention governments make to further the 
neoliberal agenda, obscuring the intricate relationship between the market and the state.  
Wendy Brown, for instance, notes that despite the contributions Marx’s theory of capital 
and Weber’s rationalization thesis make to contemporary understandings of 
neoliberalism, ‘neither brings into view the historical-institutional rupture it signifies, 
the form of governmentality it replaces and the form it inaugurates, and hence the 
modalities of resistance it renders outmoded.’634   
 
Brown’s analysis directs attention to the all-encompassing quality of neoliberal 
rationality, its presence in every aspect of contemporary human existence, while 
highlighting how this permeation relies on an underestimation of it as a ‘constructivist 
project.’635  Thus, while the neoliberal project envisions and assesses all components of 
human behaviour and subjectivity within the confines of a market rationality, it doesn’t 
leave these factors to chance, nor does it place faith in the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
classical liberal model.  Rather, the ‘hand’ of neoliberalism is an active agent, 
intervening in social policy, legal reforms, and countless initiatives at the domestic and 
international levels.  The state itself must behave as a market; its policies and initiatives 
must be defensible as cost-wise and economically productive.  Neoliberalism is both the 
directive for the state to act in the interests of the market and the underlying logic which 
grants such initiatives legitimacy.
636
  Further, neoliberalism is also actively involved in 
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the ‘dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate competition, free trade, and 
rational economic action on the part of every member and institution of society.’637 It is 
in this way that the neoliberal ‘hand’ is not as readily visible as its level of involvement 
in contemporary human existence might suggest it should be, effectively obscuring its 
conditions of possibility.    
 
The neoliberal subject: A normative ontology 
These norm-setting practices of neoliberalism are a significant means by which 
neoliberal rationality establishes itself as a foundationalist discourse. As David Harvey 
has argued, to gain dominance, an ideology or ‘way of thought’ must embed its 
‘conceptual apparatus’ into the common sense, thus removing it from scrutiny or 
resistance. This apparatus must contain valorised ideals, those that ‘appeal to our 
intuitions and instincts, to our values and desires’ and Harvey contends that 
neoliberalism’s selection of individual freedom and human dignity was a wise one, 
given their ‘compelling and seductive’ character.638  Yet, if neoliberalism is a new dog, 
this is an old trick.  The ability to obscure its conditions of existence through the 
dissemination of legitimizing norms has been a key component to capitalism’s 
widespread survival given the inherent contradictions within the system itself.
639
 The 
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expansion and prosperity of capital does not benefit the many but rather the few – and 
even then it is on the basis of exploitation. Thus, the system necessitates the production 
and maintenance of this exploited class, on the one hand, and a means of disciplining 
this population so as to avoid its rebellion, on the other. The true triumph of the system 
thus lies not in its ability to coerce populations or to manage widespread revolt but 
rather to generate ideological adoption of the system and its ‘conceptual apparatus’ 
among its subordinated classes.
640
  Surely this is the contribution liberalism makes to 
the neoliberal project, championing notions of freedom, autonomy, and equality such 
that it becomes ‘that which we cannot not want.’641  For Brown, this represents the 
normative effort of neoliberalism where every dimension of socio-political life is 
subjected to an economic rationality not simply on the basis that it is efficient to do so, 
but that it is also right.
642
 Morality, within neoliberalism, simply is economic 
rationality. It is ‘configured entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, 
benefits, and consequences.’643  The effect is a construction of a particular ontology that 
is in service to neoliberal rationality. The ‘good citizen,’ within a moral paradigm based 
on economic rationality, is an entrepreneur.
644
 She must engage in a strict regime of 
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(and the distribution of rights and benefits) is determined on the basis of a person’s marketable skills 
rather than membership to a nation state: Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations of 
Citizenship and Sovereignty (Duke University Press 2007).   This leaves those whose skills are deemed 
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managing risks according to a calculated assessment of the costs and benefits of each 
proposed action. To recall the phrasing of a sporting coach from the previous chapter, 
the moral responsibility of the neoliberal subject is to ‘economize oneself.’645  Failure to 
do so, to ‘navigate impediments to prosperity,’ is an indicator of a ‘mismanaged life.’646  
 
This model of a moral obligation to ‘manage’ oneself according to a normative ontology 
should strike the reader as familiar. As discussed in Chapter Three, the need to 
effectively balance one’s appetites and desires was an integral component to medieval 
understandings of health and salvation. Within the medieval frame, however, many of 
the values esteemed within a contemporary neoliberal context would have been 
considered vices. Greed, profit maximization, competition, increased privatization, and 
possessive individualism were conditions of appetites the medieval ‘good citizen’ 
needed to constrain.  This forms the crux of consent’s role in the context of medieval 
medicine.  It was the marker of the well balanced or ‘managed’ life.  In his own analysis 
of the decline of ecclesiastical authority during the eighteenth century, Foucault argues 
that this pastoral power over the subject was merely taken up in another form. ‘It was no 
longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world,’ Foucault argues 
‘but rather ensuring it in this world.’647 This new context meant a shift in the meaning of 
‘salvation’ from one focused on the after-life to one rooted in the values of an emergent 
economic rationality: wealth, security, and the liberty to pursue these on an 
                                                                                                                                                                          
not to have sufficient economic value outside the realm of citizenship or, to use Judith Butler’s phrasing, 
‘stateless within the state’; Butler and Spivak (n 293).  
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 This is a paraphrasing of the words of Loïc Wacquant’s boxing coach who critiqued one of the rookie 
boxers for failing to ‘economize hisself.’ See Wacquant (n 597), 146. 
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 Brown (n 623), 42. 
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individualised basis. In the words of Margaret Thatcher: ‘Economics are the method but 
the object is to change the soul.’648 
 
This shift in political and ontological rationality warrants closer reflection for the insight 
it offers on the role the consent-as-autonomy narrative plays in the contemporary 
neoliberal context.  Chapter Three’s glance backwards to the medieval world allows for 
a clearer picture of how consent served as a means of both defining virtue and of 
facilitating conformity to this standard.  The sick suffered because they had been sinful.  
Poor health was the marker of this unbalanced life.  Consent was the means of 
remedying this, through conformity to a dominant (and Christian) way of being.  
Similarly, the Ancient context examined in Chapter Two demonstrates how consent 
marked the boundaries of ‘good citizenship’ both in terms of who was entitled to 
consent and in terms of what consent served to protect (i.e. patrilineage).  What 
conformist subjectivities does consent serve today?  To what end is this promise of 
autonomy?  Gerald Cohen asked a similar question in a lecture he gave at the London 
School of Economics in 1980 when he sought to understand how certain kinds of 
liberals and libertarians could defend private property on the basis of an understanding 
of ‘freedom’ that did not recognize the ‘unfreedom’ of private ownership itself.649 He 
answers this query by suggesting that at the heart of this position is a tendency to treat 
private property ‘as part of the structure of human existence in general, and therefore 
as… merely as things are.’650  Such a position, grounded in ‘common sense’ is unable 
to see the ‘unfreedom’ of private property; it is obscured, rendered unintelligible.  Yet, 
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Cohen urges, to ‘think of capitalism as a realm of freedom is to overlook half of its 
nature.’651  
 
The relevance of this for the consent-as-autonomy story is perhaps best understood 
through an examination of how medieval trade practices were altered with the 
emergence of liberalism’s classical economic theories. The medieval marketplace was a 
setting of both stringent regulation and customary practices.
652
 It was not a design of 
profit but of community sustenance. This is well evidenced by a 1768 pamphlet 
describing a farmer’s attendance at the market as ‘a material part of his duty; he should 
not be suffered to secret or to dispose of his goods elsewhere.’653 Bread was a staple in 
most medieval diets. As such, there were a number of statutory and customary 
provisions which strictly regulated how the growth and sale of grain, flour, and corn 
should operate. Both millers and bakers were thought of as ‘servants of the community, 
working not for a profit but for a fair allowance.’654   
 
Foucault assesses these characteristics of the medieval market as indicative of a model 
of distributive justice, where ‘the market operated to ensure that, if not all, then at least 
some of the poorest could buy things as well as those who were more well-off.’655  This 
echoes some of the observations made by Lianna Farber with respect to the role of 
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consent in medieval trade where consent was less about establishing voluntariness in 
trade transactions
656
 (as it is commonly employed in contemporary contract law) and 
more about the contemplation of ‘need’ and what could be considered a ‘just price.’657 
Where prices were set far above what the seller could reasonably be deemed to require 
for sustenance (or where usury was paid out of compulsion), consent was not possible.  
Again, this is not because the consent given for the trade might be considered 
‘involuntary’ (a tempting – but retrospective – reading of consent) but rather because it 
was not in alignment with the ‘common good,’ or as Thompson might suggest, the 
customs the community held in common.
658
 It was these customs that created the 
crowd’s ‘legitimizing notion’ which prompted riotous action when the market price was 
deemed too high. This legitimizing notion was rooted in a shared understanding of 
traditional customs which was supported by the wider consensus of the community.  
This consensus had significant force – rioters were frequently able to control the market 
price of food (often through violent protest) without fear of sanction from authorities 
who, as Thompson describes, were made ‘prisoners of the people’ as a result.659  
Thompson’s work details a number of highly descriptive examples, many of which 
dispel the more common explanation that riots were attributable to mere hunger 
(particularly where crowds entered mills or bakeries to destroy the goods rather than 
steal them).
660
 Instead, these riots demonstrate the crowd’s role in setting the ‘just price’ 
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 Farber, (n 321), 94-95.  Farber attributes this to the two central sources which influenced medieval 
authors’ considerations of voluntariness, i.e. classical Roman law and Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics – 
both of which endorsed the maxim, ‘forced will is will.’   
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 Farber  traces much of this through an examination of medieval authors’ writings on usury (n 321), 93-
97. 
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 This is similar to consent in the medieval medical forum, where consent was understood to be the 
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 Thompson (n 652), 189. 
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 See Thompson (n 652), 230-235. One particularly vivid example from West Cornwall is relayed where 
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and the existence of what Thompson has described as ‘the moral economy of the 
crowd.’661   
 
This moral economy was altered with the emergence of classical liberalism. Well 
encapsulated in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, this new theory called upon 
members of the market to simply ‘leave it alone,’ abandoning the strict regulations of 
the medieval economy so as to allow it to function on its own accord – a strategy, 
according to Smith and his disciples, which would permit the market to flourish rather 
than flounder amidst excessive and unneeded constraint.  This was the work of Smith’s 
notorious ‘invisible hand,’ an unseen coordinator of the various individual interests and 
demands of the market’s participants, facilitating prices to ebb and flow according to the 
desires and distastes of human nature.
662
   This had the effect of granting the market and 
its activity a certain epistemological authority.
663
 If the market was merely functioning 
according to a set of ‘natural’ laws, the resulting prices (and commercial activity) must 
be, in some sense, true. It is in this way that Foucault suggests the market became a site 
of truth.
664
 This had far wider-reaching effects than mere price-setting.  The truth-telling 
power of the market also served to delineate what it meant to be a ‘good citizen,’ 
effectively de-moralizing the crowd’s ‘moral economy’ in favour of a supply and 
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demand model of the common good.  Central to this task was situating Smith’s market 
economy as amoral so as to give it the effect of truth. As E.P. Thompson has argued: 
It should not be necessary to argue that the model of a natural and self-adjusting 
economy, working providentially for the best good of all, is as much a 
superstition as the notions which upheld the paternalist model… Whereas the 
first appeals to a moral norm – what ought to be men’s reciprocal duties – the 
second appears to say: ‘this is the way things work, or would work if the State 
did not interfere.’ (203). 665 
 
Here, the force of invoking an ahistorical truth (‘this is the way things work’) is rather 
apparent.  The market rationality gains a sense of inevitability, thus obscuring modes of 
resistance - for how does one challenge that which has always been?
 666
  This is perhaps 
best demonstrated by the difficulty the contemporary reader has of envisioning an 
alternative to the human nature presumed (and produced) by free market rationalities.  
As Thompson suggests, 
[i]t is not easy for us to conceive that there may have been a time, within a 
smaller and more integrated community, when it appeared to be ‘unnatural’ that 
any man should profit from the necessities of others, and when it was assumed 
that, in time of dearth, prices of ‘necessities’ should remain at a customary level, 
even though there might be less all round (252-253).
667
 
 
Studies like Thompson’s reveal that despite accounts of capitalism and its market 
rationality as having always been or, perhaps more aptly, being merely the result of 
allowing persons to ‘act freely,’ there are alternative accounts of how communities 
might live together and the ‘natures’ of those that live within them.  Further, this 
‘freedom fable’ told by classical liberalism has had observable effects on prevailing 
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attitudes about not simply how the market ought to operate but also about what 
constitutes ‘good’ citizenship and ‘normal’ human behaviours and desires, suggesting 
‘there is nothing merely economic about economics.’668  The medieval subject stands in 
stark contrast to the liberal one which took its place, described by Wendy Brown as:  
‘Fiercely autonomous and diffident… unencumbered by anyone or anything, 
independent in both senses of the term (free of dependents and dependency in civil 
society). [The liberal subject] is not oriented toward relationships and persons but 
toward self and things.’669 Perhaps most pertinent to the present inquiry is the 
presumption that if the constitution of subjectivity can be seen to have been so 
dramatically changed with the introduction of an economic rationality, so too, must the 
law’s understanding of its subject have shifted.  The ‘birth’ of homo economicus was 
met with a capitalist calculus for all aspects of the human condition, including the 
means by which law assessed criminal responsibility and meted out penalties.
670
  ‘Crime 
and punishment were meant to be exchanged as costs and benefits like any other 
commodity, and punishment was an economic disincentive to crime.’671  Surely within 
this frame, where human beings are self-interested, profit-seeking, and driven by 
rational choice, the exercising of one’s will, the rules of self-governance, and the very 
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meaning of freedom itself must also have economic ‘worth.’672  The last chapter’s 
examination of the consent defence in sport provides some evidence of a prevailing 
notion in the contemporary context that to be ‘free’ one must be able to expend one’s 
property, one’s bodily capital as one wishes.  This is the bedrock of the libertarian 
position that views private property as the ‘embodiment of freedom,’ where 
[u]nless people are free to make contracts and to sell their labour, or unless they 
are free to save their incomes and then invest them as they see fit, or unless they 
are free to run enterprises when they have obtained the capital, they are not 
really free.
673
  
  
This suggests a grid of (economic) intelligibility is at work in law wherein human nature 
and action are evaluated for their (neoliberal) rationality. Consent must presumably also 
conform to this calculus. Consider, for instance, the observation Erik Olin Wright 
(2005) has made about consent as a ‘cost smart’ means of exploiting labour (given the 
expensive ‘overhead’ in extracting it coercively).674 Or Randy Barnett’s claim that 
consent ensures maximum economic efficiency in contractual transactions.
675
  While the 
contemplation of consent in a cost-benefit rubric may not appear as incongruous in 
contexts of labour relations or contract, what happens to law’s use of consent in the 
criminal and medical fields when its neoliberal logic is considered?   
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Exploring Consent within a Capitalist Logic: Revisiting Criminal and Medical Law 
 
Those who could not carry their contractual obligations were now to appear 
'anti-social', and to be confined under a new legitimacy. The scandalous and 
bizarre were to be placed under a revised medical mandate, in asylums that 
promised to cure and not merely to incarcerate. Law-breakers and malefactors 
were no longer to have the status of bandits or rebels, but were to become 
transgressors of norms motivated by defects of character amenable to 
understanding and rectification.
676
 
 
In this excerpt, Rose and Miller identify the core of neoliberalism’s moral epistemology, 
whereby what is thought to be ethically estimable and ‘naturally’ possible is in 
congruence with what is economically viable. Wendy Brown makes a similar point with 
respect to the normative ontology that a neoliberal rationality entrenches and 
propagates, through which the moral responsibilities (and understandings) of citizenship 
are economically defined.
677
  Consent does not operate independently of this frame.
678
 
Rather, as the observations made by Rose and Miller suggest, when a political 
rationality takes on a moral form, it gains the power to inform the aims and uses of 
government itself.  Ideals such as ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’ take on particular 
(‘economized’) meanings within a neoliberal rationality and so, too, do the laws which 
are enacted in their name. Thus, the ‘good citizen’ is defined within an economic 
calculus – a framework that is also used to define what it means to be a ‘good patient’ 
(in medical law), a ‘good player’ (on the sports field), and a ‘good girl’ (in adjudications 
of sexual assault).  
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This points to two of the central ways consent can be seen to operate within (and as a 
component to) neoliberal rationality. The first is through invocations of the ‘common 
good’ and legal interpretations of public or social utility – a key factor in law’s 
delineation of the scope and content of consent. The second is the extension of this 
neoliberal ‘good’ onto individual ontologies, whereby certain behaviours and 
subjectivities are prescribed (and valorised) while others are not. Under the law’s rubric 
of ‘reasonableness,’ those actions (and actors) that best conform to neoliberal values of 
efficiency, calculated risk, and self-management are deemed ‘capable’ of consenting. 
The rest are effectively excluded from this legal performance of autonomy.  The 
following two sections examine each of these factors that are used in the jurisprudence 
to limit consent (i.e. social utility and capacity) in further detail. 
 
Social utility in a neoliberal world 
As discussed in previous chapters, judicial limits are often placed on consent in the 
name of social utility, where claims to autonomy (via consent) are over-ruled on the 
basis that the activity the accused persons were engaged in is thought to have no ‘good 
reason.’679  As was noted in the previous chapter, these social utility arguments were 
initially used by the courts to rule against the availability of the defence of consent in 
circumstances where bodily harm was incurred merely for sake of profit.
680
  Judicial 
views on boxing have since changed, as has the broad prohibition against exhibitions of 
sport for profit, as courts now explicitly acknowledge the ‘good reason’ of such events.  
This can be observed in the oft-cited Supreme Court of Canada judgement in Jobidon 
(1991) case where Gonthier J (writing for the majority) remarks: 
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the policy of the common law will not affect the validity or effectiveness of 
freely given consent to participate in rough sporting activities, so long as the 
intentional applications of force to which one consents are within the customary 
norms and rules of the game. Unlike fist fights, sporting activities and games 
usually have a significant social value; they are worthwhile.
681
 
 
Although the court does not elaborate on the ‘significant social value’ of sporting 
activities in Jobidon, the cases surveyed in the previous chapter demonstrated how 
contemporary courts distinguish between assault and sport on the basis of the latter’s 
quality as a ‘manly pursuit.’ Further, these cases provide evidence that the early profit-
seeking exclusion delineated in Coney has not survived in contemporary treatments of 
the social utility of contact sports.  Instead, the law’s treatment of violence that erupts 
on the professional playing field is adjudicated in ways that align with neoliberal ideals 
of calculated risk, the ‘manly pursuit’ of profit, and the unavailability of the consent 
defence for those players who had not adequately ‘economized’ their body capital. 
 
This suggests that while claims to the ‘public interest’ are somewhat of a staple in the 
law’s dealings with consent, it is not a static category. Instead, understandings of what 
might be useful to society or ‘good’ for everyone are shifting concepts, as evidenced  by 
the very different functions and values ascribed to consent in Ancient Greece, the 
medieval marketplace, or the contemporary sports field.  Following the widespread 
adoption of classical liberalism and its endorsement of the social contract, consent has 
been inseparably connected to notions of the ‘common good.’ Freedom to act in the 
world is constrained by what’s good for everyone else living in it.  But as these 
communities change, so, too, does the conceptualization of what will be of the most 
social value or use.  
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What, then, is socially utile in a neoliberal world?  What does neoliberalism value? 
Certainly, the components of individualism and its resultant responsibilisation
682
 play a 
central role in the neoliberal understanding of the ‘common good,’ as do unfettered 
trade, competition, calculated risk, profit maximization, and governmental policies 
principled in non-interference. Yet, for all of its inferences about facilitating the ways in 
which citizens might live in the company of others, the neoliberal conception of what 
might be commonly good has very little to do with community. Rather, independence 
reigns supreme in neoliberal rationality, where individuals are ‘left alone’ to make their 
own decisions and live with the resulting consequences. The neoliberal ethic is thus a 
self-regarding one, rooted in the claim of universal self-interest.  And while many 
commentators have suggested there is a need to temper this self-interest with some 
sense of ‘civic virtue’ so as to foster more social (if not distributive) justice or to 
preserve the sustainability and legitimacy of the market itself,
683
 the ‘economic 
morality’ of neoliberalism conflates the good with the entrepreneurial. In such 
equations, civic virtue itself becomes a private, self-regarding matter.
684
   
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the consent defence in sporting contexts provides 
some evidence of this economically motivated notion of social utility where what is 
thought to be ‘good’ is also that which fosters competitive aggression, effective risk 
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207 
 
management, and, perhaps above all, freedom of choice. Within a neoliberal rationality, 
however, this freedom is understood within a consumerist model, aptly described by 
David Harvey as the ‘liberty of consumer choice.’685 It is an all but limitless ability to 
commodify.  For instance, when asked to comment earlier this year on the increasing 
incidents of neurological disorders among professional athletes, the co-director of 
Boston University’s Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy, (himself a 
former professional athlete), suggested the league organisations were ‘trading money 
for brain cells.’686 Within a neoliberal rationality, this is a fair trade.  After all, homo 
economicus is, above all else, an entrepreneur of herself. This is a model of ‘goodness’ 
that some have argued has replaced the so-called ‘Protestant work ethic’ where labour 
itself (of the mind and body) was valued as a means of pursuing the good life.
687
 
Instead, the ‘modern citizen is not that of the producer but of the consumer’ where 
personal fulfilment, social good, and moral virtue are pursued through ‘purchasing 
power.’688  This is a power to both buy and sell – be that barley or brain cells. Freedom 
within this rubric is not a liberty to labour, but rather a liberty to consume. ‘Choice’ is a 
selection from a range of options that are ‘marketed’ and promoted. 689  It is a freedom 
to make use of one’s bodily capital by selling or trading it for the best possible return. 
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The description of the accused which the court offers in one of the first criminal 
prosecutions of an athlete for in-game violence provides some evidence of this 
monetarily-driven conception of social utility and the proper use of bodily capital.  In 
the Canadian case of Green, (discussed in detail in Chapter Four), the court described 
Green’s evidence as ‘that of a man who is very experienced in his sport, a man who 
undoubtedly plays boisterously, as he is paid to; he is well known and his reputation is 
well known, and other players respect that reputation, as they have to in the 
circumstances.’690 The accused’s act of violence is validated for the court by the fact 
that he receives financial compensation for his behaviour – an understanding that is 
supported by the game itself, where ‘enforcers’ are hired specifically to engage in on-ice 
fighting.
691
 Further, the court doesn’t describe the accused’s actions as violent or 
assaultive, but rather as ‘boisterous play,’ keeping stride with the common law’s 
tradition of valuing aggression and physical force in ‘manly pursuits.’ This is solidified 
in the Green judgment when the court explains its reasons for acquittal (on the basis of 
implied consent), noting that ‘Mr. Green's action was instinctive, and… more protective 
                                                                                                                                                                          
binding undertaking; having or not having children should, it appears, be a personal choice. Leisure has 
been invented as the domain of free choice par excellence. However constrained by external or internal 
factors, the modern self is institutionally required to construct a life through the exercise of choice from 
among alternatives’ (n 688), 227. 
690
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691
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December 2013. 
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in his own interests than anything else of his own safety. Having regard to those 
circumstances, I find Mr. Green not guilty.’692  
 
This suggests that while hegemonic masculinity and pursuit of profit are valued in sport, 
they are even more estimable when sought in the face of personal risk (and for the aim 
of self-interest).
693
  And while commentators might herald physical aggression and 
bodily contact as values in and of themselves in sport, these components are often 
described in economic terms whereby pain is regarded as a ‘currency’ with which 
young men might ‘purchase’ masculine identities.694 In fact, it is difficult to find 
discussions of the social utility of sport which don’t cite its economic value.695 The very 
first page, for instance, of a 1999 text entitled Sport Matters, under the heading ‘The 
social significance of sport’ reads as follows: 
There is no need to support the contention that sport is significant by reference 
to facts and figures. It is enough to suggest a few measures which even people 
who are indifferent to sport or actively dislike it would find difficult to deny. 
Think, for example, of the following: the attention regularly devoted to sport in 
the mass media; the amounts of money, public and private, spent on sport; the 
dependency of business on sport for advertising; the growth of state involvement 
in sport for reasons as diverse as a desire to combat spectator violence and 
contribute to health or national prestige; the numbers of people who regularly 
take part in sport as performers or spectators, to say nothing of those who are 
directly or indirectly dependent on it for their livelihoods.
696
 
 
In this description, the significance of sport seems grounded in a neoliberal 
understanding of social utility, where value is determined on the basis of economic 
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return.  Within this calculus, freedom is the opportunity to pursue profit, commodify 
one’s body, and risk injury – for the right price.  This costs versus benefits equation is 
one of the central mechanisms of neoliberal rationality and is extended to all aspects of 
the socio-political world, including determinations of the value of human life itself.   
 
There is perhaps no place where this is more poignantly evidenced than in the field of 
medical law where the language of ‘cost savings’ or ‘resource allocation’ is explicit in 
deliberations about medical treatment, quality of life, and the requisite procedures for 
informed consent. For some bioethicists, this is attributable to a particular character that 
‘best interests’ considerations take on within a neoliberal rationality.  As Jill Fisher has 
suggested, neoliberalism spawns a cultural logic wherein ‘what is good for industry’ is 
what is also deemed good for the citizenry.
697
 This logic grants considerations of the 
‘public purse’ an equal (if not central) stake in a number of bioethical debates, including 
decisions concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.  Some of the legal 
commentary on a recent high-profile Canadian case, Rasouli v. Sunnybrook Health 
Sciences Centre
698
 provides some evidence of this.   
 
Hassan Rasouli, a retired mechanical engineer, immigrated to Canada from Iran in 
April, 2010. In August of the same year, he was diagnosed with a benign brain tumour 
and underwent surgery in October, 2010 to have it removed. In the days following the 
surgery, Rasouli suffered an infection (bacterial meningitis) which resulted in 
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significant neurological damage, respiratory failure, and reduced consciousness.
699
 He 
was placed on life support and designated as being in a persistent vegetative state, with 
no prognosis for recovery. In December, 2010, his physicians sought consent from 
Rasouli’s substitute decision maker (SDM) to remove the life support and transfer 
Rasouli to palliative care. Rasouli’s SDM was his wife, Dr. Salasel, a qualified 
physician who disagreed with the attending physicians’ prognosis. She maintained that 
Rasouli would regain cognitive ability and denied consent to withdraw treatment.
700
  
Amidst disputes with Rasouli’s physicians about whether or not the SDM’s consent was 
required to withdraw treatment, Dr. Salasel (Rasouli’s wife and SDM) sought an 
injunction to prevent the withdrawal of life support.
701
 This injunction was granted at 
the trial level and re-affirmed at the Court of Appeal.  An appeal of this judgment was 
heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in December, 2012 and almost a year later, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, finding that the consent of 
Rasouli’s SDM was needed to withdraw treatment.702  
 
The case has solicited a fair amount of commentary among legal scholars, bioethicists, 
and public opinion about the value of life and the circumstances in which consent can 
and should be required.  Arguments about social utility (traditionally a delimiter of 
consent in criminal law) have loomed large in these discussions, often presented within 
a neoliberal rhetoric. Hilary Young, for instance, frames the issue in the following way: 
No one wants to deny care to a patient who could materially benefit from it, but 
advances in technology allow health practitioners to keep people alive even 
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when there is no realistic prospect of improvement to their underlying condition. 
As a result, life-sustaining treatment can be provided, but as potential returns 
diminish and costs (including to the patient, in terms of invasiveness and 
suffering, as well as to the public purse) increase, it is not obvious that such 
treatment should be provided.
703
  
 
Many arguments of this ilk are found in the literature discussing end-of-life care, often 
with reference to the term ‘medical futility,’ where proposed treatments are deemed to 
be ‘irrational’ or lacking in ‘good reason’ on the basis that they are unlikely to improve 
a patient’s condition. Yet, underlying this standard of reasonableness is an economic 
vision of (social) utility that defines the value of life with the labour (and ensuing 
product) it might provide.  As Tom Koch (2011: 131) has suggested:  
The invocation of cost as a rational criterion for limiting acceptable levels of 
care for the chronically and terminally ill is rooted in the late 19
th
 century 
redefinition of individual worth as a quotient of employability and 
productivity.
704
 
 
Thus, determinations of medical futility rest on an understanding of ‘improvement’ of 
the patient’s condition that are not about extending life (as Hassan Rasouli’s request for 
continued treatment would do) so much as they are about treatment for patients who 
might cease to be economically burdensome.
705
  These monetary concerns are also 
attributed a ‘common sense’ status in the legal and bioethical commentary on medically 
‘futile’ cases, allowing the state’s economic interests to be positioned on equal footing 
with arguments about the sanctity of life, religious objections to treatment, and patient 
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autonomy.
706
  As articulated by the President of the Hastings Centre in his 1990 book, 
What Kind of Life: ‘The best medicine is that which contributes to the health that makes 
society run well, to achieve its appropriate ends.’707   
 
These arguments about state resources and the gross expenditures on healthcare operate 
on the presumption that given the scarcity of these resources, allocations should be done 
for the greatest good. Yet, these contentions rely on a particular vision of what this 
social good is – one that values economic productivity above all else.  In such a 
formulation, reasonableness or ‘rational’ decision-making is a matter of cost efficiency.  
However, despite the prevalence of concerns about health care resource allocations, 
courts have been reluctant to engage in explicit cost-benefit analyses in consent-based 
medical cases.  In most instances, following an acknowledgement of the economic 
concerns, the courts have deferred to the legislatures on the matter. The House of Lords 
decision in Bland (1993) is a good example of this practice.  Anthony Bland was a 
spectator who was crushed and asphyxiated at a football game when the stadium’s 
overcrowding safety measures failed.
708
  As a result of the injuries he sustained at the 
stadium, Bland went into a persistent vegetative state for more than three years before 
his physicians (with the consent of his family) sought a court declaration that removing 
Bland’s life-support systems would not constitute a criminal offence.  In their decision, 
the House of Lords made explicit note of the financial considerations of maintaining 
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Bland’s current condition, although they deferred judgment on these matters to 
Parliament, stating (under the heading ‘Best interests of the community’): 
Threaded through the technical arguments addressed to the House were the 
strands of a much wider position, that it is in the best interests of the community 
at large that Anthony Bland's life should now end. The doctors have done all 
they can. Nothing will be gained by going on and much will be lost... The large 
resources of skill, labour and money now being devoted to Anthony Bland might 
in the opinion of many be more fruitfully employed in improving the condition 
of other patients, who if treated may have useful, healthy and enjoyable lives for 
years to come… This argument was never squarely put, although hinted at from 
time to time. In social terms it has great force, and it will have to be faced in the 
end. But this is not a task which the courts can possibly undertake. A social cost-
benefit analysis of this kind… must be for Parliament alone, and the outcome of 
it is at present quite impossible to foresee.
709 
 
Courts have seemingly come a long way since the turn of the twentieth century when 
such deference wasn’t needed in the face of a more prevalent and widespread ‘economic 
mind.’ In the now famous case of Buck v. Bell (1927), involving the forced sterilization 
of a so-called ‘feeble-minded’ woman, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote explicitly about 
the state’s interest in restricting the number of economically dependent citizens. 
Framing the issue entirely as a matter of ‘public welfare,’ Justice Holmes declared: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices… in order to 
prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world if, 
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve 
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind… Three generations of imbeciles are enough.710 
 
The words of Justice Holmes are jarring, particularly when juxtaposed with the more 
cautious language of the House of Lords in Bland (1993); yet, the clarity of the court’s 
position in Buck v. Bell and its underlying economic motivations suggests that consent 
in the modern era performs a similar function as it has in past ages, i.e. a prescription of 
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normative subjectivity rather than an expression of personal autonomy. Holmes’ 
meaning is clear: some persons are more deserving of life than others and the 
determinant of this desert is economic productivity. While contemporary medical 
jurisprudence may have toned done its rhetoric, the underlying principles of market 
morality remain operative when social utility is in play, even when pitted against 
hallmark principles of medical ethics, such as patient autonomy or personal dignity.
711
 
Where the treatment or procedure that is the subject of a patient’s consent (or refusal 
thereof) is deemed to be too expensive or an inefficient use of state funds, social utility 
demands that it be over-ridden or disallowed.
712
 The Canadian case of Golubchuk 
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(2008)
713
 and the ensuing commentary provide a good example of this rationality at 
work.  
 
The facts of the Golubchuk case share some similarity with those of Rasouli. Samuel 
Golubchuk was an 84-year old Orthodox Jew who suffered severe brain damage 
following a fall in 2003. After several years of deteriorating health, Mr. Golubchuk was 
placed on life support at the Salvation Army Grace General Hospital in Winnipeg, 
Manitoba. Although he did have brain function, the level of this functioning was a point 
of dispute between Mr. Golubchuk’s attending physicians and his family. The 
physicians advised Golubchuk’s children that they intended to remove him from life 
support. Consent to do so was refused on religious grounds.
714
  Golubchuk’s children 
sought an injunction from the court to prevent the disconnection. This injunction was 
granted on a temporary basis, awaiting full disposition of the matter at trial; however, 
Mr. Golubchuk died (naturally in hospital) before the trial took place. During the legal 
battle, Golubchuk’s physicians argued that consent was not needed to withdraw 
treatment – a principle that the Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons endorsed 
in a guideline it released in 2008 in response to the court injunction in Golubchuk’s 
case.
715
 This guideline stated that the final decision to withdraw treatment is one that 
lies with the attending physician and not with the family.
716
  While this position 
received a fair amount of critical reception among bioethicists and legal scholars for its 
‘affront to the guiding principles of Western medical ethics: patient autonomy and 
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human freedom,’717 other commentators defend the position for its good ‘economic 
sense.’  As Bernard Dickens has noted with respect to the Golubchuk case: ‘If the 
patient’s life cannot be saved in a meaningful way and if intervention would deny 
resources that would benefit other patients… then the doctor is justified in clinical 
judgment to withhold treatment. Clinical judgment is not negotiated with patients.’718 In 
this context, Justice Holmes’ decision in Buck v. Bell does not seem so distant a past.  
 
Not only do economic conceptions of social utility influence determinations of medical 
futility and quality of life,
719
 but there is also evidence to suggest this prevailing market 
morality serves to transform the kinds of subjects that are ‘free’ to consent and the 
functions this consent is meant to perform. Jill Fisher has argued that ‘medical 
neoliberalism’ represents a commodification of both healthcare and its delivery that 
effectively converts patients into consumers.
720
  Aside from the emphasis on 
individualism that this consumer model propagates (discussed in further detail in the 
following section), there is a shift in what consent is understood to do when patients are 
thought to be ‘buying’ health products or services. Rather than an expression of patient 
autonomy, consent becomes a guard against physician liability. It marks the moment of 
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consumer choice and the shifting of responsibility for the consequences of that choice 
from healthcare providers to healthcare consumers.
721
  As Fisher notes: 
Unlike patients, consumers seeking health care bear the responsibility for the 
choices they make – or fail to make – regarding their health. Because they are 
positioned as having the right to make choices about health care, consumers also 
have the obligation to utilize whatever products and services are available to 
ensure health or to treat illness and disease. This is not to say that medical 
professionals are not liable for malpractice claims. If anything, assessing the 
appropriateness of care is another burden on consumers, and malpractice suits 
serve as a means to make claims that the products and services they sought were 
not delivered as promised.
722
 
 
Consent in this configuration serves as a legal ‘flak jacket’ – a term employed by Lord 
Donaldson in the English case, W. (A Minor) (medical treatment),
723
 referring to the 
protection against liability that consent confers on physicians against ‘the litigious.’ 
Margaret Brazier has described this model of consent in the following way: ‘Once 
consent is obtained, the doctor is protected from legal gunfire. Consent protects his [sic] 
back.’724  The flak jacket was only one of two functions Lord Donaldson viewed 
consent as serving in medical law. The first was a clinical one, described in the 
judgment in a fashion strikingly similar to the role ascribed to consent in medieval 
codes of ethics governing the doctor-patient relationship. ‘The clinical purpose,’ Lord 
Donaldson stated, ‘stems from the fact that in many instances the co-operation of the 
patient and the patient's faith or at least confidence in the efficiency of the treatment is a 
major factor contributing to the treatment's success.’725 The reader may recall that in the 
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medieval period, obtaining the patient’s consent was thought to be integral to the 
success of the treatment, even if obtained through deception. The giving of consent, in a 
medieval context steeped in religious conviction, took on a ritual form. Rather than an 
expression of freedom, the medievalist viewed consent as submission (to God, via the 
other.) Although most of this religious context has been replaced by a clinical and 
positivist one, ritual persists in the contemporary process of informed consent. 
Ethnographic studies of patients’ experiences with the consent process affirm the notion 
that the informed consent form is often viewed as merely a ‘technicality’ or part of the 
intake or assessment procedures patients experience prior to treatment, rather than a 
moment for substantive discussion or autonomy.
726
  Market morality forms the 
backdrop of this patient experience.  A conception of the physician’s time as limited 
(and more ‘valuable’ than that of the patient) and hospital resources as strained 
contribute to patients’ perceptions that compliance is the most expedient way 
forward.
727
 As noted by a participant in a 2006 ethnographic study of the reasons 
women consent to surgery: 
[…] the last thing they need is somebody turn round and saying ‘I’ve changed 
my mind I don’t want to have this,’ because it messes you know all their sort of 
thing up.
728
 
 
At times, this perception can shift to a direct feeling of coercion, as demonstrated by 
another participant in the same study: 
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Yeh, because they were there really pressurising me. It was like I was signing 
for a loan or something, and they had got this pen and they go ‘right then are you 
ready to sign’ and you just feel like they are stood there, waiting for me […] 
they had got a load of other patients and I am thinking well you really haven’t 
got time to, they are busy which I do appreciate that they are busy.
729
 
 
This suggests that within a frame of ‘common economic sense,’ patients are aware of an 
unwritten code of conduct that encourages acquiescence and discourages argumentation, 
conflict, or active questioning, all in the name of cost efficiency.  To act outside the 
ambit of these rules is to risk losing one’s status as a ‘good patient,’ thereby losing a 
perception of one’s reasonableness, and, in turn, one’s capacity to consent.  This is not 
unlike accounts from young women who claim to have difficulty saying ‘no’ when 
negotiating sexual encounters as a result of the ‘unwritten rules’ about sexual norms, 
gender roles, and  social expectations.
730
 To act assertively, to ‘own’ one’s desire, to 
change one’s mind or to stop a sexual encounter once it has begun is to risk losing one’s 
status as a ‘good girl’ just as to shy away from aggressive behaviour on the playing field 
or to misuse one’s bodily capital is to risk losing one’s reputation as a ‘good player.’ 
These acts of non-conformity with the unwritten rules are the makings of Buck v. Bell’s 
‘undesirables’; those subjects for whom consent is not available due to a lack of 
(neoliberal) reason or social utility. Consenting subjects must govern themselves 
accordingly to be granted the capacity to consent and this governance requires strict 
adherence to a neoliberal rationality.  
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The capacity to consent: An act of self-governance 
Neoliberalism, acting as political rationality, serves as a form of governmentality 
insofar as it operates through what Foucault has called ‘technologies of the self.’731 
Broadly defined, these are methods through which a state or ruling class is able to 
govern others by requiring (both juridically and ethically) that citizens exercise self-
control, in essence, governing themselves.
732
 This ethic of self-governance stems from 
two central components to neoliberal rationality, namely: individualism and 
responsibilisation.  Built on the model of the self-interested individual of classical 
liberalism, neoliberal rationality posits a social world made up of atomistic agents, each 
tasked with self-determination.  One’s life circumstances, in a neoliberal world, are 
thought to be the consequences of one’s actions and one’s choices.  Predictably, this is 
one of the elements of neoliberalism that sustains the greatest critique from 
communitarians, where the argument that human life is inherently social (rather than 
individualistic) is used to buttress claims that the complex web of inter-relationships 
among and within communities should be the basis for legal and political action.
733
 
Further, ignoring these relational components to human life allows neoliberal regimes to 
set aside the ways in which different social groups might enjoy undue privilege or work 
to oppress and exclude others.
734
  
 
Hand-in-hand with the emphasis on individualism is the process of responsibilization 
that neoliberalism puts in play.  Neoliberal rationality espouses the view that individuals 
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should be set free from the over-reaching arm of big government and left to their own 
pursuits, each aided (or marred) by the strengths and weaknesses of the individual. The 
heart of neoliberal autonomy is the freedom to pursue one’s own interests and control 
one’s own destiny (to the best of one’s abilities), without the interference of state 
regulation. In this configuration, individuals who achieve less success or experience 
more hardship are merely the victims of their own failings. The state, having ‘left alone’ 
its citizens to their own pursuits, can hardly be blamed for their lack of success; rather, 
according to the neoliberal story, such disappointments are merely the result of the 
‘natural’ order of things where some individuals simply have more than others: more 
skill, more competency, more luck, more ambition, more expertise.
735
 These categories 
of ‘more’ are the stuff of human capital and unlike other forms of capital, are indivisible 
from the person that possesses them. ‘[M]ade up of two components: an inborn 
physical-genetic predisposition and the entirety of skills that have been acquired as the 
result of “investments” in the corresponding stimuli: nutrition, education, training and 
also love, affection, etc.,’ citizens become entrepreneurs of themselves, seeking to gain 
ever greater return on their ‘investments.’736  Individuals are thus expected to ‘take 
responsibility’ for their own lives, recognizing their own strengths and weaknesses, and 
managing these effectively so as to reap the greatest benefit at the lowest cost.  
 
These elements of individualism and responsibility lie at the heart of neoliberal 
rationality, and when coupled with the principle of non-interference, result in an 
imperative to ‘look after one’s self.’ Within this ethic of self-care, individuals are tasked 
with making good choices, avoiding ‘bad’ risks, and assuming ‘reasonable’ ones. This 
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standard of reasonableness, however, is rooted in neoliberal ideals of social utility and 
value. Some endeavours will simply be deemed too ‘costly,’ either, in the medical 
context, because of the toll a particular treatment might take on hospital resources (with 
an inefficient rate of return) or, in the criminal law context, because the prospects of 
criminalization are simply too high to warrant an action in the first instance.
737
 In some 
circumstances, unreasonably risky behaviour will be that which falls outside the normal 
‘rules of play,’ an ambit, of course, which varies depending on the socio-legal context.  
On the sports field, for example, although professional athletes are expected to risk 
injury during the course of a game, they must do so in a way that doesn’t reduce the 
overall value of their bodily capital. The athlete’s body is both capital and the tool to 
obtain it, therefore reasonableness demands a certain ‘corporeal thrift’ in its usage. As 
Wacquant has observed, ‘one must make use of one’s body without using it up.’738 This 
also serves to delineate what forms of self-care (and surveillance) will be deemed 
‘rational.’ Take, for example, the following description offered of the body work of 
boxers:   
The boxer comes to consider his body, especially his hands, as his stock-in-
trade. Boxers have varied formulas for preventing their hands from excess 
swelling, from excessive pain, or from being broken. This does not mean a 
hyperchondriachal interest, because they emphasize virility and learn to slough 
off and to disdain punishment.
739
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This passage speaks both to the ideals of hegemonic masculinity that the last chapter 
found endorsed in criminal law’s assessment of ‘harm’ in sports violence cases, and to 
the commodification and maximization of capital that neoliberal rationality demands.
740
 
Where boxers do not follow these kinds of regimes to protect their ‘stock-in-trade,’ they 
are deemed to have taken unreasonable risks and thus, deserving of the consequences. 
As Wacquant notes, departures from this regime of ‘corporeal discipline’ are ‘promptly 
interpreted as the direct cause of [the boxer’s] failings in the ring.’741 
 
These ‘failings’ extend beyond the sports arena to form an integral part of the law’s 
assessment of the limits of consent.  Where acts are deemed to be too harmful or 
without sufficient social value, the law prohibits the use of consent.  Within a neoliberal 
rubric, persons are expected to engage in a strict regime of risk management, 
undertaking only those hazards that, on a cost-benefit analysis, are expected to yield 
sufficient profit to warrant the risk. This means there are some risks that will not be seen 
as ‘reasonable’ within a neoliberal rationality. Engaging in these excludes a subject 
from consent, marking the act (and actor) as ‘undesirable’ or ‘without good reason.’ 
These circumstances of ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ risk are seen as too harmful or 
without adequate social utility to allow for the invocation of consent.  This is not unlike 
the process of Christian alignment that was demanded of medieval patients so as to 
bring them good health. In the contemporary period, all things must be ‘aligned’ with 
neoliberal ideals of reason and social value (or face the consequences).  In this calculus, 
‘harm’ is not a violation of bodily integrity, a creation of coercive circumstances, or a 
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disavowal of personhood, but rather an interference with each individual’s ability to 
self-govern, where self-governance is understood as a form of economic management of 
the self. If a person chooses to mismanage herself, it is her freedom to do so; but the 
ensuing damage is her responsibility to bear.  
 
One of the loci where the neoliberal requirement of responsible risk management meets 
consent most explicitly is in the legal and social regulation of sex.  Sexual assault law 
has a long history of presuming ‘good girls’ will avoid risky situations.742 
Determinations of what kinds of behaviours or circumstances will constitute ‘high risk’ 
have largely been informed by stereotypical assumptions about female sexuality and 
gender roles, if not Victorian values of propriety.
743
 At times, these cultural assumptions 
have been judicially recognized both for the harm they create for women and the 
difficulties they present to a variety of evidentiary and investigatory matters, such as 
determinations of credibility and levels of under-reporting.
744
 One such instance, the 
Supreme Court of Canada case of Seaboyer, is significant because of the legislative 
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reforms it launched in Canada, including the first statutory definition of consent within 
Canada’s Criminal Code and a list of circumstances in which consent is not possible.745   
 
These provisions were interpreted for the first time in the Ewanchuk (1999) case, where 
the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a doctrine of implied consent for sexual assault.  
In a separate (concurring) judgment, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé noted that the ‘case is not 
about consent, since none was given.’746  Instead, the case was characterized as being 
about stereotypes of female sexuality, which rely on the notion that women say ‘no’ 
when they really mean ‘yes.’747  As a result, Ewanchuk instituted what has been called 
an ‘affirmative consent’ model where ‘consent’ must be communicated in a positive and 
verbal fashion.
748
 Consent is thus defined, in Canadian sexual assault law, from the 
subjective standpoint of the complainant. While this has led some commentators to 
describe the Ewanchuk case as the ‘no means no’ decision, others have suggested it 
might more aptly be understood as a judgment that confirmed ‘only yes means yes,’ 
given its endorsement of a positive consent standard.
749
 To satisfy the mens rea of the 
offence, the Crown must establish either that the accused knew the complainant was not 
consenting or that he did not take reasonable steps to ensure she was.
750
  As the Court 
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noted in Ewanchuk, ‘the trier of fact may only come to one of two conclusions: the 
complainant consented or not. There is no third option.’751   
 
This requirement for reasonableness stems from the Court’s treatment of the defence of 
an ‘honest but mistaken belief in consent,’ where the court was clear about the need for 
an accused to rely on more than mere body language or assumptions when assessing 
whether or not the complainant was, in fact, consenting. As the majority judgment in 
Ewanchuk stated:  
In order to cloak the accused’s actions in moral innocence, the evidence must 
show that he believed that the complainant communicated consent to engage in 
the sexual activity in question.  A belief by the accused that the complainant, in 
her own mind wanted him to touch her but did not express that desire, is not a 
defence.  The accused’s speculation as to what was going on in the 
complainant’s mind provides no defence.752 
 
In rejecting a doctrine of implied consent in sexual assault cases, the Ewanchuk decision 
established a standard of explicit consent, where affirmative agreement on the part of 
complainant for the sexual activity in question must be obtained by the accused. Critics 
of the decision raised concerns about the practicality of such a standard, given the social 
awkwardness of having to gain permission for each stage of a sexual encounter, and the 
potential detriment the affirmative consent model might have on ‘seduction’ or 
customary sexual overtures – speaking, perhaps, to the power of prevailing gender 
norms and codes of intelligibility about sex.
753
 Yet, others have praised the decision for 
the move it makes away from a view of sexual consent as a failure to resist and towards 
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an explicit, voluntary expression of desire.
754
 While, on one hand, this new approach to 
sexual consent has signalled a move away from the cultural assumptions about female 
sexuality that have previously informed beliefs about what constitutes a ‘good girl,’ the 
standard of reasonableness that is applied to judicial determinations of the mistake 
defence continues to operate within a neoliberal rationality. As Lise Gotell has argued: 
Recent Canadian decisions recognize sexual autonomy, but in a form that is 
consistent with individuated norms of criminal law. Normative sexual 
interaction is reconceived as being like an economic transaction and good sexual 
citizens are reconfigured to resemble rational economic actors assuming 
responsibility for their actions and the risks that they take.
755
 
 
Despite the impetus to eliminate harmful stereotypes about women and their sexuality 
from sexual assault law (and the criminal justice system’s response to it), the neoliberal 
components of individualism and responsibilisation function to maintain victim-
blaming practices in the law’s dealings with consent.  While Canadian courts have set 
limits on the ‘honest mistake’ defence, requiring that it be ‘reasonable’ and not held in 
the face of wilful blindness or recklessness, judicial interpretation of the circumstances 
that might inform a sense of reasonableness often focus on the behaviour or 
characteristics of the alleged victim(s) and the effect these may have had on an 
accused’s perception of consent.756  As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé noted in the Ewanchuk 
case, in response to the comments made by the appellate court judge about the 
complainant’s style of dress, her living arrangements, and her status as an unmarried 
mother: 
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[O]ne might wonder why [McLung J] felt necessary to point out these aspects of 
the trial record.  Could it be to express that the complainant is not a virgin?  Or 
that she is a person of questionable moral character because she is not married 
and lives with her boyfriend and another couple?  These comments made by an 
appellate judge help reinforce the myth that under such circumstances, either the 
complainant is less worthy of belief, she invited the sexual assault, or her sexual 
experience signals probable consent to further sexual activity.  Based on those 
attributed assumptions, the implication is that if the complainant articulates her 
lack of consent by saying “no”, she really does not mean it and even if she does, 
her refusal cannot be taken as seriously as if she were a girl of “good” moral 
character.  “Inviting” sexual assault, according to those myths, lessens the guilt 
of the accused.
757
  
 
Even where these myths do not present themselves in judicial discourse as explicitly as 
they did in Ewanchuk, the credibility of rape complainants is assessed as a matter of risk 
management. Did she exhibit ‘questionable judgment’?758 Did she drink too much, 
leaving her ‘disinhibited’ or feeling ‘flirty’?759 Did she engage in ‘bizarre’ or 
‘abnormal’ behaviours without ‘good reason’?760 Was she ‘foolish’ or old enough to 
know better?
761
 Lise Gotell has suggested these investigations into the ‘risky’ behaviour 
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of rape complainants represents a ‘revised form of victim-blaming.’762 This is well 
evidenced by a passage in a 2008 Canadian case where two men were convicted after 
drugging and sexually assaulting a woman (J.M.) they met in an online chatroom: 
J.M. communicated with a stranger who contacted her out of the blue on the 
internet. She flirted with him and foolishly agreed to meet, giving him her name, 
address, and telephone number. She knew that he had mentioned bringing 
alcohol and drugs and she did contemplate the possibility of a sexual encounter 
with him. When he showed up at the residence with his friend, she voluntarily 
got into the car… J.M.’s continued attempts to minimize her provocative and 
foolish behaviour stemmed from her intense embarrassment that she allowed 
herself to get into the situation in the first place.
763
 
 
While most legal scholars would be quick to argue consent operates differently in 
sexual circumstances than it does on a sports field,
764
 these assessments of sexual 
assault complainants’ risk management behaviour suggest the same line of thinking is at 
work in both contexts. Consent in the sports arena is confined to the ‘reasonable 
expectations of play.’ As such, by stepping onto the ice, a hockey player is deemed to 
have consented to a certain degree of force or injury, provided it occurs in a 
circumstance that is ‘usual’ or falls within the normal rules of the game. In a study 
examining the public discourse surrounding the Ewanchuk case, Wright cites the 
following Letter to the Editor that was submitted to a national newspaper by a Canadian 
lawyer: 
Actions speak louder than words. What on earth was the female complainant 
doing engaging in mutual massage with a man she had never met before in the 
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privacy of his own trailer? And yes, her rather skimpy attire would do nothing to 
discourage his allegedly unwanted advances in the course of the massage.
765
 
 
Here, the reference to ‘reasonable expectations’ is all but explicit. The complainant’s 
clothing, her act of entering the accused’s trailer (under the auspices of a job interview), 
and her engagement in ‘mutual’ massage (throughout which she repeatedly told the 
accused ‘no’) are all viewed as indicators of poor risk management, leaving her 
responsible for the consequences of these ‘choices.’ Consent is hardly an expression of 
autonomy in a context where it need not be uttered at all.
766
 Rather, in the course of the 
‘normal rules of play,’ women are denied consent precisely because they are deemed to 
be always giving it.
767
   
Perhaps most problematically, these judicial assessments of a complainant’s level of life 
‘mismanagement’ persist even where significant statutory reforms have been 
implemented with an aim for improving definitions of ‘consent’ and eliminating 
reliance on stereotypical views of women and their sexuality.  The Scottish case of HM 
Adv. v. Mutebi
768
 is a good example.  In this case, the complainant had become 
significantly intoxicated at a friend’s home before visiting a nightclub in Glasgow 
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where she continued to drink.  She left the nightclub and CCTV footage demonstrated 
that she was visibly intoxicated and unstable on her feet.  She returned to her flat and 
while her memory of events is not entirely clear, she recalled meeting the accused (a 
stranger) outside her flat, kissing him, and then ‘coming to’ in her bed amidst sexual 
intercourse with the accused.  The complainant testified saying ‘no’ at this time, at 
which point the accused left the flat (after stealing the complainant’s mobile phone and 
£170 from her wallet).  The case was significant due to being one of the first to reach 
the Appeal Court following significant statutory revisions in the 2009 Sexual Offences 
Act to the definition of consent and the circumstances in which it would be vitiated 
(including excessive intoxication).  Despite these reforms, the conviction of the accused 
for sexual assault was overturned at the Court of Appeal on the basis of the 
‘reasonableness’ of the accused’s mistaken belief in consent.  Rather than establish that 
the complainant’s state of intoxication was severe enough to vitiate consent (thus 
moving to an assessment of what steps the accused might have taken to establish his 
‘reasonable’ albeit mistaken belief in consent), the Court appears to take the 
complainant’s severe intoxication level as evidence ‘that it was likely that she would 
have consented to have sex with a stranger who she met on the street while very drunk, 
rather than regarding this as something out of the ordinary or improbable.’769 
 
This rationality prevails in the discourse of sexual assault prevention campaigns, where 
women are cautioned against walking alone at night, dressing provocatively, drinking 
too much, or leaving one’s drink unattended in mixed company. The ‘good girl’ will 
choose the well-lit route, will carry her handbag with cell phone and money close, and, 
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above all, follow her instincts.
770
  These discourses are a part of the wider crime 
prevention literature that ‘implores us to reduce our possibilities of encountering crime. 
Indeed, it is a duty of good citizenship.’771 Aside from positioning women as inherently 
rapeable,
772
 these scripts reinforce a view of sexual assault as an individualised 
problem.
773
 In congruence with neoliberal rationality, violence against women is not a 
social issue deserving of governmental intervention but rather an individual woman’s 
responsibility to guard against; to live her life in ‘proper alignment’ (to echo the 
medieval view of the consenting patient) so as to avoid injury. Provided a rape 
complainant has not led a ‘mismanaged’ life, she will be entitled to give (and refuse) 
consent. 
 
A similar approach is seen in the literature for the prevention of sexually transmitted 
diseases, where individuals are tasked with ‘taking responsibility’ for not simply their 
own health, but that of others.  This is perhaps best evidenced by the intervention of the 
criminal law in cases of HIV transmission where failure to disclose one’s positive status 
have resulted in convictions for aggravated assault
774
 and criminal negligence,
775
 each 
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on the basis that the consent to sexual intercourse is retroactively reneged on the basis 
that it was improperly or inadequately informed. Further, in each case, the risk 
presented by the offender’s conduct is positioned as a danger to the public at large, and 
the result of a failure of the individual’s responsibility to take adequate care in 
managing the risk of infection.  It is this latter aspect of the criminal law’s foray into the 
regulation of health risks that has elicited the greatest criticism from anti- or de-
criminalization advocates.  While some argue the criminal law is simply an inept tool 
for addressing public health concerns,
776
 others have suggested the law’s interventions 
serve to further stigmatize those already suffering from HIV and AIDS.
777
 Yet, the 
law’s response to these critiques has largely followed a route of soft paternalism, not 
unlike that of Mill’s traveller about to cross a broken bridge. Rather than prevent her 
from crossing altogether, the soft paternalist merely seeks to ensure she is aware of the 
risks.  As the English Court of Appeal argued in Dica (2005),
778
 a case where the 
defendant had unprotected sex with two women while aware of his HIV positive status, 
rather than prohibit the defence of consent on the basis that it was given under false 
pretences (as the Supreme Court of Canada held in Cuerrier), the emphasis would 
instead be placed on the issue of risk.
779
 ‘[R]isks have always been taken by adults 
consenting to sexual intercourse,’ the Court argued, citing sexually transmitted 
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infections and unwanted pregnancies as examples.  ‘Modern society has not thought to 
criminalise those who have willingly accepted the risks.’780  
 
The Court in Dica draws a distinction, then, between consenting to bodily harm (which 
might not be permitted on public policy grounds) and consenting to the risk of this 
harm. The latter circumstance, the Court held, was too great an imposition on personal 
autonomy.
781
 Implicit in this view of consent is the responsibilised individual, tasked 
with managing the risks s/he may encounter in life so as to yield the best outcomes. 
Note, for instance, the testimony of the complainants under cross-examination in the 
case, R. v. Konzani,
782
 where the appellant had been convicted at trial on three counts of 
inflicting grievous bodily harm after failing to disclose his HIV positive status to three 
different women (who were later infected).  In the transcript of the trial, the defence 
cross-examined the complainant as follows: 
Q. What did you know about him before you agreed to have sex with him? 
A. Not much … 
Q. Did you realise you were taking a risk of becoming pregnant. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Were you prepared to take that risk? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you realise you were taking a risk of catching a disease? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And were you prepared to take that risk? … 
A. Yes, I was, yeah.”783 
 
 
The same line of questioning was put to the second complainant at trial: 
Q. You also realise that by having unprotected sex you risk catching an  
     infection? 
A. Yes … 
Q. … That too is a risk that you took. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. That risk included the risk of contracting HIV didn't it? 
A. Yes, but I didn't think about it at the moment. 
… 
Q. That means at the time you had unprotected sex? 
A. Yes. … 
Q. But there was no discussion about HIV or tests or anything before you had   
     sex? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You agree that there was no discussion? 
A. Yes.
784
 
 
In these excerpts, consent is positioned as a form of risk assumption, where the 
responsibility for ‘getting informed’ lies with the complainant, (i.e. the ‘risk taker’ in 
the Dica Court of Appeal’s vision of the inherently risky activity of sexual 
intercourse.)
785
 This is the same approach adopted by members of the HIV positive 
community themselves, as documented in a 2005 ethnographic study of barebackers,
786
 
each of whom expressed the view that one’s health was a personal responsibility that 
included being informed and knowledgeable about the sexual choices one was making. 
Consent thus serves as a marker of this responsibility, as one of Adam’s HIV positive 
participants noted:  
When you consented to it … if your other partners were willing to participate, it 
[condomless sex] was just a given. I just assumed that they take responsibility 
for their actions if they’re willing to go along with it.787  
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This responsibilisation model persisted even where partners were consenting under false 
information, as demonstrated by another one of Adam’s HIV positive participants who 
reported the following exchange: 
I said, “I’m positive. It’s, you know, your ball game then. No problem.” And he 
said, well, his quote was, “I’m a top and I have less risk of catching it.” All right. 
And I said, “Well, that’s your choice. It’s a high risk. It’s always your 
choice.”788 
 
Similar findings were reported by Michael Bartos in a 2002 study of safe sex practices 
among HIV positive persons in Australia, where it was argued that the self-interest 
promoted among the study’s participants is not indicative of a ‘callous disregard or 
reckless[ness]’ but rather speaks to the prevalence of a neoliberal ‘common sense’ 
around consent that creates ‘fewer bonds of social obligation’ or duties of care to 
others.
789
 Instead, it is a particular neoliberal view of autonomy that underlies these 
practices, one rooted in individualised risk management.  
 
What is lost in such accounts of autonomy are, of course, the social and environmental 
inequalities that might affect one’s choices or how the contexts in which these choices 
occur might themselves limit the available options.  Jill Fisher offers the example of 
clinical pharmaceutical trials, where given the prevalent ‘economic sense’ that 
prioritizes healthcare costs over healthcare needs (where it doesn’t equate the two), 
clinical research is positioned as a ‘responsible choice’ for those who require medical 
treatments they cannot afford. Fisher elaborates: 
[P]ut another way, participation in clinical trials becomes almost a duty for those 
who have no other access to health care because it is available as a ‘choice.’ By 
privileging the individual and choice, a health care system mediated by 
neoliberal policies and cultural sensibilities tends to obscure the inequalities to 
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which those who participate in clinical trials tend to be subject. Within this 
frame, the systematic use of the uninsured or economically disenfranchised 
people as human subjects in pharmaceutical clinical development is not seen as 
being exploitive, but is instead positioned as an opportunity for members of 
those groups.
790
   
 
This positioning also has a direct effect on the role of informed consent. While premised 
as a guardian of patient autonomy, this conceptualization presupposes a certain level of 
autonomy that many of the participants of clinical trials simply don’t have. Most studies 
on informed consent within the clinical trial setting have shown that subjects’ decisions 
to participate occur long before the consent form is presented or discussed and that such 
processes have little to no impact on study participation.
791
 This has led Fisher to 
characterize the so-called ‘ready to recruit’ populations that pharmaceutical trials attract 
as ‘ready to consent’ – an observation that calls into question many of the reform 
strategies that bioethicists propose as a means of enhancing patient autonomy through 
consent.
792
 For Fisher, such calls for more process-oriented approaches to informed 
consent or the ‘partnership’ model proposed by Robert Veatch and others, while 
laudable, don’t speak to the realities of participants’ experiences, particularly in the 
clinical trial setting. While Veatch has suggested that ‘partners’ in decision-making 
processes are entitled to know about benefits and risks, the purpose of the study, its 
underlying theory, and so on, assessing these factors is made more difficult in a context 
where the study itself has been designed by the physician and the economic needs of 
patients serve to characterize participation as ‘responsible.’ Fisher suggests this 
‘indicates that the process of informed consent actually begins before potential human 
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subjects are informed about the purpose, risks, and benefits of any given study.’793 But 
accounts from patients themselves suggest the problem with consent is not when it is 
requested but the context of inequality in which it occurs. As noted by Dixon-Woods 
following a qualitative study of 25 women on their experiences with consenting to 
surgery: ‘Women’s accounts emphasise that it is the procedure of consenting that is 
instrumental in producing their docility, and thus subverts the original intention  of the 
consent process in ensuring their autonomy.’794 This procedure is one which takes place 
within a neoliberal rationality, where state resources, considerations of human capital
795
 
(and its management) as well as the ‘ceremonial order of the clinic’ serve to constrain 
the freedom patients have to explore alternatives or make ‘non-normative’ choices.796  
Put quite simply, patients are aware of ‘the rules’ and consenting – even amidst 
uncertainty
797
 or pain
798
 or fear
799
 – is how one maintains the status of being a ‘good 
patient.’  
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These are concerns bioethicists and medical legal scholars have wrestled with for years, 
often noting the systemic inequalities of the doctor-patient relationship as a central 
motivating factor in reform strategies aimed at improving the informed consent process 
so as to increase patient autonomy. Yet what is overlooked in such analyses is the role 
which the autonomy story of consent plays in both producing and sustaining this context 
of inequality.  Where consent can be seen to construct particular frames of subjectivity 
as intelligible, namely those that possess the characteristics of responsibilised neoliberal 
rationality, positioning consent as a ‘choice’ that is made by rational, calculating, and 
‘free’ individuals obscures how this ‘choice’ is ‘in large part circumscribed, if not pre-
determined, by the rules of the game in this particular field and the power relations 
contained therein.’800  
 
The consent-as-autonomy story is a narrative about a type of liberty that is understood 
to be both hypothetical and potentially ‘harmful’ when left unrestrained.  Even in the 
most ardent of anti-paternalism arguments, some means of limiting the choices of 
individuals is recognized as necessary.  Taking account of the ‘public interest’ or 
‘common good’ is the generally accepted way of establishing these parameters of 
autonomy – a practice well demonstrated in judicial treatments of consent.  Yet, when 
the ‘good’ is understood to be that which is also economically ‘rational,’ the limits to 
what one might consent to (or of what ‘knowledge’ would be reasonable to have before 
making a choice) is also that which makes ‘good economic sense.’ This is perhaps the 
most compelling evidence of how consent operates as a form of self-governance, where 
one’s freedom to act is limited by the frame of (neoliberal) intelligibility that positions 
consent as a choice in the first instance. This narrative proclaims persons to be ‘free’ to 
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consent to whatever they wish (provided they only wish acts or circumstances that 
conform to neoliberal understandings of social utility and ‘good reason.’) As Catharine 
MacKinnon has argued, there is ‘an unnoticed slippage’ from the ideals of freedom that 
consent is meant to signify to the law’s ‘actual rules that tacitly reflect and impose 
inequalities,’ resulting in consent having ‘an appeal it does not earn.’801 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that, while consent is often positioned in law 
and political theory as a signifier of inalienable freedom, it is a liberty that is heavily 
circumscribed by the norms of neoliberal rationality.  Consent is limited to 
circumstances that are judicially determined to be of social utility and not harmful, 
where both ‘social utility’ and ‘harm’ are defined within an economic calculus. Where 
subjects consent in contexts that run counter to this rationality’s unwritten rules, (e.g. in 
situations that are too high risk or lacking in ‘good reason’) they are all the more 
distasteful for what these ‘choices’ demonstrate about the would-be-consenter’s 
‘mismanaged’ life.  Consenting in such contexts  is a kind of hubris, to echo the view in 
Antiquity, and, as the medieval period suggests, such ‘sinfulness’ can only lead one to 
further ill. As Aquinas might argue, the social world is not privy to the inner wills of its 
citizens. Thus, true salvation can only be achieved on one’s own, through an exercise in 
self-regulation. Within a neoliberal context, individuals are ‘left alone’ to self-own and 
self-inspect, aligning themselves with ‘common sense’ values, and managing their risky 
behaviours in as cost-efficient a manner as possible. 
 
                                                          
801
 C. MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu’ (2006) 44(3) Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 940, 955. 
242 
 
In this way, the submissive operation of consent evidenced in the historical periods 
examined in previous chapters does not seem so distant a past.  Contemporary consent 
also appears as a means of submitting to an economic frame, wherein the ‘good’ that 
governs determinations of social utility is akin to the ‘good’ individuals might strive for 
in their own self-management regimes.  Where corporeal commodification is a rational 
act, the effective management of this capital is what marks one as a member of the 
neoliberal community. To take risks that are not economically viable, to mismanage 
one’s bodily capital, is to take one out of balance or out of alignment with neoliberal 
ideals.  To position consent as a choice serves to legitimize this calculation. It also 
serves to offload the responsibility for the various social conditions and relations which 
might impede agency or constrain choice to the individual and away from the state.  
 
This is the new ‘art of government’ that Foucault examined in his own study of the 
emergence of neoliberalism, where the authoritative arm of the state was replaced with a 
production and management of freedom.
802
 Subjects are free insofar as they exercise 
freedom in ways that are in alignment with the maintenance of the (neoliberal) order. As 
a proclaimed embodiment of this freedom, consent is not simply a means of governing, 
but of doing so under the guise of self-direction. It is, to employ the words of Foucault: 
‘a limited use of an empty liberty.’803  And while it is hardly a new line of thought to 
position political power and the dominant ideologies that support it as enabled more by 
the consent of the masses than the coercive force of the state,
804
 consent itself is left 
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unmarked in these analyses as is its promise of ‘autonomy.’ Legal scholars and 
reformers from all sides of the political spectrum debate how consent might be tweaked 
or re-tooled, while others argue it is no more than an ‘illusion.’805 Yet the story of 
autonomy that is told about consent remains untouched. The vision is that if we can only 
‘get it right,’ self-realisation, self-governance, and personal integrity will be ours.  The 
previous chapters have attempted to demonstrate the long history consent has had as a 
form of submission to dominant norms of intelligibility. The question that remains is 
perhaps the most important: why, in present day, should it be necessary for us to 
understand consent as something else?  Perhaps more to the point, what purpose is 
served by positioning this submission as autonomy?  It is to this inquiry that the 
concluding chapter turns its focus.       
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Around my feet 
the strawberries were surging, huge 
and shining 
 
When I bent 
to pick, my hands 
came away red and wet 
 
In the dream I said 
I should have known 
anything planted here 
would come up blood. 
  
− M. Atwood806 
 
 
Consent might be thought of as planted in legal ground surging with bright and 
desirable aims.  It is understood to be an enactment of personal autonomy, a guardian of 
bodily integrity, and an expression of free will.  At first glance, this understanding of 
consent is difficult to interrogate – as Hart might propose, consent’s relation to these 
fundamental values is something we have put to memory.
807
  Moreover, the values of 
personhood and freedom that are housed within consent’s story of autonomy are worthy 
ideals.  They are not, however, enjoyed equally, as many feminist and critical legal 
commentators have shown, nor is the capacity for self-governance granted to everyone.  
And while the pre-requisites for consent and the processes through which it is obtained 
or assessed have been subject to able critique, consent’s underlying promise of 
autonomy is left intact.  The aim of this thesis has thus been to open up a field of 
contestation within a narrative thought to be universally accepted as ‘common sense.’ 
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This narrative of consent-as-autonomy has gained such widespread acceptance in legal 
and political theory that it often ‘goes without saying.’  As some scholars maintain, 
‘consent and autonomy are, it would seem, inseparable.’808  Yet this inseparable 
association is countered by a rather pervasive claim in law about consent’s ‘ambiguous’ 
meaning or ‘shifting content.’809  As Hilary Young has argued, ‘the law of consent is 
tailored to the circumstances in order to achieve certain goals.’810  Certainly, the 
diversity of functions assigned to consent in law lends some credence to this claim.  It is 
used to ‘morally transform’ wrong acts,811 to establish the fairness of a trade or 
agreement,
812
 to safeguard against liability claims,
813
 and to establish the legitimacy of 
state action.  With consent, a trespass is made a visit, a theft is made a gift, an assault is 
made a surgical intervention or welcomed touch, and an act of state force is made law.  
Amidst this wide range of operations and explicit commentary on consent’s ‘protean’ 
nature, consent’s common sense never changes.  Why might this be?  Has consent 
always been about autonomy?   
 
The previous chapters’ investigations provide some evidence that, despite the ubiquity 
of the consent-as-autonomy story, it is a relatively recent conceptualization. Further, 
these historical examinations revealed alternative narratives of consent, its meaning, and 
the functions it was thought to perform that differed substantially from accounts of 
autonomy.  This suggests that there is a wide universe of consent that is belied by the 
dominance and ahistoricity of the consent-as-autonomy story.  This raises the question 
of why ‘autonomy’ has become not simply the most prevalent way of understanding 
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consent, but the only one.  Interrogating the effects of this obscuration represents the 
second overall aim of this thesis. 
 
The difficulty of this task has been two-fold.  In the first instance, the consent-as-
autonomy story represents what Joan Scott has termed a ‘foundational discourse’ and, 
as such, positions certain presumptions or principles as unquestionable. Further, such 
discourses establish a ‘common ground’ of analysis based upon these fundamental 
assumptions that serve to ‘authorize and legitimize analyses; indeed analysis seems not 
to be able to proceed without them.’814  In the case of the consent-as-autonomy story, 
these underlying values represent desirable ideals.  Few principles have been as 
‘compelling and seductive’ as personal autonomy, creating a second difficulty in 
‘reading against the grain’ of the autonomy story.815  Consent, viewed as a homeland for 
this idealized autonomy, holds an almost sacred place in law and political theory and its 
defense is all but automatic for most legal scholars.  As such, my doctoral inquiry 
necessitated venturing to contexts where this autonomy narrative might not carry as 
much influence; where the social relations might differ so greatly from those in the 
present day as to destabilize the foundations of the consent-as-autonomy tale.  As a 
means of framing this methodological route, I employed Foucault’s approach of 
genealogy, where consent could be positioned as an historical artefact, unhinged from 
some of the presumptions that enable and entrench its contemporary foundation in 
autonomy.  This method, understood to be a ‘history of the present,’ aimed to uncover 
the conditions of possibility for modern understandings of consent. 
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This thesis began, however, in familiar territory, where the autonomy story was 
presented in Chapter One as a contemporary ‘canon’ of consent law.  This included an 
examination of the legal requirements for establishing consent to sex, informed consent 
to medical treatment, and the defence of consent in sport, with a focus on the three 
‘preconditions’ of consent that dominate the jurisprudence in Canada and the United 
Kingdom in criminal law and medical law.  These key components of voluntariness, 
rationality, and knowledge were reviewed within the context of long-standing debates 
about legal paternalism and the limits to legitimate state interference in the decision-
making capacity of ‘free’ individuals.  This review revealed a paradox in the consent-as-
autonomy story, where despite proclamations of universality, consent is a highly 
regulated sphere of freedom that is only available to certain kinds of subjects.  While 
critical legal scholars, communitarian theorists, and feminists have criticised the way 
these requirements for consent have been applied by the courts, all of these accounts 
leave the meaning of consent (as autonomy) uncontested.  The latter half of Chapter 
One maintained that this is attributable to the ‘common sense’ status which the 
autonomy story has gained in the modern period.  The chapter concluded by tracing the 
connection between claims to a ‘common sense’ and the establishment of dominant 
norms of intelligibility, using a semiotic reading of Locke’s notion of ‘tacit consent’ to 
do so.  
   
The project’s genealogical investigation began in Chapter Two, where the role of 
consent in the legal regulation of sex in Antiquity was examined.  Focusing on three 
broad classifications of sexual offences in Classical Athens and Rome at the turn of the 
first century, Chapter Two demonstrated that in a historical context where personal and 
political autonomy was a right enjoyed only by free male citizens, consent functioned as 
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a marker and gatekeeper of community membership.  Consent was a juridical right that 
could be exercised only by male citizens, serving to regulate access to the women in 
their households.  In this way, consent marked out legally recognizable citizens while 
ensuring that access to female sexuality (and its procreative ends) would be restricted to 
other recognized citizens.  This role of consent as a guardian of patrilineal interests also 
operated to constitute the boundaries of the public domain and those who were entitled 
to live within it, suggesting the ways in which consent serves as a delimiter of 
normative subjectivity.  An examination of those who were excluded from the state on 
the basis of non-conformist subjectivities revealed that, despite an ability to live in a 
manner ‘free’ from state interference, these ancient ‘outlaws’ were not intelligible as 
‘autonomous,’ nor were they capable of giving or refusing consent.  Instead, their acts 
of independence lacked both coherence and cultural influence, often serving to further 
shame, rather than liberate, the non-conforming subject. 
 
Chapter Three sought to uncover an alternative narrative for one of the most secured 
discourses of consent-as-autonomy in law: the informed consent doctrine.   It began by 
demonstrating the prevalence of this narrative in bioethical and medical law scholarship,  
reviewing the many accounts of the informed consent doctrine which position it as a 
twentieth century invention.  In an attempt to find a different story of how consent 
might have operated within the medical field, Chapter Two examined the doctor-patient 
relationship in the so-called ‘Dark Age’ of medicine: the Middle Ages.  The discussion 
began by providing a picture of medieval medicine as a domain controlled by the 
Christian Church through a strict regulation of access to medical education and the 
content of what could be learned.  Favouring theory over practice, this enterprise of 
monastic medicine worked to align many of the popular medical treatises of the ancient 
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period (such as the works of Galen and Hippocrates) with a Christian ethic.  This was 
aided by the theological epistemology that was prevalent during the medieval period 
and which fostered an explanation for health and sickness that was rooted in divine 
intervention.  If the ill sought healing, they would need to find it in God.  This view 
necessarily influenced the medieval doctor-patient relationship and the codes of ethics 
that physicians themselves were held to account, often invoking images of the physician 
as an agent of God.   This, coupled with other understandings of consent that were 
prevalent at the time in theological discussions of religious conversion, marriage 
formation, and trade and commerce, provided an understanding of consent within the 
medieval medical context as a form of submission (to God) which Chapter Three’s 
conclusion argued was effected through a strict regime of self-management.  The 
relationship between this medieval model of consent and contemporary regimes of 
patient self-care was explored at Chapter Three’s end, suggesting ways in which this 
alternative story of consent may still operate today. 
 
Chapter Four examined the treatment of the defence of consent as it used in cases that 
address assaults that occur during sporting activities.  It began with a survey of the 
leading decisions from both Canada and the United Kingdom which establish what 
kinds of bodily harm (and for what purposes) a person can consent to.  A more critical 
approach was then taken to these judicial interpretations of ‘harm,’ where it was 
suggested that the criminal law’s reliance on a ‘public interest’ standard in these 
assessments of harm produces a normative framework for players where it is both 
rational and socially ‘utile’ to subject the body to violence and high-risk activity, 
provided it is in pursuit of social, cultural, and economic capital.  The canvassing of 
these key ‘sports violence’ cases revealed how the defence of consent is not available 
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where the harm incurred is deemed to be lacking in sufficient ‘reason’ or social utility, 
where each of these limits is defined within a capitalist logic.  This results in a judicial 
definition of ‘harm’ as non-conformity to hegemonic masculinity and a misuse of body 
capital, thus establishing consent as a kind of ‘license’ for corporeal commodification.  
 
Chapter Five pursued a further investigation into the underlying neoliberal rationality 
that the sports violence cases had suggested was at work in judicial assessments of the 
defence of consent.  It was also a chapter aimed at demonstrating how the alternative 
narratives of consent unearthed in the previous chapters’ historical investigations reveal 
a much wider universe of consent than what is represented by the consent-as-autonomy 
story.  Moreover, Chapter Five maintained that these alternate understandings of 
consent as a marker of cultural belonging or a form of submission continue to operate 
today, albeit under the rubric of ‘autonomy.’  This can be seen as part of a neoliberal 
rationality that has served to define all aspects of contemporary social and political life 
within an economic calculus.  On this basis, consent is available to those who conform 
to this dominant subjectivity, those who submit to the terms of intelligible neoliberal 
personhood.  Chapter Five began with a brief description of these central components of 
neoliberal rationality, focusing on how these work to construct a normative way of 
being and acting in the world.  Sexual assault and informed consent case law from 
Canada and the United Kingdom was then surveyed to examine how arguments of 
social utility and risk management are deployed in contemporary considerations of 
consent in ways that demand conformity to this neoliberal subjectivity.  Further, the 
ahistorical status of capitalism was also examined as a way of explaining how these 
neoliberal definitions of the ‘self’ have been naturalized through the consent-as-
autonomy story.  The chapter concluded with a discussion of the role which this 
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autonomy narrative serves within capitalist ideology.  Therein it was argued that the 
promise of embodied self-governance that is made by the consent-as-autonomy story 
enables both the history of consent as a form of submission and its modern day 
remnants to remain hidden from view.  The contemporary subject enjoys a ‘freedom’ to 
consent, provided the acts and behaviours she chooses to engage in ultimately serve a 
neoliberal understanding of the ‘common good.’   
 
The historical investigations that this thesis provided of consent in other periods suggest 
that it is a legal and political concept that has performed a wide array of functions that 
differ from its current understandings as a form of autonomy.  Moreover, while it is 
common in contemporary scholarship to see consent positioned as a ‘twentieth century 
doctrine,’ this thesis has demonstrated that consent has a much longer history.  What is 
recent about consent is its story of autonomy and, as Chapter Five revealed, this is a 
narrative embedded in a particular history and politics.  This highlights a number of 
important observations about why the modern association between consent and 
autonomy is made so indivisible as to prevent its historicisation, rendering alternative 
understandings of consent unintelligible.  
 
The first of these observations lies in one of the key objectives of the neoliberal state.  
Akin to the laissez-faire doctrine of classic liberal theory, neoliberal rationality presents 
itself as ahistorical and inevitable. It is merely the result of leaving citizens to make 
their own decisions.  The consent-as-autonomy story enables a particularly disciplined 
form of corporeal commodification, as seen in Canadian and British case law that 
addresses bodily harm in criminal and medical contexts.  This use of the body is 
understood through a lens of ‘choice,’ thus removing any contemplation of the state’s 
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interest or directive power in this economic constitution of subjectivity and its bodily 
deployment.  The effect is to position neoliberal rationality as the ‘natural’ outcome of 
leaving citizens to self-govern, moving the conditions of possibility for a neoliberal 
order beyond the frame of inquiry and contestation. 
 
Secondly, this corporeal commodification is ‘naturalized’ through this understanding of 
consent-as-autonomy.  The result is the transfer of responsibility for the risks and harms 
that result from this economic calculus and its ‘use’ of human capital from the state to 
the private citizen.  This serves to mask the inequalities and various circumstances that 
act to limit or direct individual choice in ways that marginalise certain subjectivities 
while privileging others.  Wendy Brown describes this as moving the notion of self-
responsibility to new heights, where ‘the rationally calculating individual bears full 
responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no matter how severe the 
constraints on this action – for example, lack of skills, education, and child care in a 
period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits.’816  The consent-as-
autonomy story thus acts to enforce what Wacquant has described as a ‘laissez faire et 
laissez passer’ model for bodily harm and self-commodification which, while seemingly 
non-invasive for the ‘dominant class’ and its idealized subjectivities, ‘turns out to be 
paternalist and intrusive for the subaltern.’817  This is a key component to the common 
‘unfortunate but not unfair’ legal argument used to recognize inequality in opportunity 
or circumstance while denying state responsibility for these conditions of ‘poor 
fortune.’818  Where one can be said to have ‘chosen’ an act (via consent), the 
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consequences – however unfair or reproachable – are the individual’s to bear.  The 
social conditions which might have influenced this choice are not relevant factors in this 
equation.  
 
Take, for instance, the arguments put forward by the Canadian government in the recent 
Supreme Court of Canada case assessing the constitutionality of the Criminal Code’s 
prostitution provisions.
819
  In a judgment declaring the provisions to be invalid, the 
Supreme Court summarized one of the government’s central claims as follows: 
The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario argue that prostitutes choose to 
engage in an inherently risky activity. They can avoid both the risk inherent in 
prostitution and any increased risk that the laws impose simply by choosing not 
to engage in this activity. They say that choice — and not the law — is the real 
cause of their injury.
820
  
 
Although the Supreme Court dismisses these arguments, they are a poignant example of 
how the discourse of ‘choice’ can elide the socio-political and personal conditions that 
might constrain or unduly influence a decision to engage in sex work.
821
   The 
‘consensual’ participation of professional athletes in violence that is configured as ‘part 
of the game’ is another case in point, particularly given the circumstances which 
influence these players’ participation (e.g. low levels of education or skill and lack of 
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alternative and lucrative employment opportunities) and the cultural norms which 
construct this aggression and its risks as ‘reasonable.’822 
 
Thirdly, the indivisible association of consent with autonomy allows it to benefit from 
the myth of liberalism’s non-interference principle.  Chapters Four and Five 
demonstrated the ways in which consent operates in the contemporary context as a 
means of regulating the methods of and limits to corporeal commodification. It is 
positioned as a liberty or ‘right’ that is restricted to those who conform to dominant 
norms of idealized subjectivity.  Provided one can align oneself with the model of the 
‘good patient,’ the ‘good player,’ or the ‘good girl,’ the deployment of consent will be 
permitted.  In this way, consent can be understood as a ‘license’ to certain uses of the 
body.
823
  Licensing has been recognized by some scholars to be a means through which 
self-governing bodies are created, ‘allow[ing] governments to ensure that certain spaces, 
activities and people are under constant surveillance and are subject to immediate 
disciplinary measures’ without the appearance of state interference.824  When consent 
operates as a license, it effectively renders the disciplinary measures of neoliberal 
rationality invisible, leaving ‘liberal sensibilities’ unoffended.  This is the work of the 
autonomy narrative, its mythic promise of non-interference stated rather succinctly in 
the following excerpt from Don Herzog: 
The liberal state doesn’t tell us how to lead our lives. It doesn’t insist that we be 
devoted to any one religion; indeed it is indifferent to whether we’re religious at 
all. It doesn’t instruct us on the merits of competing life plans, on whether it’s 
better to pursue fame, money, or a nondescript happiness. Provided we don’t 
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harm others, the liberal state allows us to pursue our proudest aspirations – or to 
bask mindlessly in cathode rays emanating from our television sets. It is silent 
on a host of issues.
825
 
 
The state does, however, appear to have quite a lot to say about how citizens should lead 
their lives, establishing normative ways of both being and acting in the world.  Yet these 
prescriptions are neither visible nor subject to interrogation through the consent-as-
autonomy story.  Where one’s consent to engage in a behaviour or to align with a 
normative subjectivity is defined as an act of autonomy, there is little room to examine 
the state’s role (or its interests) in defining and policing these conformist ideals.  
Consent would thus seem to operate as a component of the ‘ideology of freedom’ Marx 
wrote about.  The social experiences and interactions that take place within a capitalist 
society can be made sense of in a manner that does not implicate the underlying 
political rationality that enables these social relations to develop in the first instance.
826
  
Yet while it is tempting to view this ideology as merely an ‘illusion,’ the consent-as-
autonomy story has proven to be more productive than this ‘magical’ descriptor might 
indicate, mandating conformity to subjectivities that privilege the neoliberal order under 
the rubric of ‘freedom.’ 
 
Some legal scholars have already called for a displacement of consent in statutory 
treatments of sexual assault, where it is argued that an emphasis on the presence of 
coercion
827
 or desire
828
 might operate in more equitable ways.  Bioethicists maintain 
that a redefinition of ‘informed consent’ as an on-going process, rather than a moment 
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of decision or choice, is needed.
829
  And many legal commentators have begun to 
suggest that sports violence is more aptly addressed in civil actions than through the 
defence of consent in criminal law. Yet what many of these reform strategies have in 
common is an uninterrogated commitment to the consent-as-autonomy story.   
 
In this respect, this thesis has dug in familiar ground.  The notion of freedom as not just 
an ideal but also an ideology has been amply explored within critical legal scholarship 
for decades.  While understanding one’s role in a social or political order in terms of 
submission was prevalent in pre-modern times, modernity is characterized by a 
ubiquitous belief in freedom.  ‘Never have so many people,’ Alan Wolfe has written ‘… 
believed [they] should play a role in defining their own morality as they contemplate 
their proper relationship to God, to one another, and to themselves.’830 Certainly, the 
historical investigations in Chapters Two and Three demonstrate how consent was 
conceptualised within a rubric of unequal power relations and compulsory 
subjectivities. The contemporary contexts explored in Chapters Four and Five 
demonstrate how consent continues to operate within a rubric of submission, albeit to a 
neoliberal order rather than a divine one.  The central difference between these pre-
modern and modern conceptions of consent is in the latter’s commitment to freedom, to 
understanding everything – even submission – as an act of autonomy.   
 
The way forward, then, may not be in redefinition or reinvention projects, but rather in 
what Alan Norrie has suggested is a call for the law to be more honest, even if that 
means having to be a bit ‘meaner.’831  I would argue the ‘problem’ with consent law is 
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not in how it is defined, communicated, or limited, but rather its indivisible, 
unquestionable association with autonomy, itself a relic of a particular historical 
moment where the commodification of the body and the individualisation of 
responsibility was embedded into the ‘common sense.’  The modern condition as one 
entrenched in an ideology of freedom has rendered the conditions of possibility for the 
consent-as-autonomy story invisible and, along with those, any contemplation of the 
material context in which that ideology is enabled.  Moving beyond the illusion of 
consent-as-autonomy may simply entail acknowledging the histories of consent that 
differ from this freedom fable, thus opening a space for contemplation between the ideal 
that consent has come to represent and the reality in which this concept is put to work 
today. 
 
 
           
          
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
acknowledgement of these political and moral components of the defense’s legal treatment might be 
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